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Abstract 
Previous literature documents that a disproportionate number of firms focus on 
reporting meeting or beating earnings benchmarks because of various capital market 
incentives. These incentives including higher price-earnings multiples, higher 
abnormal returns, and lower cost of debt are economically influential for both single-
period and multiple-period meeting or beating. However, it still leaves unclear from 
prior studies what drives this phenomenon and whether meeting or beating 
benchmarks reflects true performance.  
This study therefore attempts to empirically answer those two questions using the 
context of firms who report consecutive earnings increases and decreases (earnings 
strings). I start from investigating economic implications of positive earnings strings 
in equity markets. I next examine whether strings of earnings increases are 
economically real. In addition, in the final investigation I explore the broader context 
of meeting or beating prior year’s earnings in debt markets. 
Collectively, the findings suggest that first valuation implications of earnings strings 
are mainly driven by information with respect to combinations of firm fundamentals, 
future growth, and future risk. Second, earnings strings are determined by strong 
business fundamentals, not a result of reporting choices. Third, observed rating 
premiums are dependent on past firm performance and firms with current earnings 
increases experience successive rating downgrades if they previously report 
repeatedly poor performance.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
This study is motivated by the observed valuation premiums given to firms that meet 
or beat earnings thresholds. The extensive literature on meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks documents that firms tend to report profits, earnings increases, and 
positive earnings surprises relative to analysts’ earnings forecasts. Evidence 
reported by Barth et al. (1999), Lopez and Rees (2002), Bartov et al. (2002), Kasznik 
and McNichols (2002), Brown and Caylor (2005), Myers et al. (2007), Jiang (2008), 
Koonce and Lipe (2010), and Shanthikumar (2012) indicates that firms who achieve 
earnings targets economically enjoy higher price-earnings multiples, higher abnormal 
returns, and lower cost of debt. Although this strand of literature provides evidence 
that valuation premiums are primarily determined by investors’ perceptions of higher 
expected growth and lower future underlying risk, it still leaves several important 
issues open to investigation. Therefore, the motivation of this thesis is mainly to 
investigate why valuation premiums exist in the presence of consecutively meeting 
or beating prior period’s earnings (earnings strings).  
1.2 Research Questions and Main Findings 
Previous studies on the economic implications of earnings strings on price suggest 
that there are valuation rewards to firms reporting consistency in earnings increases. 
To date, it is still unclear why it is the case. I examine whether the rational 
explanations are valid for this phenomenon in Chapter 2. 
My starting point for investigating the determinants of price premiums is the Barth et 
al. (1999) model. As their model does not include non-interaction variables of an 
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earnings string and control variables, my first question is: Do earnings strings affect 
price irrespective of earnings levels? I then investigate the risk-based explanation for 
valuation premiums assigned to firms reporting earnings strings. This investigation is 
based on the findings from both Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) and Penman and 
Yehuda (2015). Their findings suggest that realization of earnings growth resolves 
the level of uncertainty which, in turn, leads to a decrease in the expected return. If 
earnings strings are associated with a similar uncertainty resolution, I would expect 
higher prices to be associated with strings. My second question therefore is: Are 
valuation premiums associated with risk in future earnings? Next, I examine the 
relation between earnings strings and firm fundamentals as it is suggested by Lev 
and Thiagarajan (1993) who find an association between firm fundamentals, 
earnings persistence, and future earnings. Specifically, they argue that firm 
fundamentals, measured by F-Score, are positively associated with earnings 
persistence and subsequent earnings growth. This implies that firms who are 
fundamentally stronger are likely to report higher earnings persistence, and hence 
higher future earnings growth. Their evidence therefore supports the view that 
earnings strings or consecutive earnings growth are a manifestation of strong 
business fundamentals of firms. Thus, my third question is: Are earnings strings 
associated with firm fundamentals? Finally, firms who report longer earnings strings 
are less likely to continue their growth because profitability is a mean-reverting 
process (Fama and French, 2000). This leads to an examination of the information 
role of long earnings strings. My last question hence is: Do longer earnings strings 
provide the same level of information content about future growth and future risk? 
In Chapter 2 I do not find, in contrast with prior literature, that earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs) vary with earnings strings. I nevertheless find that average share 
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price is higher for firms exhibiting longer strings than shorter strings. In addition, I 
find that the relation between earnings and price is moderated by predicted earnings 
volatility as a proxy for future risk. This risk measure is also incremental to past 
earnings variability commonly used in previous literature. With regard to the relations 
between earnings strings and firm fundamentals, I find that stronger firm 
fundamentals are positively associated with longer earnings strings. Longer strings, 
in turn, are associated with both higher future growth and higher future risk relative to 
shorter strings. Because longer strings are associated with higher share prices, I 
conclude that this association is dominated by market expectation of future growth. 
There are conflicting views as to whether earnings strings are either a manifestation 
of a successful business model or a product of reflecting managerial discretion. 
Previous studies have not exploited the time dimension in strings to disentangle this 
confusion. Chapter 3 empirically attempts to resolve this puzzle. 
Initially, I investigate whether earnings strings represent poor reporting quality 
proxied by high abnormal accruals. I hence ask the question: Are firms who report 
earnings strings associated with higher levels of accruals? It then goes on to explore 
the information content of earnings strings and traditional measures of accounting 
quality. I ask the following question: Are earnings string informative with respect to 
future firm performance over and above measures of accounting quality? The final 
question is related to market perceptions of earnings strings and proxies for reporting 
quality. My last question is: How do investors incorporate and react to the 
information content of earnings strings and measures of accounting quality? 
In Chapter 3, I find that abnormal accruals are higher for firms reporting at least one 
year of earnings increases. However, further analysis reveals that earnings strings 
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are positively associated with measures of future growth and lower future risk after 
controlling for accounting quality. The returns analysis documents evidence 
consistent with initial under-pricing of strings that are associated with poor 
accounting quality. The returns analysis also documents that abnormal accruals 
attract higher contemporaneous returns, but that this is reversed in subsequent 
period. Collectively, this paper yields evidence that is consistent with strings that are 
indicative of good performance rather than being the result of earnings management. 
The literature on meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is well developed in equity 
markets but is limited in debt markets. I explore the broader context of earnings 
strings in debt markets in Chapter 4. 
As Jiang (2008) documents that credit rating premiums are assigned to firms 
reporting current earnings increases relative to prior year’s earnings, I examine 
whether such rating premiums are dependent on past firm performance. Therefore, I 
ask the following question: To what extent are incremental rating upgrades related to 
consistency in past performance (good or poor earnings strings) in assessing firms 
that increase their earnings in a current period? Given the information content of 
meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, it is likely that observed rating premiums 
are merely a proxy for future firm performance. Hence, I ask the question as follows: 
are rating premiums associated with measures of future growth and risk? The final 
examination concerns rating agencies’ perceptions of current earnings increases and 
prior earnings strings associated with high abnormal accruals. This leads to the 
following question: how do rating agencies perceive current earnings increases and 
past earnings strings in the presence of high accruals? 
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The findings in Chapter 4 reveal that credit rating upgrades are assigned to firms that 
report current EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) 
increases relative to prior year’s EBITDA. I additionally find that firms who increase 
their current EBITDA suffer from successive rating downgrades if they previously 
report negative EBITDA strings, but those who previously report positive EBITDA 
strings do not benefit from rating upgrades. These results are not sensitive to 
controlling for ex post future growth and risk. However, I do not find any association 
between rating changes and high abnormal accruals. Collectively, the evidence is 
consistent with the view that credit rating agencies understand the information 
content of EBITDA strings albeit being conservative with upgrades in response to 
strings of EBITDA increases. 
1.3 Contributions 
Collectively, this study contributes to literature on meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks in a number of ways. First, I document that investors reward firms who 
report earnings strings with price premiums irrespective of earnings levels. It 
suggests that the information content of earnings is not different regardless of the 
presence of strings, but on average firms with earnings strings attract higher 
valuations. 
Second, I provide evidence that risk in future earnings is partially capable of 
explaining valuation premiums to earnings strings. This implies that expected high 
future earnings is an incomplete explanation for the valuation implications of 
earnings strings. 
Third, it is clear that stronger firm fundamentals drive longer earnings strings. This 
evidence shows that stronger economic performance determines higher future 
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earnings growth through the channel of earnings persistence. It highlights the 
valuation role of firm fundamentals. 
Fourth, I offer evidence that the information content of earnings strings with respect 
to future growth and risk varies with the length of strings. This is new evidence of 
intertemporal predictability of earnings strings for future growth and future risk. 
Fifth, there is evidence suggesting that earnings strings are predicting growth and 
risk in subsequent periods in the presence of high levels of abnormal accruals. It 
tends to support the view that high accruals for string firms are value-relevant pieces 
of information. 
Sixth, I provide new evidence on market reactions to combinations of earnings 
strings and abnormal accruals. That is, I find that investors initially discount high 
accrual string firms and then correct their valuations in the next period. This is 
consistent with a mis-pricing argument. 
Seventh, I document that observed credit rating premiums to meeting or beating 
prior year’s earnings are dependent on past firm performance. I also find evidence 
that credit rating agencies have long memory for repeatedly poor performance. 
Eighth, I provide evidence that documented rating rewards continue to hold when 
controlling for future firm performance. This suggests that current earnings increases 
convey information incremental to future growth and risk that is privately accessed 
by rating agencies. 
Lastly, I offer evidence that rating upgrades or downgrades are not associated with 
high abnormal accruals. This supports neither the earnings management argument 
nor the information content argument. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 provides the 
research papers that include their own introduction, literature review, research 
questions, research design, sample, empirical results, and conclusion. Chapter 5 
offers a summary, concluding remarks, and future work. 
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Chapter 2: Future Earnings, Firm Fundamentals, and Earnings Strings 
2.1 Introduction 
The effects of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (henceforth MBEB) on prices 
or returns are known to be important in capital markets. A large number of papers 
have investigated empirical implications of three earnings thresholds; zero earnings, 
prior periods’ earnings, and earnings forecasts (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; Bartov et al., 
2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; and Brown et al., 2009). The evidence indicates 
that there are valuation premiums for firms surpassing these benchmarks.1 For 
example, Barth et al. (1999) document that price-earnings multiples are higher for 
firms reporting earnings increases for at least five consecutive years. Several studies 
suggest that these market rewards are mainly due to better growth opportunities or 
lower expected returns. Recent research on the economic implications of 
consistently meeting earnings targets, however, leaves the open question as to 
whether earnings strings are associated with future earnings uncertainty and firm 
fundamentals which in turn drive up valuations. In this study I penetrate the “Black 
Box” behind earnings strings and provide several explanations based on underlying 
firm performance.2 Specifically, I examine if strings serve as a signal of lower future 
risk and/or capture underlying fundamentals. I also examine if the information 
content of strings varies with their lengths.3  
The original Barth et al. (1999) model is not sufficiently complete because it does not 
incorporate the non-interaction effects of an earnings string and control variables on 
                                                          
1 Valuation premiums are defined various across papers. They include higher prices, higher price-earnings 
multiples, higher returns, and lower cost of debt. 
2 Earnings string, earnings series, earnings pattern, and earnings streak are interchangeably used throughout the 
paper. By these words I mean a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings defined in section 4.1.  
3 An earnings string refers to a firm with a string of earnings increases. It is defined as a firm that reports at least 
one quarter of increases in seasonally adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). An EPS 
increase is defined with respect to EPS from the same quarter of the prior year.   
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prices. I modify their model by incorporating level variables of an earnings string and 
other controls in order to help alleviate a problem of an omitted but correlated 
variable. This predicts that earnings strings are positively associated with prices 
unconditional on earnings. Hence, I ask: Are earnings strings associated with prices 
irrespective of levels of earnings? 
Findings from both Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) and Penman and Yehuda (2015) 
imply that the realized growth in earnings resolves the level of uncertainty which, in 
turn, leads to a reduction in the required rate of return. Consequently, I expect that 
strings are associated with lower future risk. I therefore ask: Are the valuation 
premiums to earnings strings indicative of lower future uncertainty? 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) find a link between firm fundamentals, earnings 
persistence, and future earnings. It implies that a firm that reports consecutively 
higher earnings is due contemporaneously to higher earnings persistence and 
stronger past firm fundamentals. Accordingly, it is likely that valuation premiums 
given to long string firms are from strong firm fundamentals. Thus, I ask: Are longer 
earnings strings associated to stronger past fundamentals?  
However, because firms cannot grow forever, longer strings may be more closely 
associated with future risk than future growth. I therefore explore if there is a change 
in predictive power of growth vs. risk as the length of earnings strings increases. 
Therefore I ask: Do longer earnings strings provide the same level of information 
content about future growth and future risk? 
I conduct three sets of analyses based on a sample period is 1989 - 2014. In the first 
set of analyses, I examine whether strings moderate the relation between earnings 
and prices; that is, I investigate if earnings coefficient responses (ERCs) vary with 
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the length of a string and predicted future earnings variability. Given that past 
research has only used a measure of risk based on past earnings variability, past 
earnings risk may not fully encompass future earnings information which directly 
affects prices. I argue that predicted variability of future earnings is more appropriate 
as a proxy for future earnings risk than past earnings variability.  
In the second set of analyses, I explore whether stronger firm fundamentals are 
related to longer earnings strings that may be, in turn, rewarded with higher prices. 
Therefore, I include a standardized aggregate fundamental score based on Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993) in my analysis to capture the firm fundamentals. Given that firms 
cannot carry positive earnings growth to infinity, longer strings may reflect firm 
fundamentals rather than signal future growth.  
Complementing the previous two analyses, in the third set of analyses I examine the 
extent to which future growth is related to the duration of an earnings string. The 
rationale is that longer the earnings strings, the more difficult it is for firms to report 
further earnings increases. I also examine whether future earnings uncertainty is 
associated with lengths of the earnings strings. Specifically, longer earnings strings 
may indicate lower levels of risk for these firms relative to firms with shorter strings. I 
expect that an earnings string will be both informative with regard to growth and risk 
for short string, but as a string prolongs the predictive ability of a string shifts from 
growth to risk.  
My main findings are as follows. First, Table 2.5 finds that the incremental ERCs for 
strings firms observed by Barth et al. (1999) no longer hold when controlling for the 
individual effects of earnings strings and control variables. It also suggests that 
earnings strings are positively associated with stock prices irrespective of earnings. 
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These two findings conclude that the results of Barth et al. (1999) are not robust to 
econometric treatments. Although uncertainty of future earnings is value relevant, 
earnings strings still continue to provide explanatory power. This suggests that the 
premium to strings is not merely a result of reflecting lower future uncertainty. 
Second, Table 2.6 suggests that firm fundamentals are positively associated with 
earnings strings, suggesting that stronger business models drive longer earnings 
strings. Third, Table 2.7 indicates that the relation between future growth and prior 
earnings strings is stronger for firms with longer strings. This implies that firms 
reporting long earnings strings still expect higher future growth. This is contrary to a 
mean-reverting process of profitability, it highlights a growth-based explanation for 
long series of earnings growth. In contrast, Table 2.8 finds that longer strings are 
associated with weaker reduction in future earnings risk. It suggests that a long 
string contains information that is less relevant to assessing future earnings 
uncertainty. Taken together, it is likely that the results based on Table 2.5 are 
supported by the argument that the growth effect dominates the risk effect, and 
hence the positive implications for earnings strings. 
This study contributes to MBEB literature in a number of ways. First, I fail to find 
evidence of incremental price-earnings multiples to string firms documented by Barth 
et al. (1999), once I adapt their original model to include a standalone string variable 
and a number of additional controls. Nevertheless, I do find that the average price of 
firms with longer strings is higher than firms with shorter strings. Therefore, the 
information content of earnings seems similar regardless of the presence of strings, 
but string firms attract higher valuations, on average. 
Second, my finding that predicted future earnings variability is associated with lower 
prices (directly as well as indirectly through a moderation of the pricing implication of 
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earnings), suggests that anticipated larger future earnings is an incomplete 
explanation for the valuation consequences of earnings strings. Bartov et al. (2002) 
and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) conjecture that strings may capture a risk 
dimension, but do not explore this avenue. I provide evidence on the valuation role of 
strings after controlling for past and future risk measures. I further show that 
earnings is not a valuation channel affected by strings although it is affected by 
future risk. This is also important because future earnings risk is unlikely to be fully 
captured by past earnings variability which is the measure most commonly used in 
the literature. 
Third, this paper sheds significant light on evidence that earnings strings are driven 
by stronger fundamentals. More specifically, stronger fundamentals drive longer 
strings implying more persistent earnings growth. This complements Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993) who find that a high fundamental score is positively related to 
larger earning changes but that this is limited to one- and two-year ahead earnings 
changes. 
Finally, this analysis provides an important insight into how information content of 
earnings strings varies with their length. Specifically, shorter earnings patterns signal 
lower future risk, while longer strings inform higher future growth. This new evidence 
of intertemporal predictability of earnings strings for future growth and future risk 
adds to studies on MBEB. Kasznik and McNichols (2002) and Brown et al. (2009) 
conclude that MBEB is a reflection of future growth and risk but they do not examine 
how information about growth and risk varies across string lengths. I extend their 
studies by documenting evidence that the growth factor seems dominate the risk 
factor in pricing decisions when strings develop. It also contributes to recent 
literature on accounting information and risk, for example Penman and Yehuda 
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(2015), by showing that consecutive earnings growth signals lower underlying risk. 
Collectively, this paper sheds light on information roles in different stages of earnings 
strings. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses related previous 
research. Section 2.3 describes the development of hypotheses. Section 2.4 
provides research design and methods. Section 2.5 provides sample selection. 
Section 2.6 and section 2.7 report empirical results. Section 2.8 offers a summary 
and concluding remarks. 
2.2 Prior Research 
2.2.1 Overview 
Studies on MBEB largely document that firms prefer reporting small profits to 
reporting losses, showing earnings increases over previous periods’ earnings, and 
announcing positive earnings surprises relative to analysts’ earnings expectations.4 
In particular, there are a disproportional number of firms that meet or beat three 
earnings benchmarks: zero earnings, previous period’s earnings, and analyst 
consensus earnings forecasts.  Barth et al. (1999), Lopez and Rees (2002), Bartov 
et al. (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Brown and Caylor (2005), Myers et al. 
(2007), Jiang (2008), Koonce and Lipe (2010), Shanthikumar (2012), and An et al. 
(2014) provide compelling evidence that there are significant economic-related 
benefits to MBEB. Collectively, this evidence suggests that markets assign higher 
price-earnings multiples, react with positive abnormal returns, or require lower cost 
of debt to firms surpassing earnings targets. On the other hand, there are adverse 
consequences to failing to MBEB. DeAngelo et al. (1996) find that firms with 
                                                          
4 Jiang (2008) has classified three types of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks: positive earnings (i.e., 
profits), positive earnings changes, and positive earnings surprises. 
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consistent earnings growth experience stock price declines when such growth 
terminates. Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Kinney et al. (2002) suggest that firms 
slightly missing analyst earnings expectations experience disproportionate 
decreases in stock prices.  
Earnings are shaped by management’s motives. Graham et al. (2005) provide 
survey evidence on management’s opinions with respect to reporting earnings and 
find that over 80% of financial executives or chief finance officers (CFOs) who 
responded to their survey believe that MBEB helps maintain (or increase) share 
prices and enhances their firm’s creditability in capital markets. Dichev et al. (2013, 
2016) indicate that approximately 95% of CFOs believe that earnings are used by 
investors for valuation purposes and that more than 90% of CFOs agree to engage 
in management of earnings to achieve earnings benchmarks due to both internal and 
external pressure.5  
The economic explanations as to why markets reward MBEB are, however, not 
sufficiently clear.6 The literature discussed below advances two main explanations 
for these rewards: increasing earnings patterns capture dimensions of growth and/or 
lower risk.7 However, this literature has not fully investigated or ruled out the 
                                                          
5 Extensive studies have established a discontinuity in reported earnings distribution around three earnings 
benchmarks: zero earnings, previous period’s earnings, and analyst consensus earnings forecasts. This 
phenomenon can also be interpreted as prima facie evidence of earnings management. In other words, if there is 
no economic incentive for meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, reported earnings distribution is assumed to 
be even and smooth around presumed benchmarks (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
1999; and Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). However, Beaver et al. (2007) argue that the discontinuity in earnings 
distribution is due to special items and income tax, not management discretion.  Durtschi and Easton (2005) 
posit that the discontinuity is caused by the deflator, the sample selection criteria, the different characteristics 
among observations, and the combination of these causes.   
6 In addition to equity market benefits, there are compensation-related benefits to MBEB. Ke (2001) argues that 
CEO’s bonus incentives and equity-based incentives encourage management to show a small amount of 
earnings increases and a series of consistently earnings increases. Ke (2004) documents the association between 
executive’s equity-based compensation and earnings management proxied by earnings series. His results suggest 
that managers have strong financial incentives to manage earnings upward.  
7 One possible explanation is that the premium is a result of mispricing. Shanthikumar (2012) argues that small 
and medium investors’ trading behaviour based on earnings momentum strategy can account for premiums to a 
pattern of increasing earnings. 
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possibility that a consistent pattern of earnings increases is associated with other 
underlying firm characteristics, for example, fundamentals such as inventory or 
accounts receivable, or the specific combination of growth, risk, and firm 
fundamentals.  
2.2.2 Growth-Based Explanation to Market Rewards to MBEB 
Several studies empirically examine a growth-signalling explanation for market 
premiums. Bartov et al. (2002) document that firms reporting zero or positive 
earnings surprises enjoy higher incremental quarterly abnormal returns. They argue 
that MBEB conveys positive information about future earnings.8 Consistent with 
Bartov et al. (2002), but using a different research design, Kasznik and McNichols 
(2002) investigate whether the premiums to firms having no or positive earnings 
surprises are attributed to either future earnings or distinct market premiums. They 
find that MBEB firms report a series of future earnings that is significantly higher than 
firms not meeting earnings expectations. They conclude that investors rationally 
anticipate higher earnings outcomes over subsequent periods for MBEB firms once 
they observe meeting or beating forecasted earnings. This conclusion is supported 
by experimental findings that consistent earnings patterns convey information about 
both better future performance and higher management’s creditability (Koonce and 
Lipe, 2010). Although these studies attribute market rewards to MBEB firms for 
better future performance (a numerator effect in valuation models), market premiums 
may also be due to the underlying risk. 
                                                          
8 Bartov et al. (2002) also assess the consequences of expectation management and earnings management. Their 
findings suggest that earnings surprises resulting from expectation management or earnings management are 
still associated with premium, albeit lower ones. This may be due to failure by market participants to detect 
earnings management, or alternatively, that earnings management is not perceived to be responsible for the 
earnings surprises. 
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2.2.3 Risk-Based Explanation to Market Rewards to MBEB 
A second possible explanation for market rewards for different earnings patterns is 
related to perception of underlying risk. Perceptions of lower risk would be 
associated with a lower discount factor applied to future cash flows (a denominator 
effect), leading to higher prices. Consistent with this argument, Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) find evidence that pricing effects of consistently meeting 
benchmarks cannot be fully explained by future earnings. They suggest that such 
rewards possibly are attributed to investors’ perceptions that these firms are less 
risky and, in turn, have a lower expected rate of return.  
Brown et al. (2009) advance an information risk explanation to premiums to meeting 
or beating earnings forecasts. Specifically, they examine the effects of meeting or 
beating earnings expectations on information asymmetry. Their results suggest that 
information asymmetry is reduced after beating earnings expectations because 
MBEB attracts investors’ attention and increase a firm’s investment visibility. Xie’s 
(2011) findings suggest that terminating a string of earning increases is associated 
with higher expected rate of returns – implying higher risk – and downwardly revised 
expectations of future cash flows. These results imply that market rewards attached 
to meeting or beating benchmarks may be attributable to lower uncertainty of future 
payoffs which, in turn, induce investors to lower their required rate of return.  
2.2.4 The Interrelation of Growth and Risk  
Although growth and risk seem as two distinct attributers, recent research suggests 
they are inter-related. Penman and Yehuda (2015) argue that, in addition to cash-
flow news, accounting measures convey discount rate news. They posit that deferral 
of earnings continues until uncertainty is resolved implying higher risk. In contrast, 
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earnings realization implies a decrease in expected rate of return due to resolution of 
uncertainty.9 Their findings suggest that positive earnings changes imply lower risk 
as uncertainty is resolved. While Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) propose a model in 
which expected earnings are modified for risk and no further adjustment to the 
discount rate should be used beyond risk-adjusted expected earnings. Their model 
specifies that risk residing in earnings affects firm value. Combining these two 
papers suggests that realization of increases in earnings may be related not only to 
future growth but also to lower risk. It can be, therefore, thought that earnings growth 
resolves fundamental risk which, in turn, reduces expected rate of return. In other 
words, lower fundamentals-based risk reflected in growing earnings is potentially one 
of economic determinants of higher price accruing to firms generating consistent 
earnings growth. 
2.2.5 Other Explanations to Market Rewards to MBEB 
Although many studies document that premiums associated with patterns of 
increasing earnings are driven by growth opportunities and lower underlying risk, it is 
commonly known that firm fundamentals determine both earnings and hence firm 
value.10 It seems logical that a firm with stronger fundamentals is more likely to 
report earnings strings. This may explain the association between earnings strings 
and prices.11 Several studies described below provide results supporting the link 
between fundamentals, earnings persistence, and future growth.  
                                                          
9 Deferring earnings recognition to the future reflects higher future earnings growth. However, future growth is 
at risk until it materializes. On the condition that markets discount expected earnings growth as they view it as 
risk, expected earnings growth is associated with expected returns. Consequently, once earnings are realized, 
this means that uncertainty is resolved and, in turn, implies lower risk or lower discount rate. 
10 If fundamentals associated with an earnings generating process are a result of operating, investing, financing 
activities of a firm, they should also be related to firm value. 
11 Dechow et al. (2010) point out that earnings persistence, a proxy for earnings quality, depends on firm 
fundamentals and accounting system.  
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Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) report evidence consistent with firm fundamentals being 
positively associated with both earnings persistence and future earnings growth. 
Their results suggest that investors infer earnings persistence from fundamental 
information. Fundamentally-stronger firms tend to have larger earnings response 
coefficients reflecting higher persistence of earnings. Furthermore, they find some 
evidence that firms with higher fundamentals are likely to report higher future 
earnings. Their conclusion is that fundamentals underpin both earnings persistence 
and earnings growth. Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) articulate a direct link between 
fundamental information and future earnings growth. Their findings indicate that 
several fundamental variables are useful to investors and analysts for forecasting 
short-term and long-term earnings, incremental to earnings surprises. Abarbanell 
and Bushee (1998) further report that abnormal returns on portfolios formed on 
fundamental analysis are substantially attributed to one-year-ahead earnings. 
Fundamentals may drive earnings persistence which, in turn, may lead to earnings 
strings. Chen (2013) finds that time-varying earnings persistence model based on 
fundamentals can explain post-earnings announcement drift. Her results suggest a 
relation between fundamentals-based earnings persistence and investors’ reaction. 
Yao (2015) builds on Chen (2013)’s model to posit that underlying economic 
performance drives earnings persistence. His findings are consistent with the fact 
that firms with more persistent earnings are fundamentally stronger. Yao (2015) also 
documents that certain fundamentals – namely the percentage change in sales, 
unproportioned increased inventory to sales, unproportioned increased receivables 
to sales, unproportioned increased SG&A to sales, and unproportioned decreased 
gross margin to sales – predict breaks in earnings strings. He concludes that 
investors rationally use fundamental information to assess earnings persistence. 
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Tomy (2012) further documents that fundamental performance varying with business 
cycle influences persistence of earnings. Levels of earnings persistence are 
dependent on fundamentals determined by the state of macroeconomic conditions.  
Despite there is overwhelming evidence that earnings patterns are rewarded by the 
market, there are still a number of questions to answer. First, are there any non-
interaction effects of earnings strings and control variables on prices? As the original 
Barth et al. (1999) model only investigates pricing implications of earnings strings 
and other controls conditional on earnings, it is possible that earnings strings and 
controls may affect price irrespective of earnings levels. Therefore, I modify the 
original Barth et al. (1999) model by adding level variables of an earnings string and 
control variables into the model and examine whether the main effects of strings and 
control variables are incrementally significant. 
Second, are market rewards to increasing earnings patterns related to predicted 
variability in future earnings as suggested in prior literature but as yet unproven? To 
the extent that investors employ past earnings patterns to predict future performance 
reflected in prices, they also predict future risk.12 More specifically, I investigate if 
variability in future earnings (my proxy for investors’ estimate of future risk) provides 
incremental explanatory power over variability in past earnings.  
Third, are longer earnings strings associated with past fundamentals? While prior 
research suggests that increasing earnings patterns are associated with earnings 
growth, a firm cannot grow forever. Hence, it is unlikely that market rewards to longer 
                                                          
12 The implicit assumption behind the expected relation between future earnings and stock price is that markets 
possess information about future earnings. Prior research on the price informativeness reveals that markets can 
access valuation relevant information about a firm’s future profitability and such information is incorporated 
into stock price (Kothari and Sloan, 1992; Collins et al., 1994; and Durnev at al., 2003). Specifically, markets 
incorporate anticipated earnings into stock prices and such information manifests itself in price-earnings 
relation. Since investors are able to forecast future earnings of a firm, it is likely that they can predict the shape 
of distribution of earnings. 
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patterns of increasing earnings are associated with better future growth 
opportunities. Instead, market rewards may be related to past strong fundamentals. I 
therefore examine if longer patterns are positively related to past fundamentals.  
Finally, are any documented association between future growth/future risk and the 
pattern of increasing earnings moderated by the length of the pattern, conditional on 
firm fundamentals? Because firms are unable to continue their growth eternally, 
longer patterns of earnings increases are less likely to predict future growth. Hence, 
longer patterns should be better predictors of lower future risk than shorter ones. I 
therefore assess whether longer strings provide the same level of information with 
respect to future growth and risk. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development  
The previous section suggests that it is still unclear whether market premiums for 
MBEB are related to growth opportunities, underlying risk, strong fundamentals, or a 
combination of these factors. My starting point for exploring the determinants of such 
price rewards to patterns of increasing earnings is Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model, 
which suggests that price is the sum of current book equity value plus discounted 
future abnormal earnings. A straightforward interpretation of Ohlson’s (1995) model 
is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in earnings or, a decrease in risk (i.e. discount 
rate), would lead to a higher stock price.  
The analysis of Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) and Penman and Yehuda (2015) 
appears to support Barth et al.’s (1999) measure of risk that is based on past 
earnings. However, evidence from McInnis (2010) suggests that past earnings 
volatility is not associated with cost of capital, which casts doubt on its construct as 
an appropriate proxy for risk. For instance, earning increases may, at the same time, 
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resolve past uncertainty, but also indicate new uncertainty (i.e. origination of new 
deferrals). In addition, Konstantinidi and Pope (2016) suggest that risk in future 
earnings, derived from forecasted earnings distribution, is incrementally relevant 
over commonly used risk proxies, e.g. past earnings variability. Donelson and 
Resutek (2015) argue that past earnings variability conveys two types of information 
that are earnings uncertainty and time-series earnings variation, but only earnings 
uncertainty information is associated with future returns. These findings imply that (i) 
future earnings uncertainty captures dimensions of risk not captured in past earnings 
volatility, and (ii) using past earnings variability as a proxy for earnings risk may be 
inappropriate. This is because the time-series variation in past earnings is unrelated 
to future returns. As a result, future variability in earnings may be a better measure of 
a firm’s underlying risk. At the same time, price is a forward-looking measure that 
depends on estimates of future growth. However, past earning may not fully 
encompass future earnings information. Past earnings risk, hence, is a crude 
measure of market expectation of a firm’s prospects.  
This all leads to the first hypothesis. Investors estimate the variability of future 
earnings to determine the firms’ risk. I hypothesize that valuation premiums are 
driven by lower risk in future earnings. Formally: 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for the variability of future earnings, the price-earnings 
multiples and prices of firms reporting an increasing earnings string are not different 
from the price-earnings multiples and prices of firms that do not report an increasing 
earnings string. 
The other relevant explanation for higher prices is that both underlying risk and 
growth opportunities are driven by fundamentals. Fundamental information analysis 
35 
 
identifies a better approach adopted by markets to forecast expected earnings 
which, in turn, determine prices (Nissim and Penman, 2001). Insofar as 
fundamentals play a vital role in firm valuation, it stands to reason that firms with 
stronger economic fundamentals will report better future performance.  Markets 
therefore assign higher prices to firms with a series of increasing earnings because 
these firms have been, and are expected to remain, fundamentally better.  
I therefore conjecture that firms with stronger past fundamentals are likely to exhibit 
strings of earnings increases. The second hypothesis is formally stated: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, a string of increasing earnings is positively related to 
firm fundamentals. 
Having a relative short string of earnings increases may be related in equal 
measures to growth and reduced future risk. Yet, firms cannot continue to grow in 
perpetuity. While string firms are expected to report growing earnings, this is true up 
to a point as earnings growth ultimately has to reverse. Since past earnings growth 
follows a mean reverting process, longer patterns of increases in earnings should be 
associated with weaker growth opportunities on average (Fama and French, 2000). 
The predictive balance of an earnings string therefore may shift in the direction of 
risk rather than growth as the string has prolonged. Consequently, any price reward 
to extended strings is likely a reflection of anticipated lower risk than better growth 
prospects (e.g. in the case of mature large firms). I conjecture that longer strings are 
signals of lower future growth but lower future risk relative to shorter strings. Such a 
trade-off regarding the growth and risk leads to two hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 3.1: Ceteris paribus, a longer string of earnings increases is more 
weakly associated with future earnings increases than a shorter string, controlling for 
firm fundamentals. 
Hypothesis 3.2: Ceteris paribus, a longer string of earnings increases is more 
strongly associated with future earnings variability than a shorter string, conditional 
on fundamentals. 
2.4 Research Design  
2.4.1 Assessing Market Rewards to Earnings Strings Controlling for Future 
Risk  
A firm with a string of earnings increases is defined as a firm that reports at least one 
quarter of increases in seasonally adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary 
items (EPS).13 An EPS increase is compared with earnings per share before 
extraordinary items (EPS) from the same quarter of the prior year.14 Using EPS and 
the four quarters lagged earnings benchmark is consistent with the findings of 
Graham et al. (2005). They find that 85.1% of CFOs agree or strongly agree that 
earnings number or EPS at same quarter last year is the most important earnings 
benchmark. The reasons why managers care for four quarters lagged earnings are 
that this benchmark is the first item to be compared with in press release, that this 
benchmark is relatively difficult to manage after the 10-Q has been submitted to 
SEC, and that this benchmark is what investors use to assess corporate 
performance.15 By construction, the definition of firms with a string in this study is 
                                                          
13 I adjust quarterly earnings per share by cumulative adjustment factor provided by Compustat database. 
14 I label a firm reporting a string of earnings increases as a string firm. 
15 A string of earnings increases relative to four quarters lagged numbers is basically intriguing because it 
reflects the most influential motivation of a firm. 
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more restricted than other papers using annual earnings (e.g. Barth et al., 1999).16 
For a one-year earning string, this study requires a firm to meet or beat prior period’s 
earnings for four quarters consecutively. In contrast other papers define a string 
based on increases in annual earnings even if some quarterly earnings within the 
year declined.    
2.4.1.1 Estimating Future Earnings Risk  
Kothari et al. (2002) and Amir et al. (2007) argue that research and development 
(R&D) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are important determinants of uncertainty in 
future earnings. It therefore stands to reason that R&D and CAPEX can be used to 
predict risk in future earnings. These papers also provide results suggesting that 
future earnings variability decreases (increases) in firm size (financial leverage). 
Therefore, I adapt the model used in Kothari et al. (2002) as follows.17  
  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1) 
Where FESD is standard deviation of changes in future earnings for twelve quarters, 
calculated as standard deviation of ex post future twelve quarters’ percent changes 
in quarterly earnings per share. RD is quarterly research and development expenses 
scaled by lagged market value of equity. CAPEX is quarterly capital expenditure 
scaled by lagged market value of equity.18 MKTVALUE is log of total market value of 
equity. LEV is the ratio of the sum of short term debt and long term debt to the sum 
of long term debt and market value of equity. NPM is net profit margin and ԑ is a 
                                                          
16 Consistent with prior research, I include non-decreasing earnings firms in the increasing earnings firm sample. 
17 Other risk measures of future earnings may be able to be derived from predicted earnings distribution 
(Konstantinidi and Pope, 2016) or obtained from dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Gebhardt et al., 2001; and 
Gode and Mohanram, 2003). Donelson and Resutek (2015) argue that the forecast dispersion is not a good 
proxy for uncertainty of future earnings. 
18 Scaling by lagged market value of equity is to control for heterogeneity across firms. One can view that 
scaling by lagged market value of equity is consistent with the denominator of market rate of return which is 
divided by a lagged market price. It can be thought of investment base of firm value at the beginning period.  
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residual term. The subscripts i and t denote firm and time, respectively.19 I adapt 
Kothari et al.’s (2002) model by adding net profit margin as another source of future 
earnings uncertainty. Higher profitability should lead to lower future earnings 
uncertainty as to the extent it is deserved from stronger competitive positions. The 
opposite is true for lower profitability firms. Therefore, net profit margin jointly 
captures both current profitability and future variability in earnings. 
To predict future earnings variability (PFEVAR), I conduct the following procedure. 
First, I estimate quarterly cross-sectional OLS regressions of FESD on RD, CAPEX, 
MKTVALUE, LEV, and NPM. The sample period for this estimation is from 1989Q1 
to 2008Q4. All accounting and market variables are winsorized at the 1% top and 
bottom tails of the distribution. Second, I use all estimated coefficients from the first 
step to compute fitted values of FESD for each quarter. For estimating this risk 
measure, I use only information that is available to market participants at the point of 
estimation. For example, when I estimate predicted values of standard deviation of 
changes in future earnings at 1992Q1, I use all information available from 1989Q1 to 
1992Q1 so as to guarantee that accounting information used in the model is already 
known to investors when estimating predicted earnings risk. Therefore, the period for 
estimating fitted values is from 1992Q1 to 2011Q4. Third, I square FESD to obtain 
future earnings variance or PFEVAR as a proxy for future earnings variability, 
consistent with Barth et al. (1999). 
                                                          
19 See the definitions of variables in appendix A. 
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2.4.1.2 The Association between Price and Earnings Strings 
To test hypothesis 1, I straightforwardly adapt the original Barth et al. (1999) model 
to examine the pricing effects of earnings strings and future earnings uncertainty. 
Specifically, 
         𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                          + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           
                          + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                         
                          + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽12(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                          
                          + 𝛽𝛽13(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  +  𝛽𝛽14𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                          (2) 
Where PRICE is stock price two months after fiscal quarter-end. EPS is quarterly 
earnings per share adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends. In addition to both, 
STRING20Q is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a string of 
earnings increases for at least twenty quarters, and zero otherwise.20 PFEVAR is 
predicted future earnings variability as described above. Importantly, to examine the 
effects of future earnings uncertainty on price, I include the future earnings risk 
variable (PFEVAR) and the interaction term between earnings per share and risk in 
future earnings (EPS x PFEVAR) in equation (2). 
I modify the original model of Barth et al. (1999) based on the following arguments. 
Barth et al. (1999) use model price as a linear function of permanent earnings. It is 
questionable that accounting earnings in a given period is a good proxy of 
permanent earnings. In other words, accounting earnings may not be a good proxy 
for permanent earnings because accounting earnings change at all the time. 
Moreover, there are alternative valuation models, such as the Ohlson (1995) model 
                                                          
20 A sensitivity analysis of different string lengths is reported in Table 5 Panel E.  
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that suggests that firm value is a function of earnings, book value of equity, and other 
information. In particular, other information may be captured in the context I study by 
the presence of earnings strings. I therefore include STRING20Q and other variables 
on their own in the extended model. 
As indicated in hypothesis 1, the primary interest in equation (2) is that after 
controlling for future earnings risk, I expect that 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 are not statistically 
different from zero. It suggests that there is no difference in price-earnings multiples 
and prices between string firms and non-string firms because future earnings risk 
fully captures the incrementally positive effects of earnings strings. In addition, 
because risk and price are negatively related, the coefficients 𝛽𝛽3 and 𝛽𝛽4 are expected 
to be negative.  
I control for growth (LTGROWTH), past operating risk (EVAR), and financial risk 
(LEV) due to the reason that price-earnings multiples is a function of growth and risk 
(Collins and Kothari, 1989). Book value of equity (BVE) is included as suggested by 
Ohlson’s (1995) model. I control for firm life-cycle effects by including firm age (AGE) 
as a proxy for business cycle in the model so that it captures a certain aspect of 
growth induced by stages of firm life-cycle. Consistent with the original model, I 
include U&B that is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a member of 
utility or bank sectors, and zero otherwise. Note that I adapt the Barth et al. (1999) 
model by adding non-interaction variables, firm age, and future earnings risk in the 
model. 
The variables, STRING20Q, LTGROWTH, EVAR, PFEVAR, and LEV, are interacted 
with EPS to capture the incremental effects on pricing of earnings owing to earnings 
strings, growth, past risk, future risk, and leverage. In addition, to allow for a different 
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relation between EPS and prices for utilities and banks, EPS is interacted with the 
indicator U&B.  Year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and clustering standard 
errors by year and firm are performed in this specification.21 All accounting and 
pricing variables are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom tails of the distribution. 
Note that I employ OLS estimation method to estimate equation (2). 
2.4.2 Assessing the Valuation Role of Firm Fundamentals  
To test hypothesis 2 that firms reporting earnings strings are related to the strong 
firm fundamentals, I construct a standardized aggregate fundamental score following 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993). Motivated by the fact that investors and analysts use 
firm fundamentals or fundamental analysis to determine the value of a firm’s 
securities I explore the link between strings and fundamentals. Firm fundamentals 
include financial variables that Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) find useful in security 
valuation. These variables are likely to capture key-value drivers, e.g. competitive 
position, earnings, risk, or growth. For example, disproportionate increases in 
inventory to cost of sales may suggest that firms are having difficulties in generating 
revenues and suggests that future earnings may decline since managers are under 
pressure to reduce the levels of inventory. Therefore, it is expected that firm 
fundamentals are associated with firm performance and hence firm value and 
earnings strings. 
This fundamental score is based on 12 underlying fundamental signals including 
inventories, accounts receivable, capital expenditures, research and development 
expenses, gross margin, selling and administrative expenses, provision for doubtful 
                                                          
21 According to the identification strategy, industry fixed effects, rather than firm fixed effects, are specified in 
the model because the implications of earnings patterns may be time invariant effects captured by firm fixed 
effect variables. Accordingly, all specifications in this study use industry fixed effects to mitigate the potential 
time invariant effects. 
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receivables, effective tax rate, order backlog, labor force, LIFO earnings, and audit 
qualification. Each fundamental signal is binary variable. I assign one if an individual 
signal is a positive signal (good news), zero otherwise. Firms with a larger number of 
strong fundamentals obtain a higher score.22  
A standardized aggregate fundamental score is a sum of each fundamental score for 
each firm and quarter, standardized by the number of available signals. To construct 
an average standardized aggregate fundamental score, I calculate an average value 
of standardized aggregate score, by averaging standardized aggregate fundamental 
scores from period t-20 to period t-1. The rationale for using lag information is that 
fundamental scores are a signal by construction. Twenty periods average value is 
consistent with Barth et al. (1999).  
I construct the following model to examine the determinants of STRING as a function 
of the past fundamentals score. 
𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                              + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 (3) 
Where STRING is the length of a past string of earnings increases. FSCORE is an 
average value of standardized aggregate score. Consistent with hypothesis 2, I 
expect 𝛿𝛿1 to be positive insofar as past fundamentals are positively related to strings 
of increasing earnings.  
This model controls for growth opportunities (MB, STGROWTH, and SALEG), 
investment (CAPEX), capital structure (LEV), firm life-cycle (AGE), and conservative 
                                                          
22 A fundamental score signalled by research and development expenses is available from year 1989. That is, a 
standardized aggregate fundamental score including this particular signal starts from year 1994 because I 
construct this score using twenty quarters of score history. However, the results remain qualitatively unchanged 
when I perform this test covering the sample period starting from the year that research and development 
expenses data are available or year 1994. 
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accounting (CSCORE) (Fama and French, 1995: Lang et al., 1996; Fama and 
French, 2006; and Khan and Watts, 2009). This specification also includes year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm and year. All 
accounting and pricing variables are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom tails of the 
distribution. Equation (3) is estimated using OLS estimation method. 
2.4.3 Changing from Growth to Risk Signalling as Strings Become Longer  
Although investors may predict better future financial performance when they 
observe strings of earnings increases, firms cannot sustain growth in perpetuity. As 
stated in hypothesis 3.1, I expect that longer earnings strings are less related to 
future earnings growth but more strongly to future risk. I investigate hypothesis 3.1 
by modifying equation (3) as follows. 
        𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                  + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
                                  + 𝛿𝛿8𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                (4) 
Where FSTRINGxQ is an indicator variables that equals one if a firm reports a future 
string of earnings over a specific length of quarters (Q) and zero otherwise. A future 
string is defined sequentially as four, eight, and twelve quarters ahead (one, two, and 
three years ahead respectively). STRINGxQ is an indicator variables that equals one 
if a firm reports a past string of earnings increases over a specific length of quarters 
and zero otherwise. For the sake of brevity, a past string is defined sequentially as 
previously four and twenty quarters (past one and five years respectively).23 A past 
four-quarter (twenty-quarter) earnings string is a proxy for a short (long) string. 
                                                          
23 I also investigate this test when a definition of a past string includes eight, twelve, and sixteen quarters. The 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Future string captures earnings growth and so 𝛿𝛿1 captures the information content of 
current string for future growth.  
In equation (4), the lengths of past earnings strings variable help examine the extent 
to which firms can sustain increasing earnings patterns. On one hand, if good 
performance persists, strings would persist into the future implying 𝛿𝛿1 is expected to 
be positively and significantly greater than zero. On the other hand, if the persistence 
of earnings strings is low, 𝛿𝛿1 could be either close to zero or negative. By varying the 
lengths of past and future earnings strings, I am able to empirically assess the 
magnitude of δ1 as a function of the length of past strings. According to hypothesis 
3.1, I expect that past longer earnings strings are weakly related to future earnings 
growth. All accounting and pricing variables are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom 
tails of the distribution. I also perform year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and 
clustering standard errors by firm and year. Note that I employ Probit Maximum 
Likelihood estimation method to estimate equation (4). 
To test hypothesis 3.2 that the relation between the lengths of earnings strings and 
future earnings risk, I estimate the following model. 
        𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    
                          + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       
                          + 𝛾𝛾9𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾10𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                               (5) 
Equation (5) modifies the approach taken by Kothari et al. (2002) and Amir et al. 
(2007) who investigate the relation between future earnings variability and past R&D 
expenses and capital expenditure. As per hypothesis 3.2, I expect that longer 
earnings strings to be strongly and inversely associated with future earnings 
variability. More specifically, 𝛾𝛾1on longer strings is more negative. 
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The control variables capture other determinants of subsequent earnings volatility 
including past earnings volatility (EVAR), firm fundamentals (FSCORE), firm 
investment (RD and CAPEX), size (MKTVALUE), diversification effects (SALE), real 
economic shock (SALEVAR), capital structure (LEV), and business cycle (AGE) 
(Kothari et al., 2002; Amir et al., 2007; Dichev and Tang, 2009). Similar to other 
regressions, year fixed effects and industry fixed effects are estimated in the model. I 
also cluster standard errors by firm and year. All accounting and pricing variables are 
winsorized at the 1% top and bottom tails of the distribution. Note that I employ OLS 
estimation method to estimate equation (5). 
2.5 Sample  
The accounting and market data are collected from both COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
databases. The data set covers all available US listed firms during the period of 1989 
– 2014.24 I start collecting data from year 1989 because quarterly research and 
development expenses data are available from that year. The initial set of sample 
involves 687,922 firm-quarter observations. Having deleted firms not listed in NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, this yields the sample which is equal to 529,944 firm-quarter 
observations. Since I require earnings history for constructing the string variable, the 
sample is substantially reduced to 425,356 firm-quarter observations or 11,028 
unique firms. This set of sample is available for all analyses in this paper.25 Sample 
formation process is summarized in Panel A of Table 2.1. The definition of an 
earnings string gives rise to survivorship bias. While it is impossible to fully overcome 
                                                          
24 Although all tests begins from year 1989 when R&D data are available, to maximize the sample, I go back to 
year 1983 to obtain twenty-quarter history of earnings per share data and data of variables used for estimating 
fundamental scores, consistent with Barth et al. (1999). This procedure therefore helps increases the number of 
observations entered in all analyses. 
25 Comparing my sample size with those of previous studies, the number of observations is substantially greater 
than Barth et al. (1999)’s sample and Liu (2013)’s sample which is 21,173 and 83,443 firm-year observations 
respectively. In terms of a firm-quarter observation, a sample used in this paper is considerably larger than 
Myers et al. (2007)’s sample of 746 firms and Yao (2015)’s sample of 11,469 firms. 
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this problem, to mitigate this concern, I define a string firm as a firm reports at least 
one quarter of earnings increases. This broadens the set of observations used in this 
study. 
I present the sample of 425,356 firm-quarter observations classified by year in Panel 
B of Table 2.1. Overall, the number of observations continuously increases over the 
sample period and keeps stable until the end. The sample contains an average of 
16,360 observations per year. With respect to firms reporting earnings strings, the 
proportion of string firms shows an increasing trend from 1989 to 2006, and a 
decreasing trend during financial crisis of 2007 – 2009.  
Panel C of Table 2.1 reports the Fama and French 17-industry classifications of the 
425,356 firm-quarter observations.26 This panel further distinguishes between string 
and non-string observations. The number of firms reporting strings of increasing 
earnings varies across industries. Certain industries are more likely to show earnings 
strings than other industries. For example, the incidence of earnings strings is high in 
Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials industry but it is relatively low in 
Fabricated Products industry, implying that service sectors seem have a greater 
ability to prolong growth in earnings. A few firms in Steel Works, and Mining and 
Minerals industries, however, reports earnings strings, reflecting that traditionally 
heavy industries are even more difficult to sustain lengthily growing reported 
earnings. 
Table 2.2 analyses firm-quarter observations of earnings strings by their lengths. As 
expected, the number of string observations is inversely related to the duration of 
earnings momentum. Specifically, more than 76% of firms (76.07%) do not report 
strings of at least four quarters. Only 0.98% of firms report consecutively growing 
                                                          
26 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. 
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earnings for at least twenty quarters. Because there is a very small number of firms 
reporting earnings strings longer than forty quarters, I report the total number of 
observations of this group in a single category, namely 40 quarters or more.27  
Table 2.3 reports a transition matrix of an earnings string of four quarters ahead 
given the length of prior strings. Initially, there are only 24% of firms reporting four-
quarter strings of earnings increases. However, 35% of such string firms are able to 
proceed with another four-quarter string in the subsequent period. Note that 44% of 
firms that have previously earnings strings of eight quarters end up reporting an 
earnings string of twelve quarters. If firms report patterns of increasing earnings for 
sixteen quarters in a row, they tend to maintain earnings momentum with the 
probability which is higher than 0.50. That is, firms having strings of sixteen-quarter 
are more likely than other firms to continue increasing earnings in the following four 
quarters. A string momentum is clear with the passage of time. An overriding 
conclusion from Table 2.3 is that the likelihood of a future string increases with the 
length of prior strings, consistent with Barth et al. (1999).  
2.6 Main Results  
2.6.1 Estimating Future Earnings Uncertainty  
The results of estimating future earnings volatility based on the model used in 
Kothari et al. (2002) are reported in Table 2.4. These results help evaluate construct 
validity of a risk in future earnings measure. Recall that I regress standard deviation 
of percentage changes in future earnings on a set of independent variables. The 
sample for equation (1) is 197,236 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 
1989 – 2008. Descriptive statistics is provided in Panel A. The mean (median) of 
                                                          
27 The maximum length of a streak of consecutively increasing earnings in the sample is 75 quarters for only one 
firm. 
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FESD is 5.937 (1.813). I find that on average firms invest in their business as they 
report the means (medians) of RD and CAPEX are 0.007 (0.000) and 0.022 (0.009) 
respectively. 
Consistent with Kothari et al. (2002) and Amir et al. (2007), In panel B the results are 
based on Fama-MacBeth regression; they suggest that R&D, CAPEX and leverage 
are positively related to future earnings variability, but both market value of equity 
and net profit margin are inversely correlated to variability of subsequent earnings. 
The results are qualitatively similar to Kothari et al. (2002). However, I find that the 
adjusted R2 in this study is lower relative to that reported by Kothari et al. (2002). 
The lower adjust R2 may be due to the sample constructed from quarterly data. I 
evaluate the economic significance of RD and CAPEX and find that the economic 
significance of RD is 0.054 that is greater than 0.014 of CAPEX. These findings 
confirm that future earnings uncertainty is more pronounced for research and 
development expenses than capital expenditure, consistent with prior literature. For 
the pooled OLS, the results are similar in all respect although capital expenditure 
loses its significance. I also find that the economic significance of RD is equal to 
0.037 which is higher than 0.011 of CAPEX. Overall, the findings from OLS still 
indicate that research and development expenses are more associated with future 
earnings variability than capital expenditure. 
The estimations yield predicted values of changes in future earnings standard 
deviation of 208,334 firm-quarter observations including negative values of 1,857. 
Consistent with the definition of standard deviation, I drop all negative fitted value of 
standard deviation of future earnings’ changes. It leaves 206,477 firm-quarter 
observations. I then square them to obtain future earnings variance. As the modified 
Kothari et al. (2002) model shows that future earnings risk can be predicted by RD, 
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CAPEX, MKTVALUE, LEV, and NPM, and my results suggest the consistent 
evidence, it is reasonable to use predicted future earnings variance estimated from 
that model as a proxy for risk in subsequent earnings because this risk measure 
potentially captures risk in future earnings. 
2.6.2 The Association between Price and Earnings Strings Conditional on 
Future Earnings Uncertainty  
In this section I report the association between price and earnings strings conditional 
on risk in future earnings. Table 2.5 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for this 
sample.28  Summary statistics for main variables are generally consistent with those 
documented in previous studies (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; and Barth et al., 
1999). For instance, the mean stock price (PRICE) is $20.415, and the mean 
quarterly earnings per share (EPS) is 0.229. Barth et al. (1999) report the mean 
stock price of $20.27, and the mean annual EPS of 1.21. 
The correlations between various variables are reported in Table 2.5 Panel B. I find a 
positive (negative) association between earnings strings and price, firm performance, 
and growth (risk and firm age). Future earnings variability and past earnings 
variability are also positively and significantly correlated with the correlation 
coefficient of 0.099 (0.340), reflecting that future earnings variability captures 
different dimensions of underlying risk from past earnings variability.  
I find that levels of earnings risk depend on the specific duration of earnings strings 
(See Table 2.5 Panel C). I use future/past earnings risk dichotomy in this analysis in 
order to assess the comparative effects of earnings patterns on both risk measures. 
                                                          
28 I require data of twelve-quarter future earnings in order to calculate standard deviation of future earnings. 
Therefore, the testing period covers from year 1992 to 2011. Because of the data requirement for estimating 
predicted future earnings risk, the sample is 137,457 firm-quarter observations during year 1992 – 2011. 
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The findings suggest that risk in future earnings is more pronounced for non-string 
firms compared to firms reporting any other lengths of strings, consistent with the 
view that a firm with an unpredictable growth of earnings is embedded with higher 
fundamentals-based risk reflected in time-series variation in earnings.29 This panel 
indicates that predicted volatility of future earnings almost monotonically reduce as 
an earnings string prolongs, suggesting that earnings risk in subsequent periods is 
negatively associated with a series of consecutively earnings growth. In contrast, 
past earnings variability related to spans of strings seems follow concave trend – first 
increase and then decrease – over the course of earnings strings. The descriptive 
results provide supportive evidence that future earnings variability and past earnings 
variability are different constructs of risk. 
The main results of the regression for testing hypothesis 1 are reported in Table 2.5 
Panel D. In Column (1) I replicate Barth et al. (1999) as base model. Note that the 
model is similar to Barth et al. (1999) in all respect except the use of quarterly data. If 
earnings of firms with earnings strings are priced higher than other firms, the 
coefficient on EPS x STRING20Q is expected to be positive. Consistent with Barth et 
al. (1999), I find that the coefficient estimate on EPS x STRING20Q is positively and 
highly significant (𝛽𝛽2 = 6.298, p-value = 0.000). As for control variables, risk 
measured as EVAR is negatively associated with price as expected. The findings 
also document that earnings and book value of equity have positive associations 
with prices. The inverse relationship between prices and an indicator variable for 
utilities and banks suggests that regulated industries attract lower prices on average. 
The coefficient estimate on EPS x LTGROWTH is positive and significant, implying 
that higher past growth rate yields higher prices. Taken together, evidence from 
                                                          
29 Fundamentals-based risk relates to the notion that fundamentals change as the business environment changes. 
Change in the business environment is a risk that firms have to manage.  
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Column (1) confirms the findings of Barth et al. (1999) in that earnings of string 
companies attract higher valuation than earnings of non-string companies.   
I extend the original model specification of Barth et al. (1999) to incorporate level 
variables, and by adding the AGE variable, whilst including industry fixed effects, and 
clustering at the firm and year levels. I do this because the Barth et al.’s (1999) 
original model may suffer from several econometric problems. First, it is important to 
include all variables that appear in the interactions as individual variables. I therefore 
enter STRING20Q, U&B, LTGROWTH, EVAR, and LEV to the model so as to avoid 
an omitted correlated variable problem.30 Second, I control for firm life-cycle effects 
by including firm age in the model so that it captures a certain aspect of growth 
induced by the stage of the business cycle. For example, young firms likely face 
greater growth opportunities albeit at a higher risk. In contrast, mature firms likely 
have exhausted high growth opportunities in earlier years, and now enjoy a (more) 
stable business environment and hence expect lower returns. These differences in 
the stage of a firm life-cycle are proxied by firm age. Third, omitting fixed effects may 
influence the Barth et al.’s (1999) results (Gormley and Matsa, 2014). Fourth, I 
cluster standard errors by firm and year in order to mitigate the effects of cross-
sectional and temporal dependence between observations (Petersen, 2009).  
The results of estimating this modified model are presented in Columns (2) to (4) of 
Panel D. I find that, in Column (2), price-earnings multiples are statistically equal for 
both string and non-string firms as the coefficient estimate on EPS x STRING20Q is 
now insignificant. This suggests that market rewards introduced by Barth et al. 
(1999) vanish after controlling for the main effects of earnings strings, utilities and 
                                                          
30 Barth et al. (1999) include the proxies for growth and risk as non-interactive covariates. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that an earnings pattern not only affects price as an interactive variable, but also itself may have a main 
effect on price as shifting an intercept of a regression line.  
52 
 
banks, growth, risk, and firm age. However, prices are higher for string companies 
regardless of the level of earnings, as is indicated by the positive and highly 
significant coefficient on STRING20Q. In addition, the positive and significant 
coefficient estimate on AGE indicates that older firms are associated with higher 
prices. Most control variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Having corrected for 
the potential omitted-but-important variable problem, the main results confirm that 
the incrementally positive effect of a string of increasing earnings is robust to the 
inclusion of the econometric treatment, but market rewards associated with earnings 
found by Barth et al. (1999) disappear. 
In order to examine what is the cause of disappearance of valuation premiums 
discovered by Barth et al. (1999) in Column (2), I modify the original model by Barth 
et al. (1999) by including only STRING20Q variable in the specification. This is to 
investigate whether market rewards are either conditional on earnings levels or 
depend on strings themselves as I view strings as other information in the Ohlson 
model. The results (not tabulated) show that the coefficient on EPS x STRING20Q is 
not statistically significant after controlling for the main effects of STRING20Q, 
suggesting that valuation premiums found by Barth et al. (1999) are subsumed by 
the information conveyed by STRING20Q . 
Column (3) shows the results of including industry fixed effects. The results are 
qualitatively unchanged when industry fixed effects are performed in the model. The 
results of clustering standard errors are reported in Column (4). They mainly suggest 
that firms reporting earnings strings still attract higher prices but not higher price-
earnings multiples than other firms. The results also indicate that past earnings 
variability is not associated with price after correcting firm and time effects on 
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standard errors, casting doubt on validity of a risk measure based on past earnings 
variance. 
The results of equation (2) are reported in Column (5). The results suggest that 
prices are significantly higher for string firms, after controlling for variability of future 
earnings. Consistent with the results in Columns (2) to (4), the price-earnings 
multiple of string firms is not significantly different than non-string firms. Thus 
hypothesis 1 can be rejected as I still find the positive and significant coefficient 
estimate on STRING20Q (𝛽𝛽1 = 4.895, p-value = 0.000). The results strongly imply 
that Barth et al.’s (1999) market rewards do not exist in the modified models. They 
also suggest that future earnings variability is associated with prices and price-
earnings multiples, incremental to past earnings variability. As compared to Column 
(4), the coefficient estimate on STRING20Q (EPS) decreases (increases), implying 
that controlling for variability of future earnings helps investors better understand 
valuation-relevant information of earnings.31 
I conduct additional analyses on whether different lengths of earnings strings are 
associated with higher price-earnings multiples and higher prices (See Table 2.5 
Panel E). Specifically, I estimate regressions of price on various lengths of earnings 
strings, i.e. 4, 8, 12, and 16 quarters, and a set of covariates as indicated in equation 
(2). Panel E reveals that higher price-earnings multiples are higher for firms reporting 
strings of 4 and 8 quarters. This suggests that for short strings valuation premiums 
are conditional on earnings levels. Whereas, firms who report earnings strings for 12 
quarters onward have price rewards irrespective of levels of earnings. On balance, 
the results based on Panel E lead to two conclusions. First, earnings growth history 
may induce investors to revise their expectations of firm value, or that markets may 
                                                          
31 The results are robust when I only cluster standard errors by firm or by industry. 
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anticipate longer strings by observing certain lengths of strings, or both. They, 
therefore, reward firms for longer durations of earnings strings with higher price.32 
Second, it is the case that price premiums to longer strings are not conditional on 
earnings levels. As in Panel D, I find that future earnings variability reduces the 
association of EPS with prices. 
In sum, evidence from Table 2.5 suggests the following: first, market rewards to EPS 
of strings companies documented by Barth et al. (1999) do not appear in my model 
which controls for the level of earnings strings. Second, I find that prices are higher 
for string firms in that longer strings attract higher prices, on average. This implies 
that the original Barth et al. (1999) model is not robust to alternative econometric 
specifications. Third, risk in future earnings is negatively related to price and it 
moderates the ERC in the expected direction. Notably, it is incrementally informative 
for prices over and above past risk.33 
2.6.3 The Role of Firm Fundamentals in Valuation  
To investigate the valuation consequence of firm fundamentals, I examine the 
relation between a string of earnings increases and past fundamentals. Table 2.6 
reports the results. Panel A of Table 2.6 provides descriptive statistics. The sample 
for this analysis involves 165,894 firm-quarter observations. The mean of FSCORE 
is 0.511, implying that firms have moderately strong fundamentals. Note that 
FSCORE is standardized. Correlation presented in Panel B indicate that string firms 
have stronger fundamentals (FSCORE), higher growth options (MB), lower capital 
                                                          
32 Further to prior research, I offer an explanation for market rewards to shorter strings of earnings increases that 
is investigated in later sections. 
33 One may argue that differences between my findings and that of Barth et al. (1999) are driven by a different 
definition of the string variable.  To test this argument, I use fourth quarter earnings to mimic the annual sample 
and then investigate whether the findings are qualitatively changed. The results that are reported in Table 2.14 
show that the findings are qualitatively similar to the main findings. 
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expenditure (CAPEX), higher past growth (STGROWTH), lower debt (LEV), and 
lower conservatism (CSCORE).  
The main results, which are reported in Panel C, are consistent with hypothesis 2. In 
particular, the average slopes on FSCORE are significantly positive (𝛿𝛿1= 6.837 in 
Column (1) and 𝛿𝛿1= 5.581 in Column (2), significant at 1 percent level), suggesting 
that an earnings string is positively associated with past firm fundamentals. That is, 
strong fundamentals are associated with longer strings. The results suggest that in 
Column (1) without any control variables fundamental scores are positively 
associated with the lengths of earnings strings. In Column (2) I find that 
fundamentals scores have the explanatory power incremental to sales growth, book 
value growth, and growth options. It implies that earnings strings are related to other 
dimensions of firm fundamentals, not growth per se.  
2.6.4 Changing From Growth to Risk Signalling  
Table 2.7 presents the results for the analysis of future growth. Panel A and B 
present descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for main variables used in this 
analysis, respectively. The findings from these panels are as follows. First, the 
number of firms reporting strings of earnings growth decreases with the lengths of 
strings. Second, it is clear that there is a string momentum indicated by past strings 
positively related to future strings. 
The results of Probit analysis exhibited in Panel C suggest that, inconsistent with 
hypothesis 3.1, the longer earnings strings are, the more likely firms to sustain 
growth. Four-quarter strings (STRING4Q) and long strings (STRING20Q) are 
positively associated with the next 4, 8, and 12 quarters earnings strings. More 
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importantly, the magnitude of the coefficients on STRING20Q is greater than that of 
STRING4Q, implying that growth is more persistent for longer past strings. 
In conclusion, empirical evidence documents that longer earnings strings are more 
strongly associated with future earnings growth than shorter earnings strings. This is 
contrast to hypothesis 3.1. This analysis suggests that string firms take longer time 
to experience reversals of earnings growth, implying that the growth signalling 
explanation is valid for a longer earnings string. Because the model controls for 
fundamentals, I conclude that strings convey information about future earnings 
growth that is not captured by fundamentals. 
Next, I evaluate the information role of earnings strings for future risk. The results for 
examining the association between a string of earnings and variability of future 
earnings, based on equation (5), are reported in Table 2.8. Note that descriptive 
statistics and correlations are presented in Panel A and B, and for brevity, I only 
report STRING4Q and STRING20Q as proxies for short and long strings 
respectively.  
The empirical results reveal that all lengths of past earnings string are significantly 
and negatively associated with variability of future earnings. The slopes on past 
earnings strings almost monotonically increase with the lengths of strings, 
suggesting that shorter strings are better risk predictor than longer strings. These 
findings can be interpreted that, as the duration of a string develops, the predictive 
ability of an earnings string changes the direction from risk to growth. This evidence 
is inconsistent with hypothesis 3.2, indicated by coefficients on shorter earnings 
strings that are more negative than those of longer earnings strings. Interestingly, 
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past earnings variability is not associated with future earnings variability in this 
model, suggesting that there is no persistence in earnings variability. 
To sum up, the empirical results offer evidence that a shorter string of increasing 
earnings has predictive ability for future risk. A longer string of increasing earnings 
has more ability to explain growth in future earnings than risk in future earnings. This 
conclusion emphasizes the importance of growth signalling provided by long 
earnings strings, and moderates a conventional risk-based justification. 
2.7 Additional Findings  
2.7.1 An Alternative Proxy for Future Earnings Variability 
In this section I explore some additional specifications to the model used above. First 
I perform a robustness test of the association between price and an earnings string 
controlling for an alternative proxy for risk in future earnings. Instead of using 
predicted values, I construct a simplified measure of risk in future earnings using 
quarterly earnings per share realization.  In particular, variability of realised future 
earnings is defined as variance of ex post future twelve quarters’ percentage 
changes in quarterly earnings per share. While I use ex post realizations not known 
to investors when earnings are released, I use these as a proxy for their 
expectations. This should not be mistaken for assuming that investors have full 
hindsight. 
To test the association between price and an earnings string controlling ex post risk 
in future earnings, I use equation (2) but replacing PFEVAR with FEVAR. I expect 
that the coefficients on FEVAR and EPS x FEVAR are negative, suggesting that risk 
in future earnings is associated with prices and price-earnings multiples. Table 2.9 
reports the results.  
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I find that there is the relation between price and an earnings string after controlling 
future earnings volatility. The results suggest that variability of realised subsequent 
earnings is related to price but the negative effects of future risk associated with 
earnings are not different from zero. Therefore, the results are robust to an 
alternative proxy for variability of future earnings.  
2.7.2 An Alternative Proxy for Fundamentals  
Prior literature documents that firms reporting consecutive increases in earnings tend 
to be fundamentally stronger. My results show a positive relation between 
fundamentals and a string of consistent earnings growth and also provide evidence 
that an earnings string signals sustainable growth. Chen (2013) argues that earnings 
persistence reflected in earnings growth is time-varying. That is, persistence of 
earnings is not only time-series and firm-specific, but it also varies with firm 
fundamentals. In other words, earnings persistence shifts once economic 
fundamentals change. It implies that both earnings persistence and earnings strings 
depend on firm fundamentals at every point of time. I therefore conduct an additional 
analysis complementing the main results by addressing the relation between 
fundamentals-driven earnings persistence and a string of increasing earnings.  
In doing so, I construct a time-varying earnings persistence measure based on 
fundamental variables using the Chen (2013) model. In particular, the model follows 
the standard earnings persistence model but allows the coefficient of earnings 
persistence varies with fundamental variables as follows.          
          𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑎𝑎1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 + �𝑐𝑐0 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 � × 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1      (6) 
Where EARN is earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. F is 
determinants of earnings persistence estimated from firm fundamentals. Firm 
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fundamentals include market share, capital intensity, firm size, profit margin, asset 
turnover, asset growth, accruals, loss, earnings decrease, and extreme earnings 
change. Time-varying earnings persistence for time t is estimated from the model as 
follows.                                      
                                      𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐0𝑖𝑖−1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1                                          (7) 
To estimate FPERSIST, I apply estimated coefficients from equation (6) to equation 
(7) in order to obtain the time-varying earnings persistence coefficient for each firm 
and each year. 
To test the association between time-varying earnings persistence and earnings 
strings, I employ equation (3) but replacing FSCORE with FPERSIST. Intuitively, 
firms reporting a sequence of earnings growth are expected to exhibit higher 
persistence of earnings, indicating a positive coefficient on 𝛿𝛿1. That is, I predict that 
firms with higher fundamentals-based earnings persistence have longer strings. The 
results of this analysis are provided in Table 2.10. 
As expected, the findings are consistent with the main results of the valuation roles 
of fundamentals. In particular, the mean coefficient estimate on FPERSIST are 
significantly positive (𝛿𝛿1= 0.688 in Column (1) and 𝛿𝛿1= 0.641 in Column (2), 
significant at 1 percent level), suggesting that string firms exhibit higher earnings 
persistence driven by stronger fundamentals. To summarize, I show supportive 
evidence that firms reporting earnings strings are fundamentally stronger than 
normal firms. 
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2.7.3 Alternative Control Variables for the Association between Earnings 
Strings and Firm Fundamentals  
I re-examine equation (3) using alternative control variables. Specifically, I 
investigate the relation between strings and firm fundamentals after controlling for 
AGE, lagged MB, lagged CAPEX, lagged STGROWTH, lagged SALEG, lagged LEV, 
and lagged CSCORE. The reason I use variables at time t-1 is that these variables 
may lead to earnings strings in the following period. For example, firms invest in 
fixed assets in year t-1 in order to achieve earnings growth in year t. The results are 
reported in Table 2.11. 
I find that firm fundamentals are positively associated with earnings strings. Firms 
with higher market-to-book ratio, higher growth in book equity value, higher growth in 
sales, lower debt, and lower conservatism are likely to have earnings strings in the 
subsequent quarter. Overall, the results are not sensitive to using lagged information 
as control variables. 
2.7.4 Future Growth in Sales and Cash Flows  
The primary findings in section 6.3 document that future growth in earnings is higher 
for longer strings. In this section, I explore whether long strings can justify other 
dimensions of future growth, i.e. future sales and future cash flows. I employ 
equation (4) to examine the relations between past earnings strings and strings of 
future sales and future cash flows by replacing FSTRINGxQ with FSxQ and FCFxQ, 
respectively. FSxQ and FCFxQ are coded similar to the way that FSTRINGxQ is 
coded. The results of Probit analysis are reported in Table 2.12. For brevity, I do not 
report coefficients on control variables. 
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Consistent with the relation between long series of earnings and growth in future 
earnings, future growth in sales is also associated with longer strings. Specifically, 
the coefficient estimates on STRING20Q for all lengths of future sale strings are 
positively significant. That is, longer string firms tend to have higher future sales.  
Turning to future cash flows, it suggests that long strings are associated with the 
next four and eight quarters of future cash flow strings. Taken together, long strings 
can justify earnings growth and sales growth for at least twelve quarters ahead but 
explain cash flow growth for only next four and eight quarters. Nevertheless, these 
findings clearly support the main results relating to the growth signalling explanation. 
2.7.5 Investors’ Views on Future Growth and Risk  
In order to evaluate investors’ understanding of growth and risk information 
embedded in a string of consecutively increasing earnings, I repeat the analysis of 
growth and risk signalling as described in section 4.3. Specifically, I estimate the 
relation between earnings strings and future growth and the relation between 
earnings strings and future risk but I employ proxies for expected growth and 
expected risk commonly used by markets. In particular, market-to-book ratio is 
proxied for expected growth. To the extent that earnings strings are associated with 
future growth they would be expected to be associated with market-to-book, which is 
also a common proxy for growth. In addition, predicted future earnings variability 
estimated from Kothari et al. (2002) is proxied for expected risk. 
Panel A of Table 2.13 reports that investors better understand that longer earnings 
strings are more likely to have higher growth opportunities than shorter strings. 
Interestingly, the parameter estimates on earnings strings monotonically increase 
from four to twenty quarters strings, indicating that markets rationally expect higher 
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future growth from longer growth in previous periods. It implies that investors fixate 
on growth momentum that induces valuation premiums to firms reporting past 
earnings strings. 
Panel B of Table 2.13 offers surprising results. I do not find the relations between 
predicted future earnings variability and earnings strings for 4, 8, and 12 quarters but 
they exist for 16 quarters onward. The interpretation of the results leads to two 
conclusions. First, as shown in section 6.1, risk in future earnings aids investors in 
extracting value-relevant information of earnings. Second, valuation rewards are 
assigned to sufficiently long earnings strings when the predictive ability of strings 
shift from risk to growth which investors only understand the implications of strings 
for growth, not risk. This evidence supports that rewards are given to at least five-
year earnings strings as documented by Barth et al. (1999). It also corroborates prior 
studies suggesting that investors see through growth, but not risk, prospects 
conveyed by strings of earnings.  
2.7.6 The Association between Price and Earnings Strings for an Alternative 
Sample  
The main findings suggest that investors reward string firms with higher prices 
irrespective of levels of earnings. That is, incremental price-earnings multiples 
documented by Barth et al. (1999) do not continue when controlling for the main 
effects of earnings strings and control variables. However, Barth et al. (1999) 
investigate the annual sample; while I use the quarterly sample. Now I exploit the 
sample for only the fourth quarter to mimic the annual sample and then test whether 
my findings are sensitive to the different sample. 
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The association between price and increasing earnings strings for the sample of 
fourth quarter is reported in Table 2.14. I find that after controlling for level variables, 
the observed premiums conditional on earnings levels are no longer significant. In 
contrast, the coefficient estimate on STRING20Q is significantly positive. This 
suggests that the main results are robust to the different sample. 
2.7.7 The Association between Price and Earnings Strings Controlling for Past 
Firm Fundamentals  
The main findings suggest that longer earnings strings are associated with stronger 
past firm fundamentals captured by FSCORE. One can argue that valuation 
premiums to firms reporting increasing earnings strings are due to strong business 
fundamentals of firms. I therefore investigate this possibility. 
To do this, I add FSCORE into equation (2) to test whether firm fundamentals are 
positively related to prices and whether price premiums are moderated by controlling 
for fundamentals. The results of re-estimating the modified version of equation (2) is 
reported in Table 2.15. The results suggest that, as expected, price is positively 
associated to firm fundamentals (the coefficient on FSCORE is 7.126, significant at 5 
percent level). In addition, the string effects are still pronounced, albeit lower one. 
This implies that valuation premiums are partially explained by firm fundamentals. 
In sum, valuation premiums continue to appear when controlling for firm 
fundamentals. This leads to a conclusion that such premiums convey other 
information incremental to fundamental economics. 
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2.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This paper estimates the association between market rewards to a string of earnings 
increases and economic fundamentals of a firm. Recent literature on meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks suggests that markets assign premiums to firms 
exceeding three types of earnings targets, i.e. profit, prior periods’ earnings, and 
analyst forecasts, motivating me to investigate the economic implications of an 
increasing earnings string. Therefore, this study provides rational explanations for 
valuation premiums on the basis of growth, risk, and firm-fundamentals arguments. 
Specifically, I argue that valuation premiums are reflections of future growth, future 
risk, and economic fundamentals conveyed by earnings strings. 
The main findings suggest that valuation premiums documented by Barth et al. 
(1999) no longer continue when including non-interaction variables of an earnings 
string and control variables in their original model. I also find that earnings strings are 
positively associated with prices irrespective of earnings levels. In addition, variability 
of future earnings partially explains variation in price and a price-earnings multiple 
but does not fully account for valuation premiums given to earnings strings. With 
regard to firm fundamentals, longer string firms are fundamentally stronger. 
Moreover, evidence shows that growth in earnings is more persistent in the long run, 
suggesting that longer earnings patterns are a good predictor for future profitability. 
In contrast, I show that the predictive ability of earnings strings is better for future 
earnings risk when strings are shorter. All evidence is likely to support the view that 
observed market rewards are greater dominated by growth than risk. 
In sum, all findings show the economic implications of earnings strings. Other than 
growth opportunities, strings of consistent earnings growth contain information about 
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fundamentals and uncertainty of subsequent earnings which, in turn, leads to higher 
market outcomes. However, growth factor seems dominate risk factor and hence the 
positive pricing implications for earnings strings. My findings strongly document that 
rational explanations are able to explain the rewards to meeting or beating earnings 
thresholds, and support the notion that fundamental variables are really important. In 
addition, they confirm that longer (shorter) strings convey growth (risk) relevant 
information.   
The caveat is that first I do not directly investigate earnings management in the 
setting of earnings strings. In extreme case, all findings are the results of accounting 
distortions which successfully fool the markets. Second, my proxies for growth and 
risk are not perfect for capturing all dimensions of future growth and underlying risk. 
This is the reason why earnings strings still have explanatory power. Third, I cannot 
rule out the mispricing explanation for market rewards. That is, investors fixate on 
continual growth and over-price high-accrual-earnings strings that are less 
persistent. Other researchers may be interested in other areas of earnings strings 
such as what causes earnings strings, fundamentals or earnings management?. 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable 
FCFxQ An indicator variable for firms with consecutively increasing cash flows over a 
particular x quarter of future periods, i.e. 4, 8, and 12 quarters ahead. It is defined 
as a firm reporting positive increases in cash flows in the next periods. An 
increase is defined compared to cash flows from the same quarter of the prior 
year. 
FESD Realised standard deviation of ex post future twelve quarters’ percentage changes 
in adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items. 
FEVAR Realised variance of ex post future twelve quarters’ percentage changes in 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items. 
FSTRINGxQ An indicator variable for firms with consecutive increases in earnings over a 
particular x quarter of future periods, i.e. 4, 8, and 12 quarters ahead. It is defined 
as a firm reporting positive increases in seasonally adjusted earnings before 
extraordinary items in the next periods. An increase is defined compared to EPS 
before extraordinary items from the same quarter of the prior year. 
FSxQ An indicator variable for firms with consecutively increasing sales over a particular 
x quarter of future periods, i.e. 4, 8, and 12 quarters ahead. It is defined as a firm 
reporting positive increases in sales in the next periods. An increase is defined 
compared to sales from the same quarter of the prior year. 
PRICE Adjusted price per share at two months after the end of fiscal quarter. 
STRING The length of a past string of consecutive increases in earnings. Consecutive 
increases in earnings are defined as a firm reporting consecutive increases in 
seasonally adjusted earnings before extraordinary items at least one quarter. An 
increase is defined compared to EPS before extraordinary items from the same 
quarter of the prior year. 
Independent Variable 
FPERSIST Fundamentals-based earnings persistence adapted from Chen (2013). She 
estimates time-varying earnings persistence using accounting-based and 
economic-based variables. These variables are market share, industry 
concentration, capital intensity, firm size, profit margin, asset turnover, assets 
growth, accruals, loss dummy, decrease dummy, and extreme earnings changes. 
FSCORE An average standardized aggregate fundamental score. It is averaged over twenty 
quarters from quarter t-20 to t-1. This methodology is developed by Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993).  
PFEVAR Predicted variance of the future twelve quarters’ percentage changes in adjusted 
earnings per share before extraordinary items. 
STRINGxQ An indicator variable for firms with consecutive increases in earnings, defined as a 
firm reporting a particular x quarter of increases in seasonally adjusted earnings 
before extraordinary items, i.e. 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 quarters. An increase is 
compared to EPS from the same quarter of the prior year. 
Control Variable  
AGE Log of firm age, calculated as the difference between current year and year when 
it was first collected by COMPUSTAT. 
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Variable Definition 
BVE Adjusted book value of equity per share at the end of fiscal quarter. 
CAPEX Quarterly capital expenditure divided by lagged market value of equity. 
CFO Operating cash flows scaled by lagged total assets. 
CSCORE Conservatism score developed by Khan and Watts (2009). 
EPS Adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items at the end of fiscal 
quarter. 
EVAR Variance of the past twenty quarters’ percentage changes in adjusted earnings 
per share before extraordinary items.  
LEV Leverage ratio, calculated as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided 
by long-term debt plus market value of equity at two months after the end of fiscal 
quarter. 
LTGROWTH Past twenty-quarter compound growth rate of book value of equity.  
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity at two months after the 
end of fiscal quarter divided by book value of equity at fiscal quarter-end.  
MKTVALUE Log of market value of equity at two months after the end of fiscal quarter. 
NPM Net profit margin, calculated as net income before extraordinary items divided by 
net sales. 
RD Quarterly research and development expenses divided by lagged market value of 
equity. 
SALEG Past four-quarter growth rate of sales revenue. 
SALES Sales revenue at the end of fiscal quarter divided by lagged market value of 
equity. 
SALESVAR Variance of the past four quarters’ percentage changes in sales revenue. 
STGROWTH Past four-quarter growth rate of book value of equity. 
U&B An indicator variable for firms in banking and utility industries. 
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Table 2.1  
Sample Composition 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Data Firm-Quarter  
Observ. 
Unique Firms 
Data set from Compustat and 
CRSP databases for the period 
1989 – 2014. 
687,922 19,188 
Less firms not listed on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ 
(157,820) (6,333) 
Data set for listed firms on 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for 
the period 1989 – 2014 
529,944 12,855 
Less observations with missing 
data for calculating string 
variable 
(104,588) (1,827) 
Sample available for all 
analyses period 1989 – 2014 
425,356 11,028 
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Panel B: Year Composition 
Year Firm-Quarter % of String 
Observ. Stringa Non-String Total 
1989 b 7,070 5,008 12,078 2.81% 
1990 b 6,662 5,349 12,011 2.64% 
1991 b 6,539 5,660 12,199 2.60% 
1992 7,941 4,828 12,769 3.15% 
1993 8,715 5,157 13,872 3.46% 
1994 9,674 5,722 15,396 3.84% 
1995 11,403 6,412 17,815 4.53% 
1996 11,616 6,524 18,140 4.61% 
1997 12,398 6,486 18,884 4.92% 
1998 11,122 7,695 18,817 4.42% 
1999 11,131 7,277 18,408 4.42% 
2000 10,639 7,309 17,948 4.22% 
2001 9,105 9,086 18,191 3.61% 
2002 11,178 6,734 17,912 4.44% 
2003 11,252 6,381 17,633 4.47% 
2004 11,390 5,788 17,178 4.52% 
2005 10,655 6,420 17,075 4.23% 
2006 10,305 6,667 16,972 4.09% 
2007 9,267 7,358 16,625 3.68% 
2008 7,766 8,901 16,667 3.08% 
2009 8,013 8,722 16,735 3.18% 
2010 10,590 5,716 16,306 4.20% 
2011 9,771 6,474 16,245 3.88% 
2012  9,073 7,299 16,372 3.60% 
2013  9,145 7,254 16,399 3.63% 
2014  9,483 7,226 16,709 3.76% 
Total 251,903 173,453 425,356 100.00% 
Average Per Year 9,689 6,671 16,360  
  
70 
 
Panel C: Industry Composition 
Industry 
 
Firm-Quarter % of String 
Observ. Stringa Non-String Total 
Food 6,292 4,135 10,427 2.50% 
Mining and Minerals 2,960 2,746 5,706 1.18% 
Oil and Petroleum Products 10,038 7,766 17,804 3.98% 
Textiles, Apparel, and Footware 3,721 2,305 6,026 1.48% 
Consumer Durables 4,467 3,275 7,742 1.77% 
Chemicals 4,389 3,225 7,614 1.74% 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 9,738 6,527 16,265 3.87% 
Construction and Construction 
Materials 
7,000 4,550 11,550 2.78% 
Steel Works 2,732 2,378 5,110 1.08% 
Fabricated Products 1,725 1,219 2,944 0.68% 
Machinery and Business 
Equipment 
31,354 22,650 54,004 12.45% 
Automobiles 3,456 2,123 5,579 1.37% 
Transportation 8,562 5,590 14,152 3.40% 
Utilities 7,798 6,496 14,294 3.10% 
Retail Stores 12,978 7,749 20,727 5.15% 
Banks, Insurance Companies, 
and Other Financials 
57,257 35,786 93,043 22.73% 
Other 77,436 54,933 132,369 30.74% 
Total 251,903 173,453 425,356 100.00% 
Note: 
This table reports sample composition.  
Panel A presents sample selection process.  
Panel B provides the number of observations based on fiscal year.  
Panel C provides the number of observations based on the Fama and French 17 industry 
classifications.  
An earnings string is defined as a firm that reports at least one quarter of increases in seasonally 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). An EPS increase is defined compared 
with earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) from the same quarter of the prior year. 
a This column reports the number of firm-quarter observations with at least one quarter of an increase 
in EPS before extraordinary items. 
b Data for year 1989 to 1991 are used for estimating predicted future earnings variability. 
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Table 2.2 
 The Distribution of Observations  
by Lengths of an (Past) Increasing Earnings String 
 
Length of Earnings Strings Firm-Quarter  
Observ. 
% of Observ. 
No String 323,570 76.07% 
4 – 7 quarters (12 – 21 months) 66,066 15.53% 
8 – 11 quarters (24 – 33 months) 19,966 4.69% 
12 – 15 quarters (36 – 45 months) 7,988 1.88% 
16 – 19 quarters (48 – 57 months) 3,611 0.85% 
Total for strings with 4 - 16 quarters 97,631 22.95% 
20 – 23 quarters (60 – 69 months) 1732 0.41% 
24 – 27 quarters (72 – 81 months) 944 0.22% 
28 – 31 quarters (84 – 93 months) 562 0.13% 
32 – 35 quarters (96 – 105 months) 374 0.09% 
36 – 39 quarters (108 months) 199 0.05% 
40 quarters or more (120 months or more) 344 0.08% 
Total for strings with at least 20 quarters 4155 0.98% 
Total 425,356 100.00% 
Note: 
This table analyses the sample distribution based on lengths of a string of earnings increases. An 
earnings string is defined as a firm that reports at least one quarter of increases in seasonally 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). An EPS increase is defined compared 
with earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) from the same quarter of the prior year. 
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Table 2.3  
Conditional Probability of String Momentum for the Next Four Quarters  
by a (Past) Earnings String 
 
Length of Earnings Strings  Conditional Probability of  
Future Four-Quarter Earnings Strings 
No String 4 Quarters Ahead 
No String 0.761 0.239 
4 quarters (12 months) 0.649 0.351 
8 quarters (24 months) 0.559 0.441 
12 quarters (36 months) 0.507 0.493 
16 quarters (48 months) 0.465 0.535 
20 quarters (60 months) 0.417 0.583 
24 quarters (72 months) 0.390 0.610 
28 quarters (84 months) 0.380 0.620 
32 quarters (96 months) 0.408 0.592 
36 quarters (108 months) 0.366 0.634 
40 quarters (120 months) 0.346 0.654 
Note: 
This table reports the probability of string development for the next four quarters conditional on 
lengths of a previous earnings string. An earnings string is defined as a firm that reports at least one 
quarter of increases in seasonally adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). An 
EPS increase is defined compared with earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) from the 
same quarter of the prior year. 
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Table 2.4  
Predicting Future Earnings Volatility  
Using the Modified Kothari et al. (2002) Model 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
FESD 197,236 5.937 1.813 13.765 96.199 0.059 
RD 197,236 0.007 0.000 0.017 0.124 0.000 
CAPEX 197,236 0.022 0.009 0.041 0.321 -0.001 
MKTVALUE 197,236 5.734 5.671 2.032 10.549 1.526 
LEV 197,236 0.266 0.163 0.328 2.218 0.000 
NPM 197,236 0.043 0.049 0.176 0.810 -0.712 
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Panel B: Empirical Results 
 
Dependent variable: FESD 
Model 
Fama-MacBeth OLS 
 INTERCEPT 8.425*** 
(0.000) 
6.666*** 
(0.000) 
RD 43.978*** 
(0.000) 
29.947*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX 4.744*** 
(0.000) 
3.548  
(0.124) 
MKTVALUE -0.680*** 
(0.000) 
-0.671*** 
(0.000) 
LEV 1.733*** 
(0.000) 
1.655*** 
(0.000) 
NPM -3.725*** 
(0.000) 
-3.594*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE NO YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO YES 
Clustered by Firm NO YES 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.028 
Observ. 197,236 197,236 
Note: 
This table reports results of predicting future earnings volatility using the modified Kothari et al. (2002) 
model. The sample comprises of 197,236 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 1989 – 
2008.  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the sample used in the regressions.  
Panel B offers the results obtained from OLS regressions according to equation (1) as follows.  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The number of observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. Inclusions of year fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm depend on specifications. P-
values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.5  
The Association between Price and Increasing Earnings Strings  
Controlling for Predicted Variability of Future Earnings 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
PRICE 137,457 20.415 14.430 21.411 144.630 0.747 
STRING20Q 137,457 0.018 0.000 0.133 1.000 0.000 
EPS 137,457 0.229 0.170 0.634 2.859 -4.510 
BVE 137,457 10.941 7.338 13.597 102.359 0.189 
LTGROWTH 137,457 0.019 0.019 0.035 0.120 -0.124 
EVAR 137,457 257.717 4.183 1,335.088 11,323.360 0.006 
PFEVAR 137,457 39.025 29.332 36.086 201.577 0.399 
LEV 137,457 0.262 0.166 0.317 2.218 0.000 
U&B 137,457 0.091 0.000 0.288 1.000 0.000 
AGE 137,457 2.956 2.890 0.605 4.043 0.000 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix - Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal   
 
Variable PRICE STRING 
20Q 
EPS BVE LTGROWT
H 
EVAR PFEVAR LEV U&B AGE 
PRICE  
 
0.075 0.629 0.681 0.214 -0.291 -0.432 -0.023 0.106 0.248 
STRING20Q 0.053 
 
 0.072 -0.034 0.136 -0.191 -0.113 -0.075 -0.019 -0.010 
EPS 0.432 
 
0.047  0.502 0.212 -0.305 -0.416 0.043 0.122 0.231 
BVE 0.697 
 
-0.017 0.315  0.088 -0.178 -0.193 0.285 0.248 0.255 
LTGROWTH 0.146 
 
0.120 0.156 0.076  -0.270 -0.208 -0.209 -0.065 -0.113 
EVAR -0.036 
 
-0.025 -0.040 -0.025 -0.075  0.340 0.023 -0.163 -0.113 
PFEVAR -0.259 
 
-0.088 -0.290 -0.104 -0.231 0.099  0.109 -0.082 -0.174 
LEV -0.031 
 
-0.059 -0.051 0.195 -0.184 0.008 0.211  0.351 0.117 
U&B 0.072 
 
-0.019 0.057 0.168 -0.040 -0.025 -0.072 0.355  0.030 
AGE 0.173 
 
-0.010 0.139 0.146 -0.085 -0.028 -0.132 0.019 0.033  
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Panel C: Lengths of (Past) Earnings Strings and Variability in Past and Future Earnings 
Length of Earnings 
Strings 
EVAR PFEVAR Observ. 
Non String 262.955 44.663 53,639 
1 Quarter 264.495 40.810 20,995 
2 Quarters 272.067 39.470 13,884 
3 Quarters 278.172 38.452 10,508 
4 Quarters 311.191 37.859 8,915 
5 Quarters 304.820 35.283 6,223 
6 Quarters 282.399 33.281 4,607 
7 Quarters 247.826 30.522 3,535 
8 Quarters 255.450 28.401 2,696 
9 Quarters 201.082 26.763 2,007 
10 Quarters 150.942 24.865 1,540 
11 Quarters 131.604 23.451 1,247 
12 Quarters 124.969 22.074 1,050 
13 Quarters 124.931 20.812 924 
14 Quarters 107.506 20.752 779 
15 Quarters 161.488 20.429 649 
16 Quarters 173.736 19.241 557 
17 Quarters 133.895 18.158 464 
18 Quarters 152.192 18.220 400 
19 Quarters 104.047 18.212 351 
20 Quarters 57.577 17.144 342 
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Panel D: Empirical Tests for Market Rewards After Controlling for Predicted Variability in 
Future Earnings 
 
Dependent variable: 
PRICE 
Result 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INTERCEPT 7.749*** 
(0.000) 
4.018*** 
(0.000) 
4.158*** 
(0.000) 
4.158*** 
(0.000) 
10.725*** 
(0.000) 
STRING20Q  
 
6.191*** 
(0.000) 
5.892*** 
(0.000) 
5.892*** 
(0.002) 
4.895*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x STRING20Q 6.298*** 
(0.000) 
-0.119 
(0.953) 
0.258 
(0.898) 
0.258 
(0.965) 
0.276 
(0.962) 
PFEVAR  
 
   -0.095*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x PFEVAR  
 
   -0.056*** 
(0.000) 
EPS 13.473*** 
(0.000) 
9.883*** 
(0.000) 
9.759*** 
(0.000) 
9.759*** 
(0.000) 
12.070*** 
(0.000) 
U&B  
 
-1.854*** 
(0.000) 
-2.136*** 
(0.000) 
-2.136** 
(0.048) 
-1.751* 
(0.083) 
LTGROWTH  
 
19.760*** 
(0.000) 
19.654*** 
(0.000) 
19.654*** 
(0.000) 
7.908* 
(0.071) 
EVAR  
 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.316) 
0.000 
(0.997) 
LEV  
 
-8.021*** 
(0.000) 
-7.825*** 
(0.000) 
-7.825*** 
(0.000) 
-5.197*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x U&B -0.740* 
(0.053) 
0.952** 
(0.033) 
0.967** 
(0.030) 
0.967 
(0.486) 
0.969 
(0.506) 
EPS x LTGROWTH 49.623*** 
(0.000) 
49.861*** 
(0.000) 
49.753*** 
(0.000) 
49.753*** 
(0.000) 
36.718*** 
(0.002) 
EPS x EVAR  -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.001) 
EPS x LEV -4.622*** 
(0.000) 
-2.854*** 
(0.000) 
-2.878*** 
(0.000) 
-2.878** 
(0.045) 
-1.411 
(0.301) 
BVE 0.925*** 
(0.000) 
0.964*** 
(0.000) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
0.930*** 
(0.000) 
AGE  1.979*** 
(0.000) 
2.123*** 
(0.000) 
2.123*** 
(0.000) 
1.306*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO NO YES YES 
Clustered by Firm NO NO NO YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.588 0.592 0.592 0.611 
Observ. 137,457 137,457 137,457 137,457 137,457 
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Panel E: Empirical Tests for Market Rewards to Specific Lengths of Strings (Less Than 
20 Quarters) After Controlling for Predicted Variability in Future Earnings 
 
Dependent Variable: 
PRICE 
Lengths of a String 
4 Quarters 8 Quarters 12 Quarters 16 Quarters 
INTERCEPT 10.713*** 
(0.000) 
10.714*** 
(0.000) 
10.748*** 
(0.000) 
10.732*** 
(0.000) 
STRINGxQ 0.126 
(0.708) 
1.089 
(0.103) 
2.491** 
(0.027) 
3.764** 
(0.013) 
EPS x STRINGxQ 5.940*** 
(0.000) 
5.403** 
(0.021) 
3.484 
(0.365) 
1.364 
(0.785) 
PFEVAR -0.095*** 
(0.000) 
-0.094*** 
(0.000) 
-0.094*** 
(0.000) 
-0.095*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x PFEVAR -0.050*** 
(0.000) 
-0.053*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055*** 
(0.000) 
-0.056*** 
(0.000) 
EPS 9.896*** 
(0.000) 
11.275*** 
(0.000) 
10.659*** 
(0.000) 
12.028*** 
(0.000) 
U&B -1.793* 
(0.075) 
-1.852* 
(0.062) 
-1.843* 
(0.064) 
-1.787* 
(0.075) 
LTGROWTH 8.734** 
(0.046) 
7.771* 
(0.072) 
7.313* 
(0.093) 
7.542* 
(0.086) 
EVAR -0.000 
(0.878) 
0.000 
(0.980) 
0.000 
(0.981) 
-0.000 
(0.997) 
LEV -5.230*** 
(0.000) 
-5.139*** 
(0.000) 
-5.150*** 
(0.000) 
-5.182*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x U&B 1.162 
(0.403) 
1.035 
(0.466) 
1.013 
(0.483) 
0.982 
(0.499) 
EPS x LTGROWTH 35.275*** 
(0.002) 
34.437*** 
(0.003) 
35.551*** 
(0.002) 
36.448*** 
(0.002) 
EPS x EVAR  -0.000*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000*** 
(0.001) 
EPS x LEV -0.997 
(0.440) 
-1.219 
(0.360) 
-1.323 
(0.324) 
-1.387 
(0.307) 
BVE 0.919*** 
(0.000) 
0.928*** 
(0.000) 
0.930*** 
(0.000) 
0.930*** 
(0.000) 
AGE 1.297*** 
(0.000) 
1.303*** 
(0.000) 
1.305*** 
(0.000) 
1.307*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.613 0.612 0.611 
Observ. 137,457 137,457 137,457 137,457 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between price, a price-earnings multiple and an increasing 
earnings string, after controlling for predicted variability in future earnings. The sample comprises of 137,457 firm-
quarter observations covering the period of 1992 – 2011.  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the sample used in the regressions.  
Panel B offers correlation coefficients. Coefficients reported in bold have statistical significance at 1 percent level.  
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Panel C presents average values of variability in past and future earnings in accordance with lengths of earnings 
strings. Lengths are from zero to twenty quarters of an earnings string. 
Panel D exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to equation (2) as follows.  
                           𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                            + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           
                                            + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                         
                                            + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽12(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                          
                                            + 𝛽𝛽13(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  +  𝛽𝛽14𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. Inclusions of year fixed effects, industry fixed 
effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm depend on specifications.  
Panel E reports results of tests for the empirical association between a price, a price-earnings multiple and a 
variety of lengths of strings of earnings increases after controlling for predicted variability in future earnings. The 
number of observations and adjusted R2 are also presented. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 2.6  
The Association between Earnings Strings and Firm Fundamentals 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
STRING 165,894 2.657 1.000 4.460 75.000 0.000 
FSCORE 165,894 0.511 0.505 0.052 0.648 0.171 
MB 165,894 2.943 1.979 3.381 25.575 0.043 
CAPEX 165,894 0.023 0.010 0.041 0.321 -0.001 
STGROWTH 165,894 0.094 0.069 0.340 2.069 -0.720 
SALEG 165,894 0.140 0.077 0.418 3.147 -0.742 
LEV 165,894 0.225 0.139 0.276 2.218 0.000 
AGE 165,894 2.894 2.833 0.625 4.043 0.000 
CSCORE 165,894 0.082 0.069 0.133 0.594 -0.196 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix - Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal   
 
 
  
Variable STRING FSCORE MB CAPEX STGROWTH SALEG LEV AGE CSCORE 
STRING  
 
0.083 0.249 -0.093 0.299 0.366 -0.131 -0.001 -0.176 
FSCORE 0.085 
 
 0.017 0.149 0.112 0.023 0.101 0.242 -0.209 
MB 0.165 
 
-0.074  -0.387 0.259 0.257 -0.379 -0.030 -0.449 
CAPEX -0.089 
 
0.017 -0.187  -0.059 -0.049 0.535 0.115 0.144 
STGROWTH 0.164 
 
0.029 0.086 -0.060  0.321 -0.162 -0.019 -0.251 
SALEG 0.119 
 
-0.068 0.146 -0.016 0.205  -0.102 -0.116 -0.143 
LEV -0.154 
 
0.047 -0.231 0.474 -0.157 -0.076  0.145 0.294 
AGE 0.003 
 
0.281 -0.049 0.004 -0.043 -0.112 0.057  -0.200 
CSCORE -0.190 
 
-0.194 -0.218 0.237 -0.169 -0.061 0.474 -0.200  
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Panel C: Empirical Tests for the Association between Earnings Strings and Firm 
Fundamentals 
 
Dependent Variable: STRING 
Result 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT -1.232 
(0.154) 
-0.522 
(0.498) 
FSCORE 6.837*** 
(0.000) 
5.581*** 
(0.000) 
MB  0.145*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX  -0.265 
(0.684) 
STGROWTH  1.370*** 
(0.000) 
SALEG  0.762*** 
(0.000) 
LEV  -0.769*** 
(0.000) 
AGE  -0.020 
(0.747) 
CSCORE  -4.021*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.102 
Observ. 165,894 165,894 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between earnings strings and firm fundamentals. The sample 
comprises of 165,894 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 1989 – 2014.  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the sample used in the regressions.  
Panel B offers correlation coefficients. Coefficients reported in bold have statistical significance at 1 percent level.  
Panel C exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to equation (3) as follows.  
𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                      + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.7  
The Predictive Ability of Increasing Earnings Strings 
for Future Growth Conditional on Their Lengths 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
FSTRING4Q 175,007 0.267 0.000 0.442 1.000 0.000 
FSTRING8Q 175,007 0.102 0.000 0.302 1.000 0.000 
FSTRING12Q 175,007 0.048 0.000 0.213 1.000 0.000 
STRING4Q 175,007 0.266 0.000 0.442 1.000 0.000 
STRING20Q 175,007 0.015 0.000 0.123 1.000 0.000 
EPS 175,007 0.180 0.149 0.703 2.859 -4.510 
FSCORE 175,007 0.510 0.504 0.058 0.648 0.075 
MB 175,007 2.783 1.883 3.166 25.575 0.043 
CAPEX 175,007 0.020 0.009 0.038 0.321 -0.001 
STGROWTH 175,007 0.098 0.073 0.320 2.069 -0.720 
SALEG 175,007 0.137 0.078 0.410 3.147 -0.742 
LEV 175,007 0.268 0.169 0.325 2.218 0.000 
AGE 175,007 2.891 2.833 0.632 4.043 0.000 
CSCORE 175,007 0.084 0.069 0.141 0.594 -0.196 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix - Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal   
Variable F 
STRING
4Q 
F 
STRING
8Q 
F 
STRING
12Q 
STRING 
4Q 
STRING 
20Q 
EPS F 
SCORE 
MB CAPEX ST  
GROW
TH 
SALEG LEV AGE C 
SCORE 
FSTRING4Q  
 
0.557 0.370 0.161 0.092 0.021 0.051 0.168 -0.050 0.029 0.136 -0.079 -0.005 -0.108 
FSTRING8Q 0.557 
 
 0.664 0.161 0.109 0.017 0.060 0.134 -0.039 0.062 0.092 -0.069 -0.002 -0.104 
FSTRING12Q 0.370 
 
0.664  0.134 0.105 0.007 0.058 0.111 -0.030 0.068 0.071 -0.060 0.002 -0.095 
STRING4Q 0.161 
 
0.161 0.134  0.208 0.226 0.085 0.242 -0.072 0.322 0.267 -0.144 -0.005 -0.166 
STRING20Q 0.092 
 
0.109 0.105 0.207  0.077 0.044 0.124 -0.053 0.099 0.067 -0.070 0.007 -0.105 
EPS 0.008 
 
0.008 0.009 0.156 0.048  0.183 0.138 0.009 0.342 0.171 0.046 0.249 -0.356 
FSCORE 0.052 
 
0.060 0.060 0.080 0.043 0.106  0.072 0.225 0.108 0.022 0.015 0.291 -0.247 
MB 0.106 
 
0.081 0.069 0.144 0.098 0.006 -0.031  -0.268 0.279 0.269 -0.425 -0.007 -0.457 
CAPEX -0.060 
 
-0.053 -0.042 -0.075 -0.039 -0.036 0.057 -0.168  -0.043 -0.029 0.379 0.152 0.084 
STGROWTH -0.018 
 
0.006 0.018 0.204 0.046 0.199 0.029 0.106 -0.045  0.339 -0.188 -0.035 -0.242 
SALEG 0.058 
 
0.025 0.019 0.139 0.021 0.073 -0.051 0.152 -0.010 0.216  -0.122 -0.118 -0.145 
LEV -0.078 
 
-0.066 -0.059 -0.137 -0.056 -0.052 -0.059 -0.252 0.331 -0.156 -0.078  0.122 0.356 
AGE -0.005 
 
-0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.007 0.151 0.321 -0.045 0.020 -0.055 -0.110 0.024  -0.224 
CSCORE -0.099 
 
-0.095 -0.088 -0.157 -0.096 -0.245 -0.228 -0.225 0.193 -0.162 -0.063 0.514 -0.219  
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Panel C: Empirical Results for the Predictive Ability of Increasing Earnings Strings for Future Growth Conditional on Their Lengths 
 Dependent Variable 
FSTRING4Q FSTRING8Q FSTRING12Q FSTRING4Q FSTRING8Q FSTRING12Q 
INTERCEPT -1.223*** 
(0.000) 
-2.094*** 
(0.000) 
-2.656*** 
(0.000) 
-1.181*** 
(0.000) 
-2.027*** 
(0.000) 
-2.572*** 
(0.000) 
STRING4Q 0.417*** 
(0.000) 
0.495*** 
(0.000) 
0.486*** 
(0.000) 
   
STRING20Q    0.714*** 
(0.000) 
0.767*** 
(0.000) 
0.737*** 
(0.000) 
EPS -0.038*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055*** 
(0.000) 
-0.061*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.151) 
-0.022* 
(0.052) 
-0.024 
(0.231) 
FSCORE 0.775*** 
(0.000) 
1.036*** 
(0.000) 
1.348*** 
(0.000) 
0.928*** 
(0.000) 
1.220*** 
(0.000) 
1.525*** 
(0.000) 
MB 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -1.328*** 
(0.000) 
-2.242*** 
(0.000) 
-3.099*** 
(0.000) 
-1.432*** 
(0.000) 
-2.409*** 
(0.000) 
-3.309*** 
(0.000) 
STGROWTH -0.333*** 
(0.000) 
-0.242*** 
(0.000) 
-0.153*** 
(0.000) 
-0.247*** 
(0.000) 
-0.128*** 
(0.000) 
-0.043 
(0.253) 
SALEG 0.152*** 
(0.000) 
0.053*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.003) 
0.182*** 
(0.000) 
0.093*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
LEV 0.006 
(0.832) 
0.049 
(0.298) 
0.016 
(0.532) 
-0.023 
(0.461) 
0.004 
(0.936) 
-0.037 
(0.576) 
AGE -0.027 
(0.121) 
-0.039* 
(0.092) 
-0.036*** 
(0.000) 
-0.031* 
(0.091) 
-0.042* 
(0.078) 
-0.039 
(0.191) 
CSCORE -0.639*** 
(0.000) 
-0.921*** 
(0.000) 
-1.140*** 
(0.000) 
-0.639*** 
(0.000) 
-0.901*** 
(0.000) 
-1.109*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.084 0.107 0.046 0.068 0.091 
Observ. 175,007 175,007 175,007 175,007 175,007 175,007 
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Note: 
This table mainly reports the predictive ability of past increasing earnings strings for future growth conditional on 
their lengths. The sample comprises of 175,007 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 1989 – 2011.  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the sample used in the regressions.  
Panel B offers correlation coefficients. Coefficients reported in bold have statistical significance at 1 percent level.  
Panel C exhibits the results obtained from Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimation according to equation (4) as 
follows.  
                         𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                           + 𝛿𝛿6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
The number of observations and pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.8  
The Predictive Ability of Increasing Earnings Strings for Future Earnings Variability 
Conditional on Their Lengths 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
FEVAR 165,302 212.072 2.740 1,112.779 9,254.334 0.003 
STRING4Q 165,302 0.266 0.000 0.442 1.000 0.000 
STRING20Q 165,302 0.016 0.000 0.126 1.000 0.000 
EVAR 165,302 258.150 4.145 1,338.854 11,323.360 0.006 
FSCORE 165,302 0.511 0.505 0.058 0.648 0.154 
RD 165,302 0.008 0.000 0.019 0.124 0.000 
CAPEX 165,302 0.021 0.009 0.038 0.321 -0.001 
MKTVALUE 165,302 6.010 5.973 2.100 10.549 1.526 
SALE 165,302 0.478 0.244 0.878 9.470 0.000 
SALEVAR 165,302 0.068 0.002 0.394 4.159 0.000 
LEV 165,302 0.273 0.173 0.327 2.218 0.000 
AGE 165,302 2.938 2.890 0.606 4.043 0.000 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix - Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal   
Variable FEVAR STRING  
4Q 
STRING 
20Q 
EVAR FSCORE RD CAPEX MKT 
VALUE 
SALE SALE 
VAR 
LEV AGE 
FEVAR  -0.271 
 
-0.144 
  
0.394 -0.091 0.126 0.105 -0.259 0.153 0.240 0.128 -0.105 
STRING4Q -0.059  
 
 0.213 -0.010 0.084 -0.023 -0.072 0.134 -0.086 -0.093 -0.142 -0.008 
STRING20Q -0.020 
 
0.213  -0.182 0.045 -0.037 -0.054 0.112 -0.072 -0.088 -0.073 -0.003 
EVAR 0.016 
 
-0.011 -0.023  -0.052 0.146 0.096 -0.271 0.155 0.267 0.055 -0.108 
FSCORE -0.018 
 
0.080 0.044 -0.025  -0.036 0.228 0.248 0.198 0.105 0.017 0.295 
RD 0.034 
 
-0.067 -0.041 0.039 -0.066  -0.163 -0.063 -0.192 -0.118 -0.300 -0.109 
CAPEX 0.030 
 
-0.073 -0.039 0.020 0.059 0.043  -0.018 0.481 0.392 0.386 0.160 
MKTVALUE -0.065 
 
0.136 0.113 -0.060 0.242 -0.154 -0.080  -0.272 -0.333 -0.029 0.315 
SALE 0.034 
 
-0.068 -0.039 0.025 0.084 0.075 0.495 -0.217  0.814 0.453 0.151 
SALEVAR 0.027 
 
-0.034 -0.021 0.026 0.009 0.057 0.336 -0.126 0.716  0.367 0.050 
LEV 0.035 
 
-0.136 -0.059 0.018 -0.052 -0.050 0.347 -0.120 0.418 0.285  0.128 
AGE -0.031 
 
-0.007 -0.003 -0.027 0.324 -0.092 0.030 0.330 0.022 -0.021 0.030  
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Panel C: Empirical Tests for the Predictive Ability of Increasing Earnings Strings for 
Future Earnings Variability Conditional on Their Lengths 
 
Dependent Variable: 
FEVAR 
Result 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INTERCEPT 226.682*** 
(0.008) 
218.939** 
(0.011) 
226.131*** 
(0.009) 
232.000*** 
(0.007) 
235.153*** 
(0.006) 
STRING4Q -120.426*** 
(0.000) 
    
STRING8Q  -130.463*** 
(0.000) 
   
STRING12Q   -125.610*** 
(0.000) 
  
STRING16Q    -112.317*** 
(0.000) 
 
STRING20Q     -101.742*** 
(0.000) 
EVAR 0.005 
(0.491) 
0.005 
(0.530) 
0.005 
(0.520) 
0.005 
(0.510) 
0.005 
(0.508) 
FSCORE 77.193 
(0.610) 
66.662 
(0.661) 
52.321 
(0.731) 
42.113 
(0.782) 
36.662 
(0.809) 
RD 1399.575*** 
(0.002) 
1452.381*** 
(0.001) 
1497.550*** 
(0.001) 
1526.275*** 
(0.001) 
1540.133*** 
(0.001) 
CAPEX 310.599 
(0.256) 
324.724 
(0.235) 
331.879 
(0.226) 
335.850 
(0.220) 
338.207 
(0.217) 
MKTVALUE -27.982*** 
(0.000) 
-28.593*** 
(0.000) 
-29.522*** 
(0.000) 
-30.227*** 
(0.000) 
-30.630*** 
(0.000) 
SALE -5.782 
(0.673) 
-5.458 
(0.691) 
-5.411 
(0.694) 
-5.305 
(0.699) 
-5.256 
(0.702) 
SALEVAR 25.938 
(0.348) 
22.783 
(0.412) 
22.200 
(0.424) 
21.810 
(0.433) 
21.553 
(0.439) 
LEV 100.118*** 
(0.000) 
106.416*** 
(0.000) 
111.414*** 
(0.000) 
114.036*** 
(0.000) 
115.213*** 
(0.000) 
AGE -19.496 
(0.242) 
-18.322 
(0.274) 
-16.918 
(0.313) 
-16.043 
(0.337) 
-15.533 
(0.352) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Observ. 165,302 165,302 165,302 165,302 165,302 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the predictive ability of past increasing earnings strings for future earnings variability 
conditional on their lengths. The sample comprises of 165,302 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 
1989 – 2011.  
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the sample used in the regressions.  
Panel B offers correlation coefficients. Coefficients reported in bold have statistical significance at 1 percent level.  
Panel C exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to equation (5) as follows.  
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      𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    
                               + 𝛾𝛾6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾9𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        
The number of observations and pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.9 
 The Association between Price and Increasing Earnings Strings  
Controlling for (Ex Post) Variability in Future Earnings 
 
Dependent Variable: PRICE    Result 
INTERCEPT 4.320*** 
(0.005) 
STRING20Q 5.849*** 
(0.002) 
EPS x STRING20Q 0.216 
(0.971) 
FEVAR -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x FEVAR -0.000 
(0.234) 
EPS 11.325*** 
(0.000) 
U&B -2.160** 
(0.046) 
LTGROWTH 19.380*** 
(0.000) 
EVAR -0.000 
(0.318) 
LEV -7.792*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x U&B 1.005 
(0.471) 
EPS x LTGROWTH 49.485*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x EVAR  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x LEV -2.836** 
(0.047) 
BVE 0.968*** 
(0.000) 
AGE 2.096*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Clustered by Year YES 
Clustered by Firm YES 
Adjusted R2 0.592 
Observ. 137,457 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between price, a price-earnings multiple and an increasing 
earnings string, after controlling for ex post variability in future earnings. The sample comprises of 137,457 firm-
quarter observations covering the period of 1992 – 2011.  
It exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the equation as follows.  
 
 
93 
 
                             𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                              + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           
                                              + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                         
                                              + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽12(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                          
                                              + 𝛽𝛽13(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  +  𝛽𝛽14𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. The regression includes year fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 2.10  
The Association between Earnings Strings 
and Fundamentals-based Earnings Persistence 
 
 
Dependent Variable: STRING 
Result 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT 2.074*** 
(0.000) 
1.779*** 
(0.000) 
FPERSIST 0.688*** 
(0.000) 
0.641*** 
(0.000) 
MB  0.139*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX  -0.171 
(0.784) 
STGROWTH  1.379*** 
(0.000) 
SALEG  0.727*** 
(0.000) 
LEV  -0.583*** 
(0.000) 
AGE  0.099* 
(0.095) 
CSCORE  -4.671*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.100 
Observ. 165,894 165,894 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between earnings strings and fundamentals-based earnings 
persistence. The sample comprises of 165,894 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 1989 – 2014.  
It exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the equation as follows.  
                     𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                        + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.11 
The Association between Earnings Strings and Firm Fundamentals 
Controlling for Alternative Control Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variable: STRING 
Result 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT -1.297  
(0.134) 
1.779*** 
(0.000) 
FSCORE 6.932*** 
(0.000) 
5.704*** 
(0.000) 
MB  0.153*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX  -0.858  
(0.217) 
STGROWTH  0.838*** 
(0.000) 
SALEG  0.820*** 
(0.000) 
LEV  -0.678*** 
(0.000) 
AGE  -0.017 
(0.785) 
CSCORE  -4.061*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.093 
Observ. 164,751 164,751 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between earnings strings and firm fundamentals controlling for 
Alternative Control Variables. The sample comprises of 164,751 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 
1989 – 2014.  
It exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the equation as follows.  
𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
                                                 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.12  
The Predictive Ability of Long Increasing Earnings Strings  
for Future Sales and Cash Flows 
 
 Dependent Variable 
FS4Q FS8Q FS12Q FCF4Q FCF8Q FCF12Q 
INTERCEPT -0.397*** 
(0.003) 
-0.779*** 
(0.000) 
-1.000*** 
(0.000) 
-1.209*** 
(0.000) 
-2.282*** 
(0.000) 
-5.774*** 
(0.000) 
STRING20Q 0.593*** 
(0.000) 
0.579*** 
(0.000) 
0.543*** 
(0.000) 
0.176*** 
(0.000) 
0.174* 
(0.096) 
0.205 
(0.236) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.110 0.118 0.024 0.072 0.101 
Observ. 174,851 174,851 174,851 173,604 173,604 157,442 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the predictive ability of long (past) increasing earnings strings for future sales and future 
cash flows. The samples vary across specifications but covering the period of 1989 – 2011 with the maximum of 
174,851 firm-quarter observations.  
First three columns exhibit the results obtained from Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimation according to the 
equation as follows.  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                       + 𝛿𝛿6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
Last three columns report the results obtained from Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimation according to the 
equation as follows.  
                              𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                        + 𝛿𝛿6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
The number of observations and pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include control variables, year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.13  
The Predictive Ability of Increasing Earnings Strings 
for Expected Growth and Risk Conditional on Their Lengths 
 
Panel A: The Predictive Ability of Increasing Earnings Strings for Expected Growth 
Conditional on Their Lengths 
 
Dependent Variable: 
MB 
Result 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INTERCEPT 5.069*** 
(0.000) 
5.098*** 
(0.000) 
5.103*** 
(0.000) 
5.083*** 
(0.000) 
5.067*** 
(0.000) 
STRING4Q 0.556*** 
(0.000) 
    
STRING8Q  0.954*** 
(0.000) 
   
STRING12Q   1.193*** 
(0.000) 
  
STRING16Q    1.330*** 
(0.000) 
 
STRING20Q     1.536*** 
(0.000) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.156 0.158 0.160 0.157 
Observ. 138,002 138,002 138,002 138,002 138,002 
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Panel B: The Predictive Ability of Lengths of Increasing Earnings Strings for 
Expected Risk Conditional on Their Lengths 
 
Dependent Variable: 
PFEVAR 
Result 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INTERCEPT 66.258*** 
(0.000) 
66.188*** 
(0.000) 
66.219*** 
(0.000) 
66.207*** 
(0.000) 
66.184*** 
(0.000) 
STRING4Q -0.785 
(0.138) 
    
STRING8Q  -0.137 
(0.830) 
   
STRING12Q   1.191 
(0.114) 
  
STRING16Q    1.921** 
(0.041) 
 
STRING20Q     2.485** 
(0.029) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 
Observ. 138,002 138,002 138,002 138,002 138,002 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the predictive ability of past increasing earnings strings for expected growth 
and expected risk conditional on their lengths. The samples comprises of 138,002 firm-quarter 
observations covering the period of 1992 – 2011.  
Panel A exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the equation as follows.  
    𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                         + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
Panel B reports the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the equation as follows.  
      𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    
                 + 𝛾𝛾6𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾9𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
The number of observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include control 
variables, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-
values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.14  
The Association between Price and Increasing Earnings Strings 
for the Sample of 4th Quarter 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
PRICE 
Result 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT 8.257*** 
(0.000) 
4.356***  
(0.000) 
STRING20Q  
 
4.828*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x STRING20Q 7.919*** 
(0.002) 
2.932 
(0.405) 
EPS 11.763*** 
(0.000) 
10.048*** 
(0.000) 
U&B  
 
-2.563*** 
(0.000) 
LTGROWTH  
 
22.473*** 
(0.000) 
EVAR  
 
-0.000** 
(0.012) 
LEV  
 
-7.944*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x U&B -0.386 
(0.584) 
1.380* 
(0.074) 
EPS x LTGROWTH 40.098*** 
(0.000) 
42.612***  
(0.000) 
EPS x EVAR  -0.000*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x LEV -3.240*** 
(0.000) 
-2.469***  
(0.000) 
BVE 0.972*** 
(0.000) 
1.007*** 
(0.000) 
AGE  2.084***  
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO 
Clustered by Year NO NO 
Clustered by Firm NO NO 
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.589 
Observ. 36,141 36,141 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between price, a price-earnings multiple and an 
increasing earnings string, for the sample of 4th quarter. The sample comprises of 36,141 firm-quarter 
observations covering the period of 1992 – 2011.  
It exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the following equation as follows.  
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               𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           
                                + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                         
                                + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽10(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                          
                                + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  +  𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. I include year fixed effects into all 
specifications. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of 
parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 2.15  
The Association between Price and Increasing Earnings Strings Controlling 
for Predicted Variability of Future Earnings and Fundamentals 
 
Dependent variable: 
PRICE 
Result 
INTERCEPT 7.582*** 
(0.000) 
STRING20Q 4.798*** 
(0.010) 
FSCORE 7.126** 
(0.024) 
EPS x STRING20Q 0.324 
(0.955) 
PFEVAR -0.093*** 
(0.000)   
EPS x PFEVAR -0.056*** 
(0.000) 
EPS 12.029*** 
(0.000) 
U&B -1.646 
(0.111) 
LTGROWTH 7.415* 
(0.091) 
EVAR 0.000   
(0.984)   
LEV -5.281*** 
(0.000) 
EPS x U&B 1.012 
(0.490) 
EPS x LTGROWTH 36.824*** 
(0.002) 
EPS x EVAR  -0.000*** 
(0.001) 
EPS x LEV -1.354    
(0.321)    
BVE 0.929*** 
(0.000) 
AGE 1.140*** 
(0.001) 
Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Clustered by Year YES 
Clustered by Firm YES 
Adjusted R2 0.611   
Observ. 137,457 
Note: 
This table mainly reports the empirical association between price, a price-earnings multiple and an 
increasing earnings string, after controlling for predicted variability in future earnings and fundamental 
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scores. The sample comprises of 137,457 firm-quarter observations covering the period of 1992 – 
2011.  
It exhibits the results obtained from OLS regressions according to the modified version of equation (2) 
as follows.  
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆20𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                          + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           
                          + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀&𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                         
                          + 𝛽𝛽12(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛽𝛽13(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                          
                          + 𝛽𝛽14(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  +  𝛽𝛽15𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                      
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. Inclusions of year fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Chapter 3: Are Earnings Strings Economically Real or Managed? 
3.1 Introduction  
Barth et al. (1999) document that price premiums are awarded to earnings of 
companies that consistently report increasing earnings (henceforth, earnings 
strings). Subsequent research provides evidence suggesting that meeting or beating 
earnings benchmarks (MBEB) serves as a signal to markets about future earnings. 
This evidence is consistent with the information content hypothesis in the MBEB 
signal (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Brown et al., 2009; and 
Xie, 2011). In contrast, according to the earnings management hypothesis, firms that 
MBEB may also use their discretion to “manufacture” such patterns. Support for the 
earnings management hypothesis can be found from research that finds a 
discontinuity around certain reporting thresholds (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; and Burgstahler and Eames, 2006).34 Further 
support for the earnings management hypothesis is provided by the fact that 
relatively few firms are able to meet or beat reporting thresholds year after year 
(Myers et al., 2007; and Chu et al., 2016). This would be expected if choices that 
increase current earnings work to reduce future earnings (e.g., as is expected from 
the reversal property of accruals).35 
These observations raise two intriguing questions that have not been fully addressed 
in prior research. First, does the documented price premium vary with the level of 
earnings management? That is, if investors believe that MBEB is achieved through 
                                                          
34 Alternatively, Beaver et al. (2007) suggest that non-smoothing distributions are caused by income tax and 
special items; while Durtschi and Easton (2005) argue that discontinuities are due to research design. 
35 There is another explanation for valuation premiums requiring the investor irrationality hypothesis 
(Shanthikumar, 2012). 
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earnings management, then the information-to-noise ratio in the MBEB signal is 
lower than would be in the absence of such suspicion.  
Second, prior literature has identified high abnormal accruals as a measure of poor 
accounting quality (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; 
and Kothari et al., 2005). However, there are opposing views maintaining that 
accounting choices that are associated with “poor” accounting are, in fact, 
informative about future performance (Sloan, 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Xie 2001; 
Fairfield et al., 2003; Richardson et al., 2005; Fama and French, 2006; Zhang, 2007; 
Cooper et al., 2008; Allen et al., 2013; Penman and Yehuda, 2015; and Ball et al., 
2015). In the context of strings I therefore ask if strings that are associated with high 
abnormal accruals are associated with future performance. A related question 
concerns how equity markets perceive strings that are seemingly “manufactured” by 
aggressive accounting choices. Answering the latter question is important given that 
prior research of the economic consequences of strings does not control for 
accounting quality. I argue that increasing length of strings are less likely to be driven 
by aggressive accounting choices owing to the reversal property of accruals. In 
contrast, firms who repeatedly MBEB are able to do so because the underlying 
business is stronger, rather than because the accounting is increasingly more 
aggressive. 
I provide evidence that abnormal accruals are positively associated with varying 
lengths of strings. I also use total accruals proxied by net working capital as an 
alternative measure for both earnings quality and future prospects of a firm. I find 
weak evidence that net working capital is higher for string firms. This evidence 
seems to suggest that strings may reflect poor quality earnings. However, further 
investigation reveals that strings that are combined with high abnormal accruals (or 
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high net working capital) are associated with higher future growth and lower future 
risk. This provides evidence that accounting choices are predictors of growth and 
lower risk. In other words, combinations of strings with high abnormal accruals (or 
high net working capital) are signals of future growth and risk and not necessarily the 
result of earnings management.  
Having established these empirical results, I subsequently explore the pricing 
implications of strings after controlling for abnormal accruals or net working capital. 
In particular, I investigate if market participants correctly price strings, and whether 
any pricing is moderated by abnormal accruals or net working capital. If the market 
regards an earnings string as a predictor of future growth and lower risk, as the 
evidence above suggests, I expect to find that contemporaneous returns are 
positively related to strings. One can view that an increasing length of earnings string 
is indicative of sustainable and possibly stronger growth opportunities which is 
expected to be reflected in contemporaneous returns. In addition, if high abnormal 
accruals (high net working capital) are also perceived as predictors of growth and 
lower risk, I do not expect to find negative market reaction. Furthermore, a 
combination of strings and “poor” accounting quality is not expected to be 
incrementally associated with contemporaneous negative returns. I find that (1) 
longer strings are more positively associated with current returns; (2) high abnormal 
accruals and high net working capital are positively (negatively) related to current 
(future) returns; and (3) combinations of high abnormal accruals, or high net working 
capital, with strings are negatively (positively) associated with current (future) 
returns. The returns evidence, complements the previous set of results about future 
profitability and lower risk, in that it suggests that investors interpret strings and high 
levels of accruals (or high net working capital) as positive performance signals. 
106 
 
However, in the case of large abnormal accruals investors seem to be over-
optimistic, as is evidenced from the magnitude of the reversal in future returns. 
Nevertheless, markets seem too suspicious of combinations of “poor” accounting 
and long strings. Taken together, the body of evidence reported here does not lend 
support to the view that abnormal accruals or net working capital are predominantly 
the outcome of earnings management.   
This paper makes two noteworthy contributions to the MBEB literature. First, it 
complements previous studies (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 
2002; Brown et al., 2009; and Xie, 2011) by providing new evidence as to the 
information content of earnings strings. Specifically, I find that although string firms 
have higher levels of abnormal accruals (or higher levels of net working capital), they 
are more likely to grow in the future and are predicted to be less risky. In particular, 
strings are associated with future growth in earnings, sales and cash flows, as well 
as lower future risk, after controlling for the firms’ accounting quality. I therefore 
conclude that the presence of strings is indicative of positive firm fundamentals and 
is not necessarily the result of aggressive accounting choices. In the light of the 
debate of whether traditional measures of “poor” accounting are the outcome of 
managerial discretion or are value-relevant pieces of information, this study provides 
evidence supporting the latter. This stands in contrast to Chu et al.’s (2016) findings 
that strings are the consequence of earnings management. However, it should be 
noted that their results do not generalize because they use a sample of string firms 
that are subsequently investigated by the SEC.  
Second, I provide novel evidence on market perceptions of combinations of strings 
and high abnormal accruals (or high net working capital). The evidence suggests 
that investors initially under-react to earnings strings associated with high levels of 
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abnormal accruals (or high levels of net working capital), which may suggest the 
market is predicting a reversal in accruals in such cases. However since I find that a 
partial correction takes place in later periods, I conclude that investors are overly 
suspicious of combinations of strings and high abnormal accruals (or high net 
working capital). This evidence furnishes us a new insight as to how investors 
perceive abnormal accruals (and net working capital) in the context of MBEB. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related 
literature and research questions. Section 3.3 describes research design. Section 
3.4 provides sample. Section 3.5 and 3.6 report main and additional results 
respectively. Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Related Literature and Research Questions 
3.2.1 Prior Literature  
A significant strand of research provides substantial evidence that companies are 
more likely to report small profits, increasing earnings, and beating analysts’ 
earnings projections.36 Prior studies document that the number of MBEB firms are 
disproportionally high because of capital market incentives. Firms that meet earnings 
targets benefit from higher prices or returns, and lower cost of debt (Barth et al., 
1999; Lopez and Rees, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; 
Brown and Caylor, 2005; Myers et al., 2007; Jiang, 2008; Koonce and Lipe, 2010; 
and Shanthikumar, 2012). Complementing this evidence, research also finds that 
firms experience stock price decreases when they are unable to continue their 
earnings momentum (DeAngelo et al., 1996; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; and Kinney et 
al., 2002).  
                                                          
36 These three benchmarks are consistent with Jiang (2008) who categorizes earnings benchmarks into profits, 
earnings increases, and positive earnings surprises.  
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To provide a succinct review of the literature, I discuss the most relevant studies 
below and then identify any unexplored issues.  
Barth et al. (1999) find that earnings of firms reporting increasing earnings strings for 
at least five consecutive years attract higher price multiples (i.e. higher ERCs). Barth 
et al. (1999) provide explanations as to why earnings strings attract higher price-
earnings multiples based on risk and growth. However, they do not explicitly test 
those explanations. In addition, they do not investigate whether these rewards vary 
with measures of accounting quality. 
Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) both provide evidence based 
on meeting or beating earnings forecasts, rather than strings of realized earnings 
increases. Specifically, Bartov et al. (2002) document that investors reward firms 
reporting earnings that meet or beat analysts’ expectations with valuation premiums, 
i.e. higher abnormal returns. They also find that such premiums are marginally 
diminished if the markets perceive that firms are engaging in earnings management 
or expectation management. They do not investigate the predictive ability with 
respect to future operating cash flows which reflects a resolution of past accruals. 
While I focus on the length of strings, they restrict attention to a single period. The 
earnings benchmark used in this study is prior year’s earnings which is different from 
that of Bartov et al. (2002) who use analyst forecasts. The concern with analyst 
forecasts is that they may be lower than prior year’s earnings because of expectation 
management. I argue that my benchmark is more difficult to meet or beat relative to 
their benchmark. Finally, I explore whether earnings strings are driven by economic 
fundamentals, an issue Bartov et al. (2002) do not address. 
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Kasznik and McNichols (2002) also provide evidence on meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. They find that these strings (only up to three years) predict future 
earnings, but they do not examine the predictability of strings with respect to other 
performance measures that I examine here (operating cash flows, sales, and risk). 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) do not find evidence of any reversal in returns in firms 
that MBEB. They therefore conclude that meeting or beating analyst forecasts is 
correctly priced. This study attempts to resolve the question as to whether earnings 
strings are the product of earnings management or underlying performance whereas 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) are silent on this issue. Hence I extend their findings 
by examining the information role of accruals and net working capital. 
Brown et al. (2009) and Xie (2011) provide evidence on the information content of 
meeting or beating earnings thresholds with regard to risk. In particular, Brown et al. 
(2009) investigate the association between meeting or beating earnings forecasts 
and information asymmetry, as a proxy for information risk. They find that information 
risk is lower for firms that achieve their earnings expectation. Xie (2011) document 
that the terminations of earnings strings give rise to lower expected cash flows 
perceived by investors and higher required rate of returns, suggesting higher risk for 
firms reporting ends of earnings strings. Neither of the papers investigates the 
forecasting power of meeting or beating earnings targets for future performance and 
managerial discretion. 
There are a few studies that directly investigate the combination of earnings strings 
and earnings management. Myers et al. (2007) provide evidence on long strings of 
earnings increases. Specifically, they argue that firms engage in earnings 
management activities in order to create earnings strings. This argument is based on 
the evidence that the frequency of firms reporting increasing earnings strings is 
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statistically higher than their simulated sample. They also find that firms with strings 
benefit from positive contemporaneous abnormal returns, consistent with the view 
that managers are motivated by the observed valuation premiums. However, they do 
not examine the information content with respect to future prospects informed by 
earnings strings. Although Myers et al. (2007) find that the actual number of string 
firms is greater than the simulated number of such firms, their findings may be 
sensitive to parameters chosen for their simulation. 
In a concurrent paper Chu et al. (2016) examine a sample of Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases or AAER firms that were investigated by the SEC. 
Their findings suggest that firms that manipulate earnings tend to report strings of 
earnings increases due to maintaining valuation premiums. However, their sample 
selection does not allow them to investigate whether earnings strings are informative 
about future growth and risk because firms who manipulate earnings do not present 
their true performance. They also ignore the information role of accruals and net 
working capital associated with strings. Moreover, using firms subject to AAER firms 
as a sample causes some concerns over drawing safe inferences. First, an AAER 
sample includes only firms that are caught by SEC following fraud detection. This is 
distinct from earnings management within GAAP. Second, AAER firms are chosen 
conditional on the fact that SEC is confident that they will win the cases. In addition, 
Larson (2008) argues that an AAER sample may comprise of firms subject to 
political reasons instead of manipulation or fraud.  
To conclude, prior literature leaves several unexplored issues. Firstly, they do not 
examine time-series properties of earnings strings, i.e. short and long strings, which 
contemporaneously affects the strings themselves and the valuation premiums. 
Secondly, they do not investigate the information content of earnings strings with 
111 
 
respect to future performance conditional on accounting quality. Finally, they are 
silent on how investors react to earnings strings conditional on accounting quality in 
current and next periods. 
3.2.2 Predictive Ability of Accruals for Growth and Risk  
Previous studies argue that the traditional proxy for earnings management, i.e. 
accruals, reflects the behaviour of opportunistic managers with respect to their 
discretion. Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002), and 
Kothari et al. (2005) use abnormal accruals (discretionary accruals) as a proxy to 
assess the levels of managerial discretion and hence the quality of earnings. 
However, more recently Penman and Yehuda (2015) and Ball et al. (2015) argue 
that accruals should be interpreted as indicators of the firms’ growth stage. Penman 
and Yehuda (2015) posit that such accounting measures convey news about both 
cash flows and discount rate. Thus they suggest that the level of accruals reflects the 
deferral of future earnings that leads to uncertainty or higher risk.37 Resolved 
uncertainty results in earnings realization or earnings growth and reduced expected 
returns. Overall, they conclude that accruals reflect signals about future earnings 
growth and lower underlying risk. Similarly, Ball et al. (2015) suggest that accruals, 
or timing differences between cash flows and earnings, arise from net investment in 
working capital. Firms adjust their levels of working capital to rationally react to 
expected growth.38 For example, firms launching new products to the market are 
likely to accumulate high levels of inventory, or may need to invest in accounts 
receivable. Consistent with this argument, Subramanyam (1996) finds that 
                                                          
37 Deferring earnings recognition through accruals to the future periods is a manifestation of future earnings 
growth. Such growth however is at risk until it materializes.  
38 Accruals are also considered to be related to lower discount rate. As accruals are interpreted as investment in 
working capital, firms expecting decreases in discount rate optimally adjust investment policy by undertaking 
more profitable projects until marginal benefits equals marginal costs. 
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discretionary accruals predict profitability and dividend in future periods. Hence, if 
firms are in a growth stage, higher-than-average accruals are expected. 
There are a number of studies in the accounting literature that use accruals as a 
measure of future growth. Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Richardson et al. (2005), and 
Allen et al. (2013) suggest that those accruals responsible for lower future returns 
are less persistent and tend to have reversals in the next periods. Fairfield et al. 
(2003), Fama and French (2006), and Cooper et al. (2008) employ a growth proxy 
explicitly based on accruals. Zhang (2007) also argue that accruals and growth are 
fundamentally related.  Moreover, Zhang, (2005), Wu et al. (2010), and Cooper and 
Priestley (2011) argue that investment which includes accruals are negatively 
associated with expected returns, implying lower risk.  
To the best of my knowledge, previous studies have not conditioned earnings strings 
on accounting quality. Given the debate about whether accruals proxy for earnings 
management or growth/risk prospects, this leads to two possibilities. First, valuation 
premiums are a result of successful earnings management. Or second, the 
accounting choice proxies for underlying business which supports the earnings 
strings and hence command higher prices.  
3.2.3 Research Questions  
Prior literature suggests that there are market-based incentives for managers to 
MBEB. This raises the possibility that managers use their discretion over reporting 
choices to achieve specific thresholds. That is, managers can increase discretionary 
accruals or abnormal accruals to inflate earnings in order to meet or beat certain 
targets. However, given the reversal property of accruals, consistently beating these 
thresholds – as is evidenced by longer strings – through accruals management 
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becomes increasingly more difficult. It therefore stands to reason that observing 
longer strings when accruals are high may stem from an alternative explanation. 
Namely, a combination of long strings with high abnormal accruals could be a result 
of the underlying business process reflecting growth and lower risk. This is 
consistent with Penman and Yehuda (2015) and Ball et al. (2015) who argue that 
accrual accounting plays a significant role in signalling firms’ fundamentals. 
Prior literature has not exploited the time dimension in strings to distinguish between 
these competing theories specifically about the information content of accruals and, 
by implication, strings. Since under either arguments, signalling or manipulation, 
firms with strings are more likely to be associated with higher levels of abnormal 
accruals (or higher levels of net working capital). This leads to my first research 
question (in two parts) as follows: 
Research Question 1.1: Do firms that report increasing earnings strings have 
higher levels of abnormal accruals (or higher levels of net working capital) than other 
firms? 
Research Question 1.2: Do firms with longer increasing earnings strings have 
higher levels of abnormal accruals (or higher levels of net working capital) than firms 
with shorter increasing earnings strings? 
While abnormal accruals may be informative with respect to growth and future risk, it 
is an open question as to whether earnings strings are incrementally informative. 
That is, controlling for the information content of the traditional measures of 
accounting quality, strings may provide additional information about the growth and 
risk in subsequent periods. This may be the case if accruals do not efficiently provide 
all the relevant information about the future.  
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On one hand, accruals are interpreted to be tools for managing earnings. It is likely 
that the associations between earnings strings and future growth/risk are moderated 
by conditioning on levels of abnormal accruals. On the other hand, if high accruals 
are a signal of future growth and risk, it is possible that high accrual strings are 
predictive of future performance. Therefore, the second research question (in three 
parts) is as follows: 
Research Question 2.1: What is the association between accounting quality, as 
measured by abnormal accruals (or net working capital), and future performance and 
risk (holding strings fixed)?  
Research Question 2.2: Are strings informative with respect to future performance 
(holding accounting quality fixed)? 
Research Question 2.3: Is the association between strings and future performance 
and risk moderated by accounting quality? 
The final research question concerns market perceptions of high accruals, high net 
working capital and string. The third research question is based on the premise that 
market perceptions can be inferred from returns: 
Research Question 3: How do investors react to string firms that report higher 
accrual (or higher net working capital) than average? 
3.3 Research Design  
3.3.1 Measuring Accounting Quality  
I measure accounting quality using the method used in the prior literature on 
earnings quality. An abnormal accrual is the traditional measure of earnings quality. 
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The earnings quality model used in this study is based on Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) as follows. 
            ∆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝐵𝐵1𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐵𝐵2𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖              (1) 
Where ΔWC is a change in working capital from year t-1 to year t, calculated as 
changes in accounts receivable plus changes in inventories minus changes in 
accounts payable minus changes in taxes payable and plus changes in other assets 
(net). CFO is cash flow from operations at time t-1, t, and t+1.39 The subscripts i and 
t denote firm and time. All variables are deflated by average total assets to avoid 
problems arising from heterogeneity. I closely follow the original model by adding an 
intercept term in order that it captures some positive or negative accruals on 
average. The residual term or ԑ is regarded as an abnormal accrual which proxies for 
the level of earnings management. The greater positive (negative) abnormal 
accruals imply higher levels of upward (downward) earnings management. 
Following previous literature, I estimate model parameters from cross-sectional 
regressions with the same industry and the same year. In other words, I estimate 
coefficient parameters using regression for each industry and each year. I require at 
least 10 industry-year observations for a cross-sectional regression. I drop all 
financial firms because of differences in business nature. To mitigate the effects of 
outliers, I winsorize all variables at the 1% top and bottom tails of the distribution.  
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) estimation model is based on an assumption that 
accruals capture information about future cash flows and firm value. In particular, 
accruals reflecting future growth and risk must convey information about expected 
cash flows. Barth et al. (2016) find that accruals which align cash flows and 
                                                          
39 See definitions of variables in Appendix A. 
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economic factor in different periods aid markets in forming cash flows expectations 
and valuations. This role of accruals is consistent with Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
who argue that current period’s accruals are related to prior, current, and next 
periods of cash flows. Moreover, Wu at al. (2010) suggest that accrual determinants 
identified in the modified Jones model, i.e. PP&E and changes in current revenues, 
do not completely reflect growth and firm investment. Zhang (2007) also argues that 
changes in inventory as one form of working capital investment are associated with 
not only current sales but also future sales that are not included in the modified 
Jones model. Hence, I estimate unexpected accruals on the basis of cash flow 
information and believe that these accruals better reveal information about future 
prospects of firms. 
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that misclassification errors estimated from accrual 
models lead to a false positive. It implies that abnormal accruals do not represent 
accounting distortions but are a manifestation of fundamental performance. 
However, they point out that using total accruals as a proxy for earnings quality is not 
different from using abnormal accruals because firms with high accruals also tend to 
report high abnormal accruals. Total accruals are a measure of accounting 
distortions that is independent from model estimations. Therefore, I use total 
accruals as an alternative measure of accounting quality. 
I employ net working capital as an empirical proxy for total accruals since total 
accruals can be interpreted as investment in working capital. It is logical that net 
working capital captures information regarding both managerial discretion and firms’ 
prospects similar to accruals because both net working capital and accruals are 
based on the same construct. I note that net working capital reflects a level of 
investment in working capital that is expected to respond to managers’ expectation 
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of growth. In this economic sense, changes or levels of net working capital would be 
similar as both directly capture expected business fundamentals and managerial 
discretion. Moreover, using a level of net working capital may be more appropriate in 
the string context, especially long strings. As it reflects accruals that are accumulated 
over multiple periods, this is consistent with the context of firms reporting 
consecutively increasing earnings for several years.  
I adopt a straightforward definition of net working capital to estimate a firm’s net 
working capital. Equation (2) is for calculating net working capital. 
                                               𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                   (2) 
Where NWC is net working capital. CA is current assets. CL is current liabilities. The 
higher NWC implies the higher investment in net working capital, hence higher 
accruals. 
To sum up, I estimate abnormal accruals from equation (1) and net working capital 
from equation (2) in order to answer the research questions 1.1 and 1.2.  
3.3.2 Assessing Predictability of Earnings Strings 
To address research questions 2.1 – 2.3, I use the following model: 
          𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                               + 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                               + 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                (3)                                                    
Where FUTURE is either: 1) average value of adjusted earnings per share before 
extraordinary items for three years ahead (FESP); 2) average value of sales for three 
years ahead (FSALE); 3) average value of cash flows from operations for three 
years ahead (FCFO), which all reflect future growth; and 4) variance of future 
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adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items for three years ahead 
(FEVER) which reflects future risk. STRING is the length of increasing annual 
earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) relative to the previous year. 
AQ is earnings quality captured by either; 1) DAbACC is an indicator variable taking 
value of one if a firm’s abnormal accrual estimated from equation (1) is higher than 
or equal to industry average for a given year, otherwise zero, and 2) DNWC is an 
indicator variable taking value of one if a firm’s net working capital computed from 
equation (2) is higher than or equal to industry average for a given year, otherwise 
zero.  
Equation (3) investigates the relation between future performance and (1) abnormal 
accruals or net working capital, (2) strings, and (3) their interaction. Therefore, this 
enables me to ascertain whether accounting quality is informative and whether a 
string is incrementally informative. If longer strings are associated with better future 
performance, holding accounting quality fixed, δ1 will be positive. If accounting quality 
is related to good (bad) future prospects of firms, holding a string fixed, δ2 is positive 
(negative). In addition, if longer strings with high accruals or high net working capital 
incrementally predict higher future performance, δ3 is expected to be positive, 
consistent with the information content hypothesis. In contrast, observing δ1 > 0 and 
δ3 < 0 is considered as strings stemming from earnings management, consistent with 
the earnings management hypothesis. 
I also control for current performance, investment, capital structure, sales growth, 
firm life-cycle, and firm size (Fama and French, 1995: Lang et al., 1996; Kothari et 
al., 2002; Fama and French, 2006; and Amir et al., 2007). Specifically, the following 
variables are included in equation (3). CURRENT, a proxy for current performance, 
is either: 1) adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS); 2) log of 
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sales (SALE); 3) cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets (CFO); 
and 4) variance of adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items over past 
three years (EVAR), depending on specifications. CAPEX, a proxy for investment, is 
capital expenditure scaled by lagged market value of equity. RD, a proxy for 
investment, is research and development expenses scaled by lagged market value 
of equity. DE, a proxy for capital structure, is debt-to-equity ratio. SALEG, a proxy for 
sale growth, is one-year sales growth rate. AGE, a proxy for life-cycle, is log of firm 
age. ASIZE, a proxy for size, is log of total assets.  
All variables except an indicator variable are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom 
tails of the distribution. I estimate equation (3) using OLS regression. I include year 
fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm in 
this specification. 
3.3.3 Examining Market Effects of Earnings Strings Conditional on Accounting 
Quality 
The following models are used to investigate how investors respond to earnings 
strings with high abnormal accruals or high net working capital. Different from Bartov 
et al. (2002) and Myers et al. (2007), I examine the effects on future returns and 
control for accounting quality and other potential effects. Equation (4) below 
examines the relation between earnings strings, accounting quality, and 
contemporaneous returns. 
                             𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                       + 𝛾𝛾4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                          + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                              (4) 
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Where RETt is market-adjusted annual returns compounded from market-adjusted 
monthly returns ending the third month after fiscal year end, consistent with Myers et 
al. (2007). 
Equation (5) below estimates the association between earnings strings, accounting 
quality, and future returns. 
                          𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                        + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                           + 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                            (5) 
Where RETt+1 is market-adjusted annual returns compounded from market-adjusted 
monthly returns starting the fourth month and ending the fifteenth month after fiscal 
year end. 
If γ1 is positive and δ1 is negative, this would be consistent with an initial over-
reaction to strings which is corrected in the returns t+1. If γ1 is negative and δ 1 is 
positive, this would suggest an initial under-reaction which is corrected in the t+1 
returns. Finding the sign of γ1 and δ1 are the same (either positive or negative) in 
both regressions would suggest an under-reaction. These three cases are 
considered as mis-pricing. If γ1 > 0 or γ1 < 0 and δ1 = 0 would indicate that the 
investors react fully to the information contained in the strings. 
With respect to high accrual or high net working capital strings, if investors perceive 
that strings are manipulated by levels of accruals, I expect that γ3 is negative, 
suggesting that the associations between returns and earnings strings are 
moderated by accounting choices. This is consistent with the earnings management 
hypothesis. On the other hand, if γ3 is positive, it implies that markets perceive that 
high accruals reflect future performance and risk, suggesting that the associations 
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between returns and earnings strings are strengthened by information contained in 
accounting choices. This is consistent with the information content hypothesis. 
Consistent with prior studies, I control for current performance captured by EPS, 
ChgEPS, CFO, size captured by SALE, capital structure captured by DE, life-cycle 
captured by AGE, and growth opportunities captured by MBt-1. Where EPS is 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items. ChgEPS is a change in 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items compared to the previous 
year. SALE is log of sales. Other variables are previously defined.  
All variables except an indicator variable are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom 
tails of the distribution. I estimate this equation using OLS regression with year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by year and firm. Note 
that I use SALE, DE, and lagged MB because I avoid using variables capturing same 
information as the right-hand-side variables or RETt and RETt+1. 
3.4 Sample  
The accounting data are obtained from Compustat while the market data are from 
CRSP. All observations are US firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The 
sample starts in 1988 as the cash flow data is only available from that year based on 
SFAS 95 Statement of Cash Flows. The initial dataset excluded financial firms 
contains 89,440 firm-year observations, 8,441 unique firms, during 1988 – 2014. As I 
require variables for AbACC estimations, the sample significantly reduces to 29,710 
firm-year observations, 4,284 unique firms, for the period 1989 – 2013. The 
additional 13,073 observations are excluded due to missing data for some of the 
variables. This provides 16,637 firm-year observations, 2,739 unique firms, over the 
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period 1989 – 2011. Note that I require three years ahead for the predictability 
analysis. The sample formation process is summarized in Panel A of Table 3.1. 
A firm with a string of increasing earnings is defined as a firm that reports at least 
one year of increases in adjusted annual earnings per share before extraordinary 
items (EPS).40 A definition of EPS increase is compared with EPS of the prior year. 
Using a previous period’s earnings as a benchmark is consistent with Graham et al. 
(2005) who argue that vast majority of CFOs agree that the most important earnings 
benchmark is a prior period’s earnings. This definition is also less likely to give rise to 
a problem of survivorship bias. Moreover, earnings are also used by the markets for 
firm valuation (Graham et al., 2005; Dichev et al., 2013; and Dichev et al., 2016).   
Table 3.1 Panel B reports the distribution of observations over the sample period. 
The number of observations, both of string firms and non-string firms, is fairly smooth 
across time. The average sample per year is 723 observations of which 443 string 
are carried. This proportion of increasing earnings at least one year relative to prior 
year is 61.27% which is consistent with Myers et al. (2007). I highlight that during 
crisis periods – dot com crisis in 2001 and financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 – the 
proportions of string observations in those years to total string observations is 
relatively low. 
I present the observations classified by the Fama and French 17 industry 
classifications in Panel C of Table 3.1.41 The incidence of earnings strings is very 
high in Machinery and Business Equipment but it is relatively low in Utilities, 
Fabricated Products, and Mining and Minerals. The low rate of earnings strings in 
those industries suggests that more regulated industries, sunset industries, and 
                                                          
40 I adjust annual earnings per share by cumulative adjustment factor provided by Compustat database. This 
adjustment reflects the effects of stock splits and stock dividends. 
41 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. 
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traditionally heavy industries seem unable to create positive earnings growth 
compared to other industries.   
Table 3.2 reports the distribution of the sample analyzed by the lengths of earnings 
strings. The number of firms reporting longer increasing earnings strings decrease 
with the length of earnings strings.42  For example, 32% of these firms have positive 
earnings growth for one year but only 15% of total firms report earnings growth for 
two consecutive years. From six consecutive years onward, they are all less than 1% 
of total firms. This pattern is consistent with a mean reverting process of profitability 
in a competitive market as argued by Fama and French (2000).  
Table 3.3 reports the probability of an earnings string of one year ahead conditional 
on a given length of past earnings strings. Consistent with Myers et al. (2007), 
approximately 60% of firms report at least one year of earnings growth. Of those 
firms 47% go on to report two consecutive years of growing earnings. However, for 
firms reporting three-year length of prior strings, over 50% of these firms report 
earnings increases for a fourth year. This proportion gradually increases until the 
tenth year of earnings strings. This implies a convex trend of strings according to the 
number of years, suggesting that for short strings firms report earnings increases 
almost by pure chance, but long strings firms carry on their earnings momentum, 
which may due to either accounting distortions or underlying economics of the firm. 
3.5 Main Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.4 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables in this study. The mean 
(median) of STRING is 1.190 (1.000), suggesting that on average firms report 
                                                          
42 The longest length of a string of increasing earnings in the sample is 14 years for only one firm. 
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earnings increases for one year. The maximum length of earnings strings is 14.000. 
Although the mean of AbACC is expected to be zero, it is in fact 0.002. This is 
because I estimate AbACC using a larger number of observations than the string 
sample (29,710 firm-year observations). The average and standard deviation of 
NWC is 234.012 and 47.322 respectively. Contemporaneous and future market-
adjusted returns are 8.4% and 8.5% per year respectively. The mean (median) EPS 
is 0.381 (0.388), suggesting firms on average report profits. I find that future earnings 
per share (FEPS) is 0.430 and 0.400 for the mean and the median that are slightly 
higher than EPS, implying positive growth in earnings for the sample. This pattern is 
also applied to the mean operating cash flows. With regard to earnings variability, 
past earnings variance (EVAR) of 5.071 is higher than future earnings variance 
(FEVAR) of 4.360.   
Table 3.5 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables. STRING is positively 
associated with AbACC and NWC. This is consistent with strings containing high 
levels of investment in working capital. It is also positively correlated with RET, 
implying that strings are positively priced. While Pearson’s correlation indicates a 
negative relation between STRING and future RET, Spearman’s suggests no 
relation. Earnings strings are related to better performance and lower earnings risk 
for current and future periods. Consistent with prior literature on accrual anomaly, 
AbACC is positively associated with RET but inversely correlated with future RET. 
Spearman’s correlation indicates that NWC has a direct association with AbACC. I 
find weak evidence that NWC is positively (negatively) related to RET (future RET). 
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3.5.2 Accounting Quality for String Firms  
According to research questions 1.1 and 1.2, my initial investigation is to examine 
whether abnormal accruals and net working capital levels are different between 
string and non-string firms. The results are reported in Table 3.6. 
For the first analysis I conduct an unmatched sample test. Specifically, I investigate 
the differences between the means of AbACC and NWC for string and non-string 
firms. The results reveal that abnormal accruals and net working capital are higher 
for string firms compared to non-string firms. In particular, the mean AbACC for 
string firms is 0.011, which is significantly higher than -0.012 for non-string firms. The 
string firms’ mean NWC is 255.419, compared to 200.238 for non-string firms. Other 
characteristics of string firms are also significantly different from those of non-string 
firms. For example, string firms have higher growth in sales (SALEG), higher sales 
revenues (SALE), higher net profit margin (NPM), and a lower debt-to-equity ratio 
(DE). 
To control for firm characteristics, I use the propensity score matching (PSM) 
procedure when performing tests of differences in AbACC and NWC.43 String firms 
and non-string firms are matched by sales growth rate, sales revenues, net profit 
margin, debt-to-equity ratio, firm age, industry, and year. These matched variables 
capture growth, size, profitability, capital structure, business cycle, industry effects, 
and time effects. Such variables are based on accounting information that reflects 
firm fundamentals, consistent with the view that firms with similar levels of 
fundamental economics should have similar levels of accruals (or net working 
capital). To verify the adequacy of the match, I perform t-tests after controlling for 
                                                          
43 Using Stata’s command - psmatch2 - to estimate average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), I perform 
Probit model and match each observation with its one nearest neighbours (with replacement) with the absolute 
difference in the propensity scores is less than 0.05 or caliper = 0.05. 
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potential effects. The best match between two groups however continues to yield 
differences in sales, net profit margin, and debt-to-equity ratio (lower sales but high 
net profit margin and lower debt-to-equity ratio for string firms). This may suggests 
that smaller size (by sales volume), higher profitability, and low debt-to-equity are 
unique business characteristics for firms reporting consistent earnings increases, 
consistent with grow stage of life-cycle. I note that the number of treated group are 
not necessarily equal to that of control group as the matching procedure is applied 
with replacement, indicating that a non-treated observation could be the best match 
for more than one observation from the treated group.  
The results of PSM method show that AbACC of string firms are substantially 
different from those of non-string firms. That is, firms with earnings strings have 
higher abnormal accruals after controlling for other firm characteristics. However, net 
working capital for string firms are not significantly different from that of non-string 
firms when controlling for firm fundamentals. In sum, firms reporting increasing 
earnings strings report higher abnormal accruals levels than firms not reporting such 
strings.44  
I next investigate the evolution in abnormal accruals and net working capital 
pertaining to firms reporting earnings strings. This analysis aims to understand firm 
behaviour relating to abnormal accruals and net working capital over the lengths of 
strings. In other words, I examine the extent to which firms present higher abnormal 
accruals or invest more in working capital conditional on lengths of strings. To do 
this, I hold the firms fixed when contrasting between lengths of strings. Table 3.7 
                                                          
44 I also match two sets of samples using by adding market-to-book ratio, a proxy for market incentives, as an 
additional matching variable and find that the results are qualitatively unchanged for abnormal accruals. 
127 
 
reports the results of tests of differences in AbACC and NWC between lengths of 
earnings strings. 
Panel A compares between AbACC, NWC and fundamental variables in the first and 
second year for firms that report strings of two years. Abnormal accruals are higher 
in the second year than in the first year (AbACC = 0.014 for the second year and 
AbACC = 0.000 for the first year) but net working capital in the second year are 
similar to the first year (NWC = 246.077 for the second year and NWC = 219.218 for 
the first year). Other characteristics of two-year-string firms are significantly different 
from those of one-year-string firms. In particular, the second year is characterized by 
better financial performance and lower leverage. Panel B and C show similar results 
to Panel A. However, there is no significant difference for longer strings, as indicated 
in Panel D. 
The results indicate that for up to four years of strings, accounting quality captured 
by abnormal accruals seems poorer relative to the preceding year. At the same time, 
other financial indicators are better in the latter year than the preceding year. This 
may be the case that abnormal accruals reflect future information about growth and 
risk. Overall, these results suggest the possibility that indications of low accounting 
quality in string firms need not imply that lengths of strings are driven by earnings 
management, e.g. firms attempt to maintain strings through more aggressive 
accounting. 
3.5.3 The Predictive Ability of Earnings Strings  
I next investigate if strings and measures of accounting quality are associated with 
measures of future growth and business risk, according to research questions 2.1 – 
2.3. Table 3.8 presents the results of estimating equation (3). 
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Panel A reports the findings when accounting quality is measured by high abnormal 
accruals. The results show that conditional on abnormal accruals, earnings strings 
are positively associated with future earnings, future sales, and future cash flows 
(the coefficient estimates = 0.066, 0.018, and 0.002, significant at 1 percent level 
respectively) but are negatively correlated with future earnings variability (the 
coefficient estimate = -0.714, significant at 1 percent level). This suggests that 
strings signal better growth opportunities and lower underlying risk.  
I also find that abnormal accruals are negatively related to future earnings consistent 
with the reversal property of accruals. However, abnormal accruals are strongly 
related to future cash flows (the coefficient estimate = 0.012, significant at 1 percent 
level). The relation between current accruals and future cash flows is expected as 
accruals can be thought of a form of investment in accounts receivable and inventory 
that anticipates future cash flows. For example, firms can collect money from 
accounts receivable. With respect to future sales and future earnings volatility, I find 
no relation with abnormal accruals. Therefore, high accruals can be considered as 
firms’ investment which leads to future cash flows. 
Importantly, the findings suggest that only the association between STRING and 
FEVAR is moderated by high abnormal accruals, suggesting that high accrual strings 
predict higher future risk relative to low accrual strings. For future performance, I do 
not find evidence that high accrual strings signal lower future earnings, future sales, 
and future cash flows compared to low accrual strings.  
Panel B presents the results when poor accounting quality is measured by high net 
working capital. STRING is again associated with higher future performance and 
lower future risk. High net working capital is positively (negatively) related to future 
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sales (future cash flows and future earnings variability). That is, controlling for the 
information content of the working capital indicator, strings are positively related to 
future performance and negatively related to future risk.45 
Collectively, the evidence from Table 3.8 is broadly consistent with the view that 
earnings strings are incrementally informative for future performance and signal 
lower risk. These relations are still strong after controlling for accounting quality. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that high abnormal accruals and high net working 
capital are associated with future performance and risk. In addition, the findings 
largely suggest that the relations between strings and future growth/risk are not 
moderated by proxies for poor accounting quality.46 
3.5.4 Market Effects of Earnings Strings  
Table 3.9 reports the estimation results of the return analyses that pertain to 
research question 3. Earnings strings are positively associated with 
contemporaneous market-adjusted returns (the coefficient is 0.06 in Column (1)). 
There is some evidence of a reversal in the model with high net working capital (the 
coefficient is -0.013 in Column (4)).  Moreover, because STRING measures the 
length of a string, the positive coefficient for contemporaneous returns implies that 
longer strings attract higher returns. High abnormal accruals and high net working 
capital are positively related to contemporaneous returns (coefficient = 0.059 in 
Column (1) and 0.070 in Column (3)), consistent with the view that markets initially 
perceive these measures positively. However, the analysis of future returns reveals 
                                                          
45 To conduct robustness test, I code DAbACC and DNWC equal to 1 when abnormal accruals and net working 
capital are higher than industry average, otherwise zero. I find that the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
46 I also employ a change in net working capital as a proxy for total accruals. Specifically, I use an indicator 
variable based on a change in net working capital. It takes value of 1 if a firm’s change in net working capital is 
higher than or equal to industry average for a given year, otherwise zero. The results are mostly consistent with 
the main results. 
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that this sentiment is subsequently reversed. In the case of high abnormal accruals 
the magnitude of the reversal exceeds the previous year’s reaction (coefficient = -
0.099 in Column (2) vs. 0.059 in Column (1)); in the case of net working capital the 
reversal is only partial (coefficient = -0.058 in Column (4) vs. 0.070 in Column (3)). 
Turning to combinations of high abnormal accruals, or high net working capital, with 
strings, investors seem to negatively perceive such combinations (coefficient on 
STRING x DAbACC = -0.019 in Column (1) and coefficient on STRING x DNWC = -
0.055 in Column (3), significant at one percent level). This implies that 
contemporaneous returns are lower for combinations of high abnormal accruals, or 
high net working capital, with earnings strings relative to combinations of earnings 
strings and low abnormal accruals, or low net working capital. This suggests that 
investors perceive that earnings strings with high accruals/working capital are 
managed. Alternatively, such combinations signal higher future earnings risk than 
combinations of strings and low accruals/working capital. However, this is partially 
reversed in the following year (coefficient = 0.010 in Column (2) and 0.015 in Column 
(4), significant at five percent level). Combined this evidence supports the 
interpretation that markets consider combinations of earnings strings and high 
abnormal accruals, or high net working capital as earnings manipulation. This is also 
consistent with the view that investor positively react to the resolution of higher future 
earnings risk. 
On balance, the findings strongly suggest that earnings strings are positively priced 
in the current period. This evidence is consistent with investors regarding earnings 
strings as indicators of growth and lower risk in subsequent periods. Moreover, the 
evidence of reversal in returns in Column (4) does not seem to contradict this 
conclusion. More importantly, the high accrual strings and the high net working 
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capital strings are under-reacted by investors in the current period, but then such 
under-reactions are reversed in the following period. This pattern is consistent with 
the view that combinations of earnings strings and high abnormal accruals or high 
net working capital are suspected by investors as a product of poor accounting 
quality. Once investors observe realization in future performance in the subsequent 
period, they correct their pricing of such string combinations. Taken together, I 
conclude that the evidence in Table 3.9 leans in the direction of information content 
hypothesis regarding strings.47     
3.6 Additional Findings 
3.6.1 Lengths of Earnings Strings and Abnormal Accruals 
In this section I attempt to investigate to what extent poor accounting quality may be 
driving earnings strings. To do so, I examine relations between earnings strings and 
abnormal accruals stratified by lengths of earnings strings. Table 3.10 reports the 
results of this analysis. 
Panel A reports the results of the regressions of an indicator variable of a particular 
length of earnings strings on signed abnormal accruals and control variables. A 
dependent variable takes value of one if a firm reports a given length of a string of 
increasing earnings, otherwise zero. The results suggest that coefficient parameters 
on AbACC decrease with lengths of strings, indicating that the explanatory power of 
abnormal accruals in explaining variations in earnings strings is decreasing over the 
course of earnings strings. A similar pattern is observed when I use the dummy 
variable (see Panel B). Specifically, parameter estimates on an indicator variable for 
                                                          
47 The results remain qualitatively unchanged when I cluster standard errors only by firm or by industry. 
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high abnormal accruals decrease with spans of strings. These findings are 
consistent with the view that accruals are less important for longer strings.  
To sum up, the decreasing magnitude of the coefficients on abnormal accruals for 
longer earnings strings is likely due to the accruals reversal property. That is, the role 
of accruals in earnings strings is less important once strings are longer. The 
implication is that longer string firms are growing in a decreasing rate. Taken 
together, the results of Table 3.10 corroborate that firms are not likely to maintain 
earnings strings through accrual management as accruals have less effects on 
longer strings. 
3.6.2 Abnormal Accruals Estimated from the Modified Jones Model 
I re-estimate equations (3) – (5) using abnormal accruals estimated from the 
modified Jones model. I also control for return on assets (ROA) in the model as 
suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). I test whether abnormal accruals based on the 
modified Jones model produce the results similar to the main findings. Specifically, I 
calculate AbACC that is estimated from the modified Jones model and then construct 
DAbACC. 
The results of the predictive ability of earnings strings for future performance are 
reported in Table 3.11. I find that earnings strings predict higher future growth and 
lower future risk. I also find that high abnormal accruals based on the modified Jones 
model are positively associated with future sales and cash flows, but are negatively 
related to future EPS. Combinations of high abnormal accruals and strings are 
largely unrelated to lower future performance.48  
                                                          
48 I also use the performance-matching modified Jones model and find that the results are qualitatively similar to 
the modified Jones model. 
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The findings of associations between returns and earnings strings conditional on 
abnormal accruals estimated from the modified Jones model are presented in Table 
3.12. Earnings strings are positively associated with contemporaneous returns. 
Abnormal accruals are negatively related to returns at time t+1. The results also 
suggest that investors price high accrual strings equal to low accrual strings. 
On balance, the results concerning the alternative measure of abnormal accruals are 
somewhat weaker. Nonetheless, they do not seem to support the view that string, 
high abnormal accruals, or a combination of both are a product of earnings 
management. The weaker results may be related to the fact that abnormal accruals 
estimated from the modified Jones model capture different dimensions from those 
estimated from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Specifically, Dechow and 
Dichev’s abnormal accruals arise from mis-alignments between economic events 
and cash flows and therefore are more informative about future prospects (Barth et 
al., 2016). In addition, the modified Jones model does not fully capture growth and 
investment of firms (Wu et al., 2010). 
3.6.3 The Analysis of the Sample Excluding the Single-Year Strings 
As suggested in Table 3.2, short strings may occur by pure chance. I conduct a 
robustness test by re-estimating equations (3) – (5) while excluding the single-year 
string observations from the sample. Dropping the single-year string firms can 
alleviate concern as to whether the main results are driven by firms who report 
earnings increases by chance. 
Table 3.13 shows the results of the predictability of earnings strings conditional on 
high abnormal accruals and high net working capital. Consistent with the main 
results, the findings in Panel A strings are positively (negatively) associated with 
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future growth (risk). High abnormal accruals is directly related to future cash flows. 
The association of future earnings variability with earnings strings are moderated by 
high accruals. With regard to the results of high net working capital in Panel B, net 
working capital is associated with lower future cash flows and lower future earnings 
uncertainty. Moreover, the association between future EPS and the high working 
capital string firms is stronger than that of string firms with low net working capital.  
The results of the return analysis are reported in Table 3.14. The results suggest that 
strings are priced contemporaneously. High abnormal accruals are positively 
associated with current returns but negatively related to future returns, suggesting 
mis-pricing. I also find that high accrual strings are initially discounted but they are 
corrected later as indicated by their associations with current and future returns. I 
find consistent results in the high net working capital tests. I note that there is some 
evidence that investors correct their valuations for strings in returns t+1. 
Overall, the findings of the sample excluding the single-year string firms are 
consistent with the main results. This confirms that the results are not dependent on 
string firms who are likely to be growing randomly. 
3.6.4 The Analysis of the Matched Sample 
As using the matched sample is to overcome the problem relating to lack of 
randomness in the main sample, I re-estimate equations (3) – (5) using the matched 
sample. The total matched sample based on the propensity score matching method 
is 13,917 firm-year observations. The results of this analysis are not tabulated. 
The findings of the predictability of earnings strings for future growth/risk suggest 
that earnings strings are capable of predicting higher future earnings, higher future 
sales, higher future cash flows, and lower future earnings volatility. The results also 
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show that high abnormal accruals are positively associated with higher future cash 
flows. Moreover, high net working capital is positively (negative) related to future 
sales (future earnings variability). I largely find that the relations between earnings 
strings and future firm performance are not moderated by high abnormal accruals or 
high working capital. 
With regard to the returns analysis, I find the results are mostly consistent with the 
main findings. Specifically, earnings strings are contemporaneously priced. Investors 
initially over-price high abnormal accruals or high net working capital but correct their 
pricing subsequently. I also find the negative association between current returns 
and high accruals/working capital strings. However, there is no evidence of the 
reversal of valuations related to strings with high abnormal accruals or high net 
working capital.  
In conclusion, the matched sample largely gives consistent results with the main 
findings. This leads to the conclusion supporting the view that earnings strings are a 
representation of fundamental performance.  
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The views on determinants of a string of earnings increases are the current debate in 
the literature on meeting or beating earnings thresholds. This leads to inconclusive 
evidence of whether earnings strings are due to poor accounting quality or 
underlying fundamentals. This paper attempts to disentangle this phenomenon. On 
one hand, the literature on earnings management employs accruals as a proxy for 
accounting quality. On the other hand, accruals are considered as investment 
relating to future growth and low discount rate. I conduct several analyses in order to 
investigate what drives earnings strings. 
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The initial results provide evidence that firms reporting strings of earnings increases 
contain higher abnormal accruals. These patterns continue until the fourth year of 
earnings strings. Given the reversal property of accrual, it is difficult for firms to 
repeatedly meet or beat earnings targets. In other words, it is less likely that long 
strings are a result of poor accounting quality. I therefore argue that indicators of 
poor accounting quality may in fact be informative with respect to growth and future 
risk. That is, for long string firms the traditional proxies for earnings management are 
better viewed as signals about future performance and risk rather than reporting 
noise owing to managerial discretion. The findings show that strings conditional on 
accounting quality are indicative of better future firm performance. Moreover, 
earnings strings are positively priced and longer strings attract higher returns. I also 
find evidence that there is a reversal of market reactions in the model that controls 
for net working capital. Further evidence suggests that investors under-react to 
strings associated with high accruals or high net working capital but subsequently 
correct their valuations when observing firm performance ex post. All evidence is 
consistent with the information content hypothesis. 
This paper provides evidence which is beneficial to investors, auditors, and 
regulators. The results suggest that long earnings strings reported by firms are likely 
to be determined by business fundamentals, justifying that valuation premiums are 
rational. High accruals and high net working capital for firms reporting earnings 
strings simply reflect investment in working capital induced by growth stage of firms, 
rather than earnings management. This should lead to another view of high accruals.    
This study has some limitations. The main caveat is that it might be the case that 
strings firm are a mix of true economic performance and earnings management. For 
example, in the beginning string firms are driven by fundamentals, in the middle they 
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engage in earnings management to prolong the strings because underlying 
performance faces negative shocks. When poor performance is reversed, strings are 
able to be continued by true earnings again. I cannot rule out this possibility. Another 
caveat is that the results rely on an accrual estimation which possibly contains 
measurement errors. There are other interesting questions in this topic. For instance, 
do debt investors or credit analysts know whether earnings strings are genuine or 
manipulated? Or can investment-based asset pricing explain valuation premiums for 
earnings strings? But I leave them with future research.  
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APPENDIX 3.A 
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
FCFO Average value of future operating cash flows for three years ahead. 
FEPS Average value of future adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items 
and for three years ahead. 
FEVAR Variance of future adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items for three 
years ahead. 
FSALE Average value of future sales for three years ahead. 
FUTURE Future performance proxied by FEPS, FSALE, FCFO, and FEVAR. 
LSTRING An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm reports a particular length of an 
earnings string. 
RETt Market-adjusted returns compounded from market-adjusted monthly returns 
ending the third month after fiscal year-end. 
RETt+1 Market-adjusted annual returns compounded from market-adjusted monthly 
returns starting the fourth month and ending the fifteenth month after fiscal year-
end. 
ΔWC A change in working capital, calculated as changes in accounts receivable plus 
changes in inventories minus changes in accounts payable minus changes in 
taxes payable plus changes in other assets (net), scaled by average total assets. 
Independent Variable 
AbACC A raw value of an abnormal accrual based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
CA Current assets 
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets. 
CL Current Liabilities 
DAbACC An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm’s abnormal accrual estimated 
from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is higher or equal to industry average 
for a given year, otherwise is zero. 
DNWC An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm’s net working capital is higher or 
equal to industry average for a given year, otherwise is zero. 
STRING The length of a past string of consecutive increases in earnings. An earnings 
string is defined as a firm reporting at least one year of increases in adjusted 
annual earnings per share before extraordinary items. An increase is compared to 
EPS before extraordinary items from the prior year. 
NWC Net working capital. I use a straightforward definition of net working capital 
calculated as current assets minus current liability. 
Control Variable  
AGE Log of firm age, calculated as the difference between current year and year when 
it was first collected by COMPUSTAT. 
ASIZE Log of total assets. 
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Variable Definition 
CAPEX Capital expenditure divided by lagged market value of equity. 
ChgEPS Change in earnings per share before extraordinary items at the end of fiscal year 
adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends, relative to the prior year. 
CURRENT Financial performance indicators of a firm at a current period proxied by EPS, 
SALE, CFO, and EVAR. 
DE Debt-to-equity ratio, computed as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by book equity value at the end of fiscal year. 
EPS Earnings per share before extraordinary items at the end of fiscal year adjusted by 
stock splits and stock dividends. 
EVAR Variance of adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items over past 
three years. 
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity at fiscal year-end. 
NPM Net profit margin, computed as net income before extraordinary items divided by 
sales. 
RD Research and development expenses divided by lagged market value of equity. 
SALE Log of sales revenue. 
SALEG Past one-year growth rate of sales revenue. 
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Table 3.1 
 Sample Composition 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Data Firm-Year 
Observ. 
Unique Firms 
Data set from Compustat and 
CRSP databases for the period 
1988 – 2014 (excluding 
financial firms) 
89,440 8,441 
Less observations with missing 
variables for AbACC 
estimations  
(59,730) (4,080) 
Data available for AbACC 
estimation for the period 1989 – 
2013 
29,710 4,284 
Less observations with missing 
variables for all analyses 
(13,073) (1,545) 
Final sample for the period 
1989 – 2011 
16,637 2,739 
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Panel B: Year Composition 
Year Firm-Year Observ. % of String 
Observ. Stringa Non-String Total 
1989 367 278 645 3.60% 
1990 429 318 747 4.21% 
1991 391 346 737 3.84% 
1992 462 246 708 4.54% 
1993 429 258 687 4.21% 
1994 483 209 692 4.74% 
1995 443 234 677 4.35% 
1996 442 247 689 4.34% 
1997 454 241 695 4.46% 
1998 399 316 715 3.92% 
1999 475 278 753 4.66% 
2000 470 296 766 4.62% 
2001 333 436 769 3.27% 
2002 495 301 796 4.86% 
2003 566 256 822 5.56% 
2004 553 210 763 5.43% 
2005 477 282 759 4.68% 
2006 507 258 765 4.98% 
2007 444 294 738 4.36% 
2008 312 371 683 3.06% 
2009 331 351 682 3.25% 
2010 500 194 694 4.91% 
2011 421 234 655 4.13% 
Total 10,183 6,454 16,637 100.00% 
Average Per Year 443 281 723 4.35% 
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Panel C: Industry Composition 
Industry 
 
Firm-Year Observ. % of String 
Observ. Stringa Non-String Total 
Food 439 223 662 4.31% 
Mining and Minerals 99 63 162 0.97% 
Oil and Petroleum Products 474 323 797 4.65% 
Textiles, Apparel, and Footware 285 160 445 2.80% 
Consumer Durables 359 232 591 3.53% 
Chemicals 276 178 454 2.71% 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 455 282 737 4.47% 
Construction and Construction 
Materials 
321 246 567 3.15% 
Steel Works 153 143 296 1.50% 
Fabricated Products 101 68 169 0.99% 
Machinery and Business 
Equipment 
2,257 1,452 3,709 22.16% 
Automobiles 164 91 255 1.61% 
Transportation 330 212 542 3.24% 
Utilities 43 28 71 0.42% 
Retail Stores 532 303 835 5.22% 
Other 3,895 2,450 6,345 38.25% 
Total 10,183 6,454 16,637 100.00% 
Note: 
This table reports sample composition.  
Panel A presents sample selection process.  
Panel B provides the number of observations based on fiscal year.  
Panel C provides the number of observations based on the Fama and French 17 industry 
classifications. An earnings string is defined as a firm that reports at least one year of increases in 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). An EPS increase is compared with 
adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) from the prior year. 
a String means a number of firms reporting at least one year of annual earnings increases relative to 
prior year’s earnings.  
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Table 3.2 
 The Distribution of Observations 
by Lengths of Increasing Earnings Strings 
 
Length of Earnings Strings Firm-Year  
Observ. 
% of Observ. 
Non String 6,454 38.79% 
1 year 5,355 32.19% 
2 years 2,512 15.10% 
3 years 1,134 6.82% 
4 years 575 3.46% 
5 years 284 1.71% 
6 years 151 0.91% 
7 years 80 0.48% 
8 years 44 0.26% 
9 years 22 0.13% 
10 years or more 26 0.16% 
Total 16,637 100.00% 
Note: 
This table analyses the sample distribution based on lengths of a string of earnings increases. An 
earnings string is defined as a firm that reports at least one year of increases in adjusted earnings per 
share before extraordinary items (EPS). An EPS increase is compared with adjusted earnings per 
share before extraordinary items (EPS) from the prior year. 
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Table 3.3  
Conditional Probability of String Momentum for the Next Year 
 
Length of Earnings Strings  Conditional Probability of  
Future One-Year Earnings Strings 
Non-String 1 Year Ahead 
Non String 0.3879 0.6121 
1 year 0.5259 0.4741 
2 years 0.5203 0.4797 
3 years 0.4896 0.5104 
4 years 0.4865 0.5135 
5 years 0.4679 0.5321 
6 years 0.4675 0.5325 
7 years 0.4651 0.5349 
8 years 0.4783 0.5217 
9 years 0.4583 0.5417 
10 years  0.5000 0.5000 
Note: 
This table reports the probability of string development for the next year conditional on lengths of a 
previous earnings string. An earnings string is defined as a firm that reports at least one year of 
increases in adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). An EPS increase is 
compared with adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) from the prior year. 
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Table 3.4 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
STRING 16,637 1.190 1.000 1.458 14.000 0.000 
AbACC 16,637 0.002 -0.000 0.057 0.191 -0.191 
NWC 16,637 234.012 47.322 632.460 4,371.000 -1,072.000 
RETt 16,637 0.084 -0.028 0.567 2.688 -0.798 
RETt+1 16,637 0.085 -0.022 0.559 2.693 -0.780 
EPS 16,637 0.381 0.388 2.172 8.069 -16.406 
SALE 16,637 5.475 5.370 2.056 10.698 -0.219 
CFO 16,637 0.077 0.090 0.133 0.366 -0.677 
EVAR 16,637 5.071 0.079 36.210 394.561 0.000 
FEPS 16,637 0.430 0.400 1.954 6.892 -13.866 
FSALE 16,637 5.645 5.541 2.037 10.811 0.474 
FOCF 16,637 0.079 0.090 0.113 0.324 -0.583 
FEVAR 16,637 4.360 0.106 29.333 337.564 0.000 
Note: 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 3.5 
 Correlation Matrix - Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal 
 
Variable STRING AbACC NWC RETt RETt+1 EPS SALE CFO EVAR FEPS FSALE FOCF FEVAR 
STRING 
 
 0.203 
 
0.093 0.273 
 
-0.017 
 
0.366 
 
0.107 
 
0.240 
 
-0.095 
 
0.223 
 
0.124 
 
0.190 
 
-0.088 
 
AbACC 0. 155  0.036 0.069 
 
-0.108 0.207 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.118 
 
-0.093 
 
0.021 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.035 
 
NWC 0.087 -0.009  0.059 0.005 0.364 0.692 0.150 0.130 0.320 0.690 0.139 0.186 
 
RETt 0.140 
 
0.084 
 
-0.008  -0.024 
 
0.164 
 
0.063 
 
0.186 
 
-0.068 
 
0.232 
 
0.107 
 
0.162 
 
-0.075 
 
RETt+1 -0.041 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.025 -0.057 
 
 -0.049 
 
0.042 
 
0.052  -0.072 
 
0.242 
 
0.084 
 
0.194 
 
-0.098 
 
EPS 0.229 
 
0.170 
 
0.158 0.074 
 
-0.066 
 
 0.499 
 
0.463 
 
-0.010 
 
0.602 
 
0.493 
 
0.356 
 
0.130 
 
SALE 0.147 
 
-0.011 
 
0.513 -0.028 
 
-0.048 
 
0.298 
 
 0.279 
 
0.194 
 
0.472 
 
0.985 
 
0.290 
 
0.259  
CFO 0.196 
 
-0.085 
 
0.105 0.107 
 
-0.026 
 
0.342 
 
0.350 
 
 -0.151 
 
0.383 
 
0.281 
 
0.594 
 
-0.096 
 
EVAR -0.038 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.001 -0.035 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.360 
 
0.001 
 
-0.081 
 
 0.001 
 
0.163 
 
-0.179 
 
0.526  
FEPS 0.162 
 
0.017 
 
0.185 0.104 
 
0.104 
 
0.531 
 
0.311 
 
0.281 
 
-0.360 
 
 0.506 
 
0.530 
 
-0.055 
 
FSALE 0.159 
 
-0.008 
 
0.512 0.015 
 
-0.009 
 
0.306 
 
0.984 
 
0.340 
 
-0.014 
 
0.340 
 
 0.315 
 
0.237 
 
FOCF 0.168 
 
0.008 
 
0.106 0.087 
 
0.098 
 
0.313  0.361 
 
0.698  -0.105 
 
0.393 
 
0.381 
 
 -0.145 
 
FEVAR -0.035 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.001 -0.038 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.174 
 
0.027 
 
-0.046 
 
0.614 
 
-0.497 
 
0.016 -0.079 
 
 
Note: 
This table offers correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients reported in bold are significant at the 1 percent level. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3.6 
 Tests of Differences between String and Non-String Firms 
 
Variable Unmatched Sample Matched Sample 
Mean 
String 
Mean 
Non-String 
t-stat. % Bias Mean 
String 
Mean 
Non-String 
t-stat. % Bias 
AbACC 0.011 -0.012 26.900***  0.011 -0.001 9.01***  
NWC 255.419 200.238 5.488***  255.419 279.981 -1.56  
SALEG 0.200 0.048 29.364*** 47.2 0.201 0.207 -1.28 -2.0 
SALE 5.574 5.319 7.809*** 12.4 5.574 5.721 -4.91*** -7.2 
NPM 14.760 4.839 15.843*** 25.9 14.760 13.291 2.34*** 3.8 
DE 0.562 0.709 -7.115*** -11.1 0.562 0.591 -1.80* -2.2 
AGE 2.666 2.663 0.301 0.5 2.666 2.661 0.52 0.7 
Observ. 10,183 6,454   10,183 3,734   
Note: 
This table reports the results of differences in abnormal accruals and net working capital between string and non-string firms using t-test (unmatched sample) 
and propensity score matching method (matched sample). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of difference tests, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
I use the propensity score matching (PCM) procedure to conduct tests of differences in AbACC and NWC.  String firms and non-string firms are matched by 
sales growth rate, sales revenues, net profit margin, debt-to-equity ratio, firm age, industry, and year.  Using Stata’s command – psmatch2 - to estimate 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), I perform Probit model and match each observation with its one nearest neighbour (with replacement) with 
the absolute difference in the propensity scores is less than 0.05 or caliper = 0.05.
148 
 
Table 3.7  
Tests of Differences between Lengths of Earnings Strings 
 
Panel A: 2 Years vs. 1 Year 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
2 Years 
Mean 
1 Year 
t-stat. 
AbACC 0.014 0.000 8.605*** 
NWC 246.077 219.218 1.536 
SALEG 0.207 0.182 2.672*** 
SALE 5.547 5.382 2.863*** 
NPM 14.633 10.246 3.964*** 
DE 0.513 0.604 -2.803*** 
AGE 2.677 2.585 4.444*** 
Observ. 2,512 2,512  
 
Panel B: 3 Years vs. 2 Years 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
3 Years 
Mean 
2 Years 
t-stat. 
AbACC 0.016 0.009 3.148*** 
NWC 283.456 249.064 1.221 
SALEG 0.207 0.196 0.978 
SALE 5.781 5.611 2.024** 
NPM 17.947 14.000 2.207** 
DE 0.440 0.515 -1.871* 
AGE 2.740 2.656 2.930*** 
Observ. 1,134 1,134  
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Panel C: 4 Years vs. 3 Years 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
4 Years 
Mean 
3 Years 
t-stat. 
AbACC 0.016 0.010 2.160** 
NWC 346.077 314.264 0.700 
SALEG 0.211 0.214 0.171 
SALE 6.105 5.929 1.559 
NPM 22.828 18.503 1.482 
DE 0.408 0.446 0.687 
AGE 2.827* 2.752 1.942 
Observ. 575 575  
 
Panel D: 5 Years vs. 4 Years 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
5 Years 
Mean 
4 Years 
t-stat. 
AbACC 0.018 0.013 1.276 
NWC 421.760 375.874 0.665 
SALEG 0.193 0.220 1.596 
SALE 6.484 6.319 1.059 
NPM 28.363 24.262 0.903 
DE 0.377 0.373 0.084 
AGE 2.889 2.820 1.337 
Observ. 284 284  
Note: 
This table reports the results of differences in abnormal accruals and working capital between lengths 
of earnings strings using t-test for the sample held the firm fixed. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance of difference tests, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.8  
The Predictive Ability of Earnings Strings, High Abnormal Accruals and, High 
Working Capital for Future Growth and Risk 
 
Panel A: High Abnormal Accruals 
 FESP FSALE FCFO FEVAR 
INTERCEPT -0.396**  
(0.017) 
0.230***  
(0.000) 
-0.020***  
(0.000) 
-4.462***  
(0.000) 
STRING 0.066***  
(0.000) 
0.018***  
(0.000) 
0.002***  
(0.010) 
-0.714***  
(0.000) 
DAbACC -0.173***  
(0.000) 
-0.003  
(0.720) 
  0.012***  
(0.000) 
-0.604  
(0.205) 
STRING x DAbACC 0.003  
(0.850) 
-0.002  
(0.523)   
0.001  
(0.313) 
0.415***  
(0.005) 
EPS 0.443*** 
(0.000) 
   
SALE  0.906*** 
(0.000) 
  
CFO   0.557*** 
(0.000) 
 
EVAR    0.494*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.164***  
(0.000) 
0.104***  
(0.000) 
0.001  
(0.649)   
1.580***  
(0.007) 
RD -0.183  
(0.432) 
-0.105**  
(0.035) 
-0.056***   
(0.000) 
-3.821  
(0.202) 
DE -0.010 
(0.615) 
-0.010***    
(0.000)   
0.001 
(0.263) 
0.298 
(0.348) 
SALEG -0.172**  
(0.010) 
0.083***  
(0.003) 
-0.012**  
(0.014) 
1.882  
(0.111) 
AGE 0.153***  
(0.000) 
-0.040***  
(0.000) 
0.001  
(0.684) 
0.008  
(0.985) 
ASIZE 0.099***  
(0.000) 
0.084***  
(0.000) 
0.006***  
(0.000) 
0.595***  
(0.001) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.972 0.510 0.385 
Observ. 16,637 16,637 16,637 16,637 
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Panel B: High Net Working Capital 
 FESP FSALE FCFO FEVAR 
INTERCEPT -0.421** 
(0.014) 
0.240***  
(0.000) 
-0.016***  
(0.003) 
-5.817*** 
(0.000) 
STRING 0.039*  
(0.058) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
0.002***  
(0.009) 
-0.484**  
(0.026) 
DNWC 0.063 
(0.153) 
0.022* 
(0.063) 
-0.006*** 
(0.004) 
-2.199*** 
(0.000)   
STRING x DNWC 0.035* 
(0.077) 
  0.000 
  (0.924) 
0.001  
(0.224)   
0.022 
(0.931) 
EPS 0.438*** 
(0.000) 
   
SALE  0.906*** 
(0.000) 
  
CFO   0.554*** 
(0.000) 
 
EVAR    0.494*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.171***  
(0.000) 
0.103***    
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.429) 
1.575***  
(0.007)    
RD -0.145  
(0.537) 
-0.101**  
(0.042) 
-0.060*** 
(0.000) 
-4.115  
(0.171) 
DE -0.003  
(0.890) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.826) 
0.193 
(0.545) 
SALEG -0.207***   
(0.002) 
  0.082*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.009* 
(0.051) 
1.843 
(0.112) 
AGE   0.160***  
(0.000) 
  -0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.809) 
-0.069  
(0.868) 
ASIZE 0.085***  
(0.006) 
0.081***   
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
  (0.000) 
0.966*** 
(0.000) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.324   0.972 0.507 0.386 
Observ. 16,637 16,637 16,637 16,637 
Note: 
This table reports the predictive ability of earnings strings for future performance and risk conditional 
on high abnormal accruals and high net working capital. The sample covering the period of 1989 – 
2011 is 16,637 firm-year observations. The results are obtained from OLS Estimation according to 
equation (3) as follows: 
             𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                  + 𝛿𝛿6𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3.9  
The Associations between Returns and Earnings Strings 
 Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals and High Net Working Capital 
 
 Conditional on High                          
Abnormal Accruals 
Conditional on                                         
High Net Working Capital 
RETt 
(1) 
RETt+1 
             (2) 
RETt 
(3) 
RETt+1 
              (4) 
INTERCEPT 0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.218*** 
(0.000) 
0.112*** 
(0.000) 
0.153*** 
(0.000) 
STRING 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.385) 
0.086*** 
(0.000)   
-0.013* 
(0.085) 
DAbACC 0.059*** 
(0.000) 
-0.099*** 
(0.000) 
  
STRING x DAbACC -0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.010** 
(0.040) 
  
DNWC   0.070*** 
(0.000) 
-0.058*** 
  (0.005) 
STRING x DNWC   -0.055*** 
(0.000) 
0.015** 
(0.024) 
EPS 0.001 
(0.864) 
-0.005 
(0.441) 
0.002  
(0.632)   
-0.008  
(0.218) 
ChgEPS 0.037*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.644) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.556) 
CFO 0.413*** 
(0.000) 
-0.027 
(0.727) 
0.384*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.908) 
SALE -0.024*** 
(0.000) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.025*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.277) 
DE 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.015* 
(0.056) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.015** 
(0.041) 
AGE -0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.041*** 
(0.000)   
-0.024** 
(0.016) 
MBt-1 -0.026*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006** 
(0.044) 
-0.025*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006** 
(0.045) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.070 0.132 0.065 
Observ. 16,637 16,637 16,637 16,637 
Note: 
This table reports the associations between returns and earnings strings conditional on high abnormal 
accruals and high net working capital. The sample covering the period of 1989 – 2011 is 16,637 firm-
year observations. The results are obtained from OLS Estimation according to equations (4) and (5) 
as follows: 
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                                     𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                             + 𝛾𝛾4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                  + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
and                            𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                             + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                  + 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Table 3.10  
The Associations between Lengths 
of Earnings String and Abnormal Accruals 
 
Panel A: Signed Abnormal Accruals 
 1-Year String 2-Year String 3-Year String 4-Year String 5-Year String 
INTERCEPT 0.140 
(0.268) 
-0.877*** 
(0.000) 
-2.000*** 
(0.000) 
-2.892*** 
(0.000) 
-3.236*** 
(0.000) 
AbACC 4.233*** 
(0.000) 
3.339*** 
(0.000) 
2.989*** 
(0.000) 
2.736*** 
(0.000) 
2.610*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.347*** 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.404) 
0.163*** 
(0.000) 
0.221*** 
(0.000) 
0.234*** 
(0.000) 
RD 0.158 
(0.456) 
-0.705*** 
(0.001) 
-1.068*** 
(0.000) 
-1.364*** 
(0.001) 
-1.441*** 
(0.002) 
SALEG 1.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.355*** 
(0.000) 
0.224*** 
(0.001) 
0.142** 
(0.044) 
0.059 
(0.405) 
AGE 0.039** 
(0.042) 
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.188*** 
(0.000) 
0.231*** 
(0.000) 
0.245*** 
(0.000) 
ASIZE 0.027*** 
(0.001) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
0.099*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
EVAR -0.001* 
(0.055) 
-0.001** 
(0.017) 
-0.002** 
(0.047) 
-0.002* 
(0.084) 
-0.004 
(0.268) 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.057 0.070 0.087 0.100 
Observ. 16,637 15,992 15,245 14,508 13,800 
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Panel B: Dummy on High Abnormal Accruals 
 1-Year String 2-Year String 3-Year String 4-Year String 5-Year String 
INTERCEPT -0.089 
(0.462) 
-1.051*** 
(0.000) 
-2.145*** 
(0.000) 
-3.023*** 
(0.000) 
-3.329*** 
(0.000) 
DAbACC 0.383*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
0.263*** 
(0.000) 
0.218*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.331*** 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.293) 
0.167*** 
(0.000) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
0.234*** 
(0.000) 
RD 0.108 
(0.605) 
-0.720*** 
(0.000) 
-1.078*** 
(0.000) 
-1.373*** 
(0.001) 
-1.447*** 
(0.003) 
SALEG 1.051*** 
(0.000) 
0.401*** 
(0.000) 
0.266*** 
(0.000) 
0.181*** 
(0.008) 
0.102 
(0.144) 
AGE 0.043** 
(0.032) 
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.187*** 
(0.000) 
0.230*** 
(0.000) 
0.242*** 
(0.000) 
ASIZE 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.048*** 
(0.000) 
0.074*** 
(0.000) 
0.097*** 
(0.000) 
0.117*** 
(0.000) 
EVAR -0.001** 
(0.042) 
-0.001** 
(0.023) 
-0.002* 
(0.054) 
-0.002* 
(0.097) 
-0.003 
(0.274) 
      
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.055 0.068 0.086 0.097 
Observ. 16,637 15,992 15,245 14,508 13,800 
Note: 
This table reports the associations between lengths of earnings strings and abnormal accruals. The 
sample varies across estimation specifications but covering the period of 1989 – 2011 with the 
maximum of 16,637 firm-year observations. The results are obtained from Probit Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation according to the following equation: 
𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                          + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
The number of all observations and Pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3.11  
The Predictive Ability of Earnings Strings for Future Growth and Risk 
Conditional on Abnormal Accruals Estimated from the Modified Jones Model 
 
 FESP FSALE FCFO FEVAR 
INTERCEPT -0.452***  
(0.006) 
0.221*** 
(0.000) 
-0.023***  
(0.000) 
-4.871***  
(0.000) 
STRING 0.047***  
(0.001) 
0.018***  
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.378***  
(0.007) 
DAbACC -0.092**  
(0.017) 
0.017** 
(0.039) 
  0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.243 
(0.553) 
STRING x DAbACC 0.028  
(0.110) 
-0.003  
(0.494)   
-0.001*  
(0.077) 
-0.217 
(0.298) 
EPS 0.439*** 
(0.000) 
   
SALE  0.907*** 
(0.000) 
  
CFO   0.584***  
(0.000) 
 
EVAR    0.494*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.165***  
(0.000) 
0.102***  
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.618) 
1.595*** 
(0.006) 
RD -0.175  
(0.453) 
-0.102** 
(0.043) 
-0.049***   
(0.001) 
-3.749 
(0.207) 
DE -0.007  
(0.720) 
-0.010***    
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.462) 
0.304  
(0.336) 
SALEG -0.206***  
(0.002) 
0.082***  
(0.003) 
-0.010**  
(0.033) 
1.821  
(0.117) 
AGE 0.156***  
(0.000) 
-0.040***   
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.898) 
0.011 
(0.979) 
ASIZE 0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.084***  
(0.000) 
0.005***  
(0.000) 
0.587***  
(0.001) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.972 0.515 0.385 
Observ. 16,637 16,637 16,637 16,637 
Note: 
This table reports the predictive ability of earnings strings for future performance and risk conditional 
on high abnormal accruals but abnormal accruals are estimated from the modified Jones model. The 
sample covering the period of 1989 – 2011 is 16,637 firm-year observations. The results are obtained 
from OLS Estimation according to the following equation: 
           𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
157 
 
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3.12  
The Associations between Returns and Earnings Strings Conditional on 
Abnormal Accruals Estimated from the Modified Jones Model 
 
 Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals 
RETt 
(1) 
RETt+1 
                               (2) 
INTERCEPT 0.151*** 
(0.000) 
0.181*** 
(0.000) 
STRING 0.051*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.664) 
DAbACC -0.006 
(0.616) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
STRING x DAbACC -0.001 
(0.802) 
-0.001 
(0.889) 
EPS 0.003 
(0.609) 
-0.007 
(0.310) 
ChgEPS 0.038*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.455) 
CFO 0.385*** 
(0.000) 
-0.052 
(0.528) 
SALE -0.024*** 
(0.000) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
DE 0.028*** 
(0.001) 
0.018** 
(0.027) 
AGE -0.041*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022** 
(0.022) 
MBt-1 -0.026*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007** 
(0.030) 
   
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.065 
Observ. 16,637 16,637 
Note: 
This table reports the associations between returns and earnings strings conditional on high abnormal 
accruals estimated from the Modified Jones Model. The sample covering the period of 1989 – 2011 is 
16,637 firm-year observations. The results are obtained from OLS Estimation according to the 
following equations: 
                                     𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                             + 𝛾𝛾4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                  + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
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and                           𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                             + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                  + 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Table 3.13 
 The Predictive Ability of Earnings Strings for Future Growth and Risk 
Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals and High Net Working Capital 
(Excluding the Single Year Strings) 
 
Panel A: Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals 
 FESP FSALE FCFO FEVAR 
INTERCEPT -0.515***  
(0.002) 
0.298*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007  
(0.190) 
-3.911*** 
(0.000) 
STRING 0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.018*** 
(0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.013) 
-0.631*** 
(0.000) 
DAbACC -0.180***  
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.408) 
  0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.851  
(0.109) 
STRING x DAbACC 0.001 
(0.925) 
-0.002   
(0.620) 
0.000  
(0.617) 
0.399** 
(0.011) 
EPS 0.451*** 
(0.000) 
   
SALE  0.903*** 
(0.000) 
  
CFO   0.567*** 
(0.000) 
 
EVAR    0.547***  
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.187*** 
(0.001) 
0.096***  
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.618) 
1.180 
(0.106) 
RD 0.126  
(0.591) 
-0.075 
(0.229)   
-0.047***   
(0.001) 
-4.957 
(0.106) 
DE 0.003  
(0.879) 
-0.009***  
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.151) 
0.467 
(0.185) 
SALEG -0.138* 
(0.078) 
0.108*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013* 
(0.060) 
1.639 
(0.268) 
AGE 0.168***  
(0.000) 
-0.035***  
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.775) 
-0.170 
(0.653) 
ASIZE 0.104*** 
(0.000) 
0.086***   
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.609*** 
(0.000) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.974 0.521 0.438 
Observ. 11,282 11,282 11,282 11,282 
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Panel B: Conditional on High Net Working Capital 
Variable FESP FSALE FCFO FEVAR 
INTERCEPT -0.538***  
(0.001) 
0.304*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.553) 
-5.240*** 
(0.000) 
STRING 0.037* 
(0.071)   
0.016*** 
(0.000)   
0.002** 
(0.010) 
-0.394** 
(0.045) 
DNWC 0.060 
(0.248) 
0.016 
(0.242) 
-0.006** 
(0.012)     
-2.001***  
(0.009) 
STRING x DNWC 0.033* 
(0.095) 
  0.001      
(0.755) 
0.001 
(0.217) 
-0.020 
(0.932) 
EPS 0.447*** 
(0.000) 
   
SALE  0.902*** 
(0.000) 
  
CFO   0.563*** 
(0.000) 
 
EVAR    0.546*** 
(0.000) 
CAPEX -0.194*** 
(0.000) 
0.096*** 
(0.000)    
-0.001 
(0.761) 
1.179 
(0.105) 
RD 0.175  
(0.465) 
-0.071 
(0.250)   
-0.052***  
(0.000) 
-5.130 
  (0.102) 
DE 0.012 
(0.608) 
  -0.008**  
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.598) 
  0.372 
(0.296) 
SALEG -0.179**   
(0.026)   
0.106*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
  (0.157)   
1.490 
(0.308) 
AGE 0.174***   
(0.000) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
0.000   
(0.907)   
-0.257   
(0.496)    
ASIZE 0.090*** 
(0.000)       
0.084***  
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.954*** 
(0.000) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.974 0.518 0.439 
Observ. 11,282 11,282 11,282 11,282 
Note: 
This table reports the predictive ability of earnings strings for future performance and risk conditional 
on high abnormal accruals and high net working capital excluding the single-year string sample. The 
sample covering the period of 1989 – 2011 is 11,282 firm-year observations. The results are obtained 
from OLS Estimation according to equation (3) as follows: 
             𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                    + 𝛿𝛿6𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3.14 
 The Associations between Returns and Earnings Strings Conditional on High 
Abnormal Accruals and High Net Working Capital  
(Excluding the Single Year Strings) 
 
Variable Conditional on                                                  
High Abnormal Accruals 
Conditional on                                          
High Net Working Capital 
RETt 
(1) 
RETt+1 
           (2) 
RETt 
             (3) 
RETt+1 
           (4) 
INTERCEPT 0.137*** 
(0.000) 
0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.067* 
(0.259)   
STRING 0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.103) 
0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018** 
(0.021)   
DAbACC 0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.093*** 
(0.000) 
  
STRING x DAbACC -0.007* 
(0.066) 
0.010** 
(0.029)   
  
DNWC   0.072*** 
(0.000) 
-0.047** 
  (0.022) 
STRING x DNWC   -0.052*** 
(0.000) 
0.015** 
(0.029)   
EPS -0.002 
(0.662) 
-0.016** 
(0.030) 
-0.001 
(0.841) 
-0.019** 
(0.011)   
ChgEPS 0.035*** 
(0.000) 
0.018**  
(0.026) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.018** 
(0.027) 
CFO 0.313*** 
(0.000) 
0.008  
(0.915) 
0.288*** 
(0.000) 
0.045  
(0.578) 
SALE -0.015*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.202) 
-0.016*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.753) 
DE 0.021*** 
(0.001) 
0.016  
(0.116) 
0.021*** 
(0.000)   
0.017*  
(0.092) 
AGE -0.018* 
(0.058) 
-0.026***  
(0.001) 
-0.018*   
(0.056) 
-0.024***  
(0.003) 
MBt-1 -0.022*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006* 
(0.093) 
-0.022*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006* 
(0.093) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.075 0.147 0.071 
Observ. 11,282 11,282 11,282 11,282 
Note: 
This table reports the associations between returns and earnings strings conditional on high abnormal 
accruals and high net working capital excluding the single-year string sample. The sample covering 
the period of 1989 – 2011 is 11,282 firm-year observations. The results are obtained from OLS 
Estimation according to equations (4) and (5) as follows: 
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                                     𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                             + 𝛾𝛾4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                  + 𝛾𝛾8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
and                            𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3(𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)    
                                              + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                   + 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
The number of all observations and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by year and firm. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Chapter 4: Earnings Strings and Credit Ratings 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature on meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (henceforth MBEB) 
documents that firms tend to avoid reporting losses, refrain from earnings decreases, 
and meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, a number of companies 
asymmetrically meet or beat three earnings thresholds: zero earnings, prior period’s 
earnings, and earnings expectations issued by analysts because of economic-
related benefits. Evidence reported by Barth et al. (1999), Bartov et al., (2002), 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Jiang (2008), and Brown et al. (2009)  indicates that 
firms beating these benchmarks experience higher stock prices as measured by 
higher price-earnings multiples, and higher abnormal returns. It has been argued that 
this is related to better growth opportunities and lower business risk. My previous 
findings in this thesis provide evidence that earnings strings predict higher growth in 
earnings, sales, and cash flows and signal lower future earnings variability. I also 
offer evidence that combinations of strings with high abnormal accruals/high net 
working capital are associated with higher future growth and lower future risk, 
consistent with the view of information content of earnings strings. 
To date, there is limited research on the economic consequences of MBEB in debt 
markets. In a related study, Jiang (2008) provides evidence that credit rating 
upgrades are the most pronounced in firms that avoid losses. He also finds that 
those upgrades are still present if earnings are managed. While Jiang (2008) 
investigates single-period MBEB, I also focus on a multi-period investigation to 
account for the fact that investors’ assessment of firm performance involves a 
number of periods (Koonce and Lipe, 2010). I also distinguish between consistently 
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good and poor past performance. Although bad news is particularly relevant to debt 
markets, Jiang (2008) is silent on investigating the economic implications of 
consecutively missing earnings thresholds.  
This paper also complements a couple of other papers in the field of this study. 
Alissa et al. (2013) find that firms engage in earnings management when they realise 
that their expected ratings are below or above their actual ratings. They also find that 
ratings are upgraded (downgraded) to their expected ratings by income increasing 
(decreasing) earnings management. However, they do not investigate the possibility 
that accruals may signal information about a firm’s future prospects (Ball et al., 2015; 
and Penman and Yehuda, 2015), as opposed to be subject to earnings 
management. Therefore, there is a possibility that the credit rating agencies are 
responding to information with respect to future performance contained in the 
accruals. Moreover, Baghai et al. (2014) provide evidence that credit rating agencies 
are more conservative over time, based on firm fundamentals. Given the importance 
of conservatism, they do not explore whether rating agencies are more (less) 
conservative for firms reporting consecutively decreasing (increasing) earnings.  
This related literature leaves several important questions open to investigation. First, 
given that rating agencies assign credit rating upgrades to firms who MBEB, to what 
extent are observed rating premiums related to consistent past performance (good or 
poor) in evaluating firms that currently increase their EBITDA? Second, are rating 
rewards associated with measures of future growth and risk or are they merely 
rewards for past performance? Lastly, given that accruals can simultaneously proxy 
for earnings quality and future growth/risk, how do rating agencies perceive MBEB in 
the presence of high accruals?  
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I focus on EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) as 
the main performance measure.49 Using EBITDA as the focus of this analysis follows 
from the fact that credit rating agencies evaluate a firm’s profitability and solvency 
using EBITDA margin (Standard and Poor’s, 2013). Moreover, investors in debt 
markets and bond analysts use EBITDA when they identify firms’ credit risk 
(Penman, 2007; and De Franco et al., 2009).  
I extend the prior literature along several dimensions. First, I explore if rating 
consequences of increasing current year’s EBITDA are present once long term 
performance is controlled for. This analysis is motivated by Koonce and Lipe (2010) 
who argue that markets use financial information over multiple years when 
evaluating current performance. In addition, I distinguish between good and poor 
past performance because credit rating agencies are likely to be more interested in 
bad news than good news about firm performance (Fisher and Verrecchia, 1997; 
and Plummer and Tse, 1999). It is likely that rating agencies assess firms’ credit risk 
more carefully when firms repeatedly underperform.  
Second, I question whether credit rating premiums for a single-year increase in 
performance is sensitive to controlling for future growth and risk. Prior literature and 
evidence in this thesis suggest that achieving earnings thresholds conveys 
information with regard to future growth and risk in equity markets (Bartov et al., 
2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; and Brown et al., 2009). This suggests that 
credit ratings agencies reward firms who MBEB with rating upgrades because they 
anticipate better future performance, or lower risk. However, because rating 
agencies are likely to observe private information, their ratings may reflect 
information beyond what is eventually revealed in subsequent financial performance. 
                                                          
49 In the other chapters, I define earnings strings based on EPS before extraordinary items. 
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To explore this possibility, I investigate whether rating premiums continue to hold 
after controlling for ex post future growth and risk. 
Lastly, I explore whether credit rating agencies correctly process information 
conveyed when firms achieve long strings of EBITDA increases or decreases while 
reporting current EBITDA increases associated with high abnormal accruals. My 
prior findings suggest that increasing earnings strings with high abnormal accruals 
are predictors of good future performance. In addition, previous studies argue that 
accruals arise when firms invest to grow and respond to lower future risk (Ball et al., 
2015; and Wu et al., 2010). This leads to a question as to how credit rating agencies 
perceive and react to EBITDA growth when it is possibly driven by high abnormal 
accruals.   
As alluded to above, to investigate the relation between credit rating premiums and 
MBEB, I use a short-term measure and a long-term measure of MBEB. Specifically, I 
use an indicator variable for firm-year in which EBITDA increases relative to previous 
year’s EBITDA. The long-term measure is the length of a string of EBITDA increases 
or decreases that is observed in the previous year. I include both variables in my 
regression analysis to examine if the explanatory power of current EBITDA increases 
are dependent on past EBITDA increases or decreases over a long period in line 
with Koonce and Lipe (2010). In other words, I examine whether the incremental 
explanatory power of the current EBITDA increases exists over and above the 
strength of past performance, as captured by the string variable.  
The main findings are as follows. Table 4.6 reports that firms that increase EBITDA 
in the current year benefit from rating upgrades in the first and second years 
following the EBITDA increase. However, Table 4.7 indicates that the association of 
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EBITDA increases with upgrades in the second year ceases to hold once the length 
of previous EBITDA strings is controlled for. Nevertheless, I do not find any evidence 
of rating reversals in the longer-term. In this specification I also find that longer 
lagged negative strings are associated with stronger future downgrades, but that 
lagged positive strings are unrelated to future credit changes. These findings are 
robust to allowing an interaction between current EBITDA increases and length of 
past EBITDA strings and controlling for future firm performance, as suggested by 
Table 4.8. I then explore the information role of high abnormal accruals by adding an 
indicator variable for high abnormal accruals and interactions with the two MBEB 
variables and report the results in Table 4.9. While I do not find that high abnormal 
accruals are related to future rating changes, I confirm the previous results.  Further 
robustness tests corroborate these main findings.        
This paper makes a number of contributions to the MBEB literature. First, I provide 
evidence that credit rating premiums documented by Jiang (2008) are subject to past 
firm performance. This indicates that credit rating agencies have long memory for 
bad news. Second, I offer evidence that rating premiums to current EBITDA 
increases are incremental to information conveyed by future performance. These 
results are particularly interesting because I control for ex post realizations of future 
performance and risk. This strongly suggests that rating agencies believe that the 
information content of EBITDA increases is long-lived. Third, I provide evidence that 
high abnormal accruals are unrelated to future credit rating changes. This does not 
support either the earnings management explanation or the information content 
explanation.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses 
previous literature and research questions. Section 4.3 describes research design. 
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Section 4.4 narrates sample. Section 4.5 provides main results. Section 4.6 reports 
additional findings. Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 Related Literature and Research Questions 
4.2.1 Background 
Previous research on MBEB provides evidence that investors reward firms that meet 
or beat earnings benchmarks such as zero earnings, preceding period’s earnings, 
and analyst consensus earnings forecasts. Consistent with the capital market 
effects, firms face incentives to meet or exceed these targets (Barth et al., 1999; 
Degeorge et al., 1999; Lopez and Rees, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Myers et al., 2007; Jiang, 2008; Koonce 
and Lipe, 2010; and Shanthikumar, 2012). Firms failing to meet such targets on the 
other hand, experience considerable decreases in share prices (DeAngelo et al., 
1996; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; and Kinney et al., 2002). 
Complementing empirical findings, survey results reveal that MBEB is important. 
Graham et al. (2005) indicate that the majority of chief finance officers (CFOs) 
strongly believe that surpassing earnings targets can boost stock prices and improve 
firms’ creditability. Moreover, Dichev et al. (2013, 2016) indicate that over 90% of 
CFOs accept that earnings are a critical input into investors’ valuation, and that 
earnings management is exploited for achieving MBEB because of both internal and 
external pressure.  
4.2.2 Overview of Credit Ratings 
Credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, provide an 
assessment of creditworthiness of an entity who issues debt or a specific financial 
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obligation.50,51 A credit rating follows an assessment of a firm’s overall business risk 
and financial strength to ultimately determine likelihood of default.52 A particular 
credit rating is issued after credit rating agencies collect and analyse all relevant 
information about a firm based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
models (Baghai et al., 2014).53 It is common that a credit rating is a form of a letter-
grade, e.g. AAA or BB. A credit rating is often accompanied by a commentary that 
includes a rating outlook and a rating watch conveying additional information to 
markets (Bannier and Hirsch, 2010). Credit ratings are used extensively in 
contracting and market regulation due to more complex financial products and the 
integration of financial markets (Frost, 2007). 
The usefulness of credit ratings is facilitated by two main characteristics: stability and 
conservatism. First, credit ratings are assumed to be stable. This implies that a 
change in credit rating must take place typically following a significant change in firm 
fundamentals or credit risk. Large credit rating agencies claim that credit ratings are 
provided based on a “through the cycle” rating approach (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). 
Amato and Furfine (2004) support these claims by demonstrating that credit ratings 
are not affected by business cycles. However, there have been many studies 
documenting that credit ratings are not independent of financial and business cycles. 
Lobo et al. (2016) find evidence that credit ratings are pro-cyclical after controlling for 
credit risk and financial risk. Credit rating agencies give lower ratings during 
recession periods but assign higher ratings during expansion times. Bar-Isaac and 
                                                          
50 There are a variety of definitions of a credit rating, see Cantor and Packer (1995), BIS (2000), Griep and De 
Stefano (2001), and SEC (2015). 
51 Most credit ratings are relative, not absolute, probability of default.  
52 Business risk in particular is related to industry characteristics, firm’s competitiveness, and management 
quality and financial strength dealing with financial characteristics and policy, capital structure, and cash flow 
projection. 
53 Baghai et al (2014) argue that they are unable to observe qualitative criteria in rating agencies’ credit quality 
assessment models. They, however, employ a firm fixed effect method to capture unobservable time invariant 
effects in their empirical specifications. 
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Shapiro (2013) document that credit ratings vary across reputational risk along with 
business cycles.  
Second, ratings are considered to be conservative if rating upgrades require a 
greater degree of verification than rating downgrades. Rating conservatism can 
reduce reputation risk to rating agency by ensuring that it is less likely that firms can 
be viewed as being financially stronger than they really are. Jorion et al. (2009) 
suggest that ratings are more stringent for investment grade class. However, Becker 
and Milbourn (2011) document evidence that Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are 
more lenient as Fitch becomes more important in the markets during 1995 to 2006.54 
In contrast, credit rating agencies tend to inflate ratings for structured products and 
mortgage-backed securities during upturns of economy (Bolton et al., 2012; and He 
et al, 2012).  
4.2.3 The Informational Role of Credit Ratings  
Credit ratings provide information that facilitates borrowing, influences market 
confidence, and enhances the efficiency of financial markets (Lobo et al, 2016). Prior 
research has classified the role of credit ratings into three distinct functions.  
First, credit ratings help aggregate and disseminate information to investors. Credit 
rating agencies’ opinions convey available information that is relevant for assessing 
a firm’s financial soundness beyond the public information (Holthausen and Leftwich, 
1986; Ederington and Goh, 1998; and Crabtree and Maher, 2005). For this reason 
the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) exclusively allows firms to disclose 
sensitive information and confidential discussion to rating agencies. Jorion et al. 
                                                          
54 Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services, Moody’s Investor Service, and Fitch Inc. maintain over 95% 
market share in the global rating market (Lobo et al., 2016). Consequently, these three agencies are the most 
important rating agencies in financial markets. They also have been severely criticized over the past few years 
as one of the causes of global financial crisis.  
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(2005) find that credit rating agencies gain confidential information such as financial 
projections by product line or division and board meeting minutes. Therefore, the 
ratings themselves convey the privately-gained information to market participants.55 
They also argue that credit rating changes are more influential than share prices 
after the enforcement of Reg FD. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) document that firms 
experience negative excess returns after credit rating downgrades, but not when 
upgrades, are issued. Past studies also indicate the relation between credit ratings 
and asymmetric information. For instance, Odders-White and Ready (2006) find that 
market liquidity in equity markets is negatively associated with poor credit ratings. An 
and Chan (2008) suggest that firms having credit ratings have lower underpricing 
when issuing equity. This literature therefore indicates that credit ratings are 
informative about firm value. 
Second, rating certification is used for capital allocation and contracting. Obtaining 
credit rating lowers a firm’s cost of debt (Whited, 1992; and Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997). Faulkender and Petersen (2006) document that rating information alleviates 
credit constraints for highly indebted firms. Sufi (2009) shows that firms raise more 
syndicated debt following the issue of their credit rating, and use this debt for 
investment and business acquisitions. Hence, there exists evidence that credit rating 
information has effects on debt contracting and financing. 
Lastly, credit ratings facilitate monitoring and regulatory activity. They are used by 
governmental regulators in various regulations and laws (Beaver et al., 2006). For 
instance, Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act (1940) requires that securities 
with only the two highest short-term rating categories issued by accredited credit 
                                                          
55 Private information collected by credit rating agencies is, for instance, long-term forecasts, pro-forma 
financial statements, and management reports. 
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rating agencies are eligible to be invested by money market funds.56 In terms of 
monitoring objectives, rating downgrades frequently lead to violations of debt 
covenants. Downward ratings can trigger an acceleration of debt repayment (Alissa 
et al., 2013). Moreover, investors may be imposed to exit their positions by 
liquidating portfolios if a firm’s credit rating reaches below certain rating categories.  
4.2.4 The Determinants of Credit Ratings 
A higher credit rating reflects that a firm has a lower probability of default and vice 
versa. In addition, credit ratings are directly associated with (and proxy for) cost of 
debt (Ahmed et al. 2002; and Francis et al. 2005). As a result, firms have to pay 
attention to their credit ratings as they have significant implications for their 
operating, investing, and financing activities.  
The literature largely focuses on several determinants of ratings including financial 
information, corporate governance, business cycles, earnings management and 
smoothness.  Each rating determinant will be discussed below. 
First, since credit ratings convey information about firms’ value, it is clear that one 
can attribute a certain firm’s credit rating to its financial performance. Purda (2007) 
employs fundamental variables to predict rating changes such as profitability, 
leverage, interest coverage, and liquidity. Chou (2013) argues that future profit 
streams can account for credit rating levels. Baghai et al. (2014) find that companies 
who obtain higher credit ratings have less debt, pay lower rents, have higher interest 
coverage, are more profitable, have less earnings variation, are larger, reserve less 
cash, have more tangible assets, invest more in capital, and have a positive debt-to-
                                                          
56 Accredited credit rating agency is referred to Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs). The three major NRSROs are Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services, Moody’s Investor Service, 
and Fitch Inc. 
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EBITDA ratio. Prior studies also indicate that firm size, profitability, operating risk, 
growth opportunities, and asset tangibility are important determinants of credit 
ratings (Ederington, 1985; and Hovakimian et al., 2009). Additionally, to the extent 
that credit ratings are determined by default risk, financial ratios are able to predict 
default probability (Altman, 1968). 
Second, insofar as corporate governance helps reduce probability of default, it 
should be regarded as a factor affecting credit ratings. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
find that outside directors play their roles in monitoring which in turn have positive 
impacts on credit ratings. This implies that the better governing mechanism leads to 
a reduction in default risk and then an increase in rating positions of firms. 
Third, credit ratings are determined by business and financial cycles. Blume et al. 
(1998), Nickell et al., (2000), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013), and Lobo et al. (2016) 
document that credit ratings are not independent from business cycles, financial 
cycles, and economic upturns and downturns. That is, inflated credit ratings exist 
during economic expansions, while conservative credit ratings emerge during 
economic contractions.  
Lastly, earnings management and earnings smoothing take place when firms desire 
to reach their expected credit ratings. Alissa et al. (2013) document that firms 
achieve their higher (lower) rating targets by engaging income-increasing 
(decreasing) earnings management.57 Jung et al. (2013) investigate the effects of 
past earnings smoothness on credit ratings. They provide evidence that less past 
                                                          
57 Alissa et al. (2013) argue that credit rating agencies assume that financial statements are accurate and 
reasonable and do not consider themselves as an auditor. 
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volatile earnings are more favourable to credit rating agencies and that past 
smoothing earnings is viewed as lower credit risk.58  
4.2.5 Research on MBEB 
Previous studies primarily investigate share-price effects on MBEB. As for the effects 
of MBEB on pricing of debt, Jiang (2008) is the first to provide evidence on valuation 
roles of MBEB in debt markets. He examines the relation between MBEB and cost of 
debt proxied by credit ratings and initial bond yield spreads. He finds that meeting or 
beating zero earnings, prior year’s earnings, or analyst forecasts is positively 
associated with credit rating upgrades. Moreover, he finds that the yield on first time 
issued bonds is negatively related to one-period meeting or beating benchmarks. His 
results suggest that such associations vary across types of benchmarks, levels of 
default risk, and whether or not firms engage in earnings management.  
However, there are important issues that he does not investigate. First, although 
consistency in earnings growth is important for both firms and investors (Koonce and 
Lipe, 2010), he does not investigate whether multi-period meeting or beating 
benchmarks has incremental implications for credit ratings. Second, given that bad 
news is crucial for debt markets, he is silent on investigating the economic effects of 
consecutively missing earnings thresholds. Third, he uses earnings per share (EPS) 
as a benchmark; while De Franco et al. (2009) indicate that bond analysts focus on 
EBITDA. Therefore, using an EPS benchmark may be an inappropriate benchmark. 
Another paper that is related to this study is Alissa et al. (2013). They find that firms 
engage in earnings management when they realise that their expected ratings are 
below or above their actual ratings. Their results also suggest that ratings are 
                                                          
58 Moody’s considers earnings volatility as a key criteria in its rating procedures (Jung et al., 2013) 
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upgraded (downgraded) to their expected ratings by income-increasing (decreasing) 
earnings management. Nevertheless, their results raise a question as to why 
companies would lower their actual credit ratings when the issued ratings are above 
expected ratings. Although Alissa et al. (2013) assume that rating agencies are 
naïve, Standard and Poor’s corporate rating criteria (2008) states that rating 
agencies take into account the quality of accounting information and make analytical 
adjustments for overstated or understated accounting items. Moreover, they do not 
investigate the possibility that accruals may signal information with respect to future 
prospects, not earnings management, and that credit ratings are reacted to such 
information. 
Baghai et al. (2014) indicate that credit rating standards have been tightened; while 
default rate is in a decreasing trend. This evidence reflects that rating agencies are 
more conservative over time. They also find that conservative ratings have 
implications for firms’ decisions with respect to capital structure. Given the 
importance of conservatism, they do not explore whether rating agencies are more 
(less) conservative for firms reporting consecutively decreasing (increasing) 
earnings. This setting may provide evidence of corrections of over-conservatism or 
under-conservatism.  
According to evidence on credit ratings and MBEB provided by prior studies, 
previous literature on credit rating does not investigate a number of important 
questions. First, are credit premiums documented by Jiang (2008) conditional on 
past performance captured by prior positive/negative EBITDA strings? Second, are 
observed credit premiums to firms with current EBITDA increases simply a reflection 
of higher future performance? Finally, as high accruals are a proxy for both earnings 
177 
 
quality and future growth/risk, how do rating agencies understand and react to MBEB 
in the presence of high abnormal accruals?  
4.2.6 Research Questions  
In the previous sub-sections I review evidence in the literature that reporting MBEB 
leads to lower cost of debt, i.e. higher credit ratings. However, it is not sufficiently 
clear from the literature what is the broader context in which MBEB is rewarded with 
credit rating upgrades. In particular, there is a possibility that rating premiums are 
assigned conditional on prior EBITDA strings as Koonce and Lipe (2010) find that 
markets evaluate firm performance over multiple periods. For credit rating agencies, 
previous negative EBITDA strings seem more important because debt market 
participants are more concerned about downside risk relative to upside growth 
potential and rating agencies are conservative (Fisher and Verrecchia, 1997; 
Plummer and Tse, 1999; and Baghai et al., 2014).  
On one hand, persistent MBEB may signal future profitability and lower underlying 
risk more powerfully than a single-year MBEB. On the other hand, because 
debtholders’ claims on assets are limited and they do not share in firms’ upside 
growth potential, a series of negative EBITDA changes may be more important than 
a positive one (Fischer and Varrecchia, 1997; and Plummer and Tse, 1999). That is, 
debt values are more asymmetrically influenced by information indicating decreasing 
firm value than increasing firm value. The holders of debt demand more reliable 
value-decreasing estimates (Florou and Kosi, 2015; and Watts, 2003) and stress 
timely arrival of bad news (Ball et al., 2008). Consistent with this, Baghai et al. (2014) 
indicate that ratings agencies are in fact conservative. I therefore expect that credit 
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rating agencies respond more to decreasing EBITDA strings than increasing EBITDA 
strings because it directly affects debt investors’ fixed claims.  
Given previous EBITDA strings, there are three possible credit rating responses to 
increasing EBITDA in the current period, as follows. First, MBEB in the current 
period following prior positive EBITDA strings provides greater assurance that firms 
are continuing their growth momentum. Second, MBEB in the current period 
following on prior negative EBITDA strings indicates improving financial 
performance. Third, MBEB in the current year with no history of prior EBITDA strings 
would suggest uncertainty in performance. I therefore ask my first research question 
(in three parts) as follows. 
Research Question 1.1: What is the association between future rating changes and 
prior EBITDA strings (holding current year’s change in EBITDA fixed)?  
Research Question 1.2: Does this association vary between past positive and 
negative EBITDA strings? 
Research Question 1.3: Is the association between rating changes and current 
EBITDA increases dependent on prior EBITDA strings? 
Extensive literature on MBEB focusing on equity markets suggests that surpassing 
benchmarks may signal expected future growth and underlying risk (Bartov et al., 
2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; and Brown et al., 2009). Extrapolating from 
Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) and Penman and Yehuda (2015), growing earnings 
resolves fundamental risk that, in turn, decreases cost of capital. Accordingly, rating 
premiums given by credit rating agencies could simultaneously be driven by 
agencies’ expectations of future growth and lower underlying risk that is signalled by 
MBEB. 
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Therefore, I am asking whether a reward for a current year’s EBITDA increase is 
simply a reflection of future performance that is seen by credit rating agencies. The 
second research question is the following. 
Research Question 2: Is the association between rating changes and current year’s 
increases in EBITDA, if any, robust to controlling for future growth and risk? 
Evidence in this dissertation suggests that firms with MBEB report higher abnormal 
accruals than other firms. It can be thought that these firms are either engaging in 
earnings management or growing. While the abnormal accrual is used as a proxy for 
earnings quality, several studies consider it as a proxy for future growth and risk.  
Penman and Yehuda (2015) argue that accruals reflect deferral of future earnings, 
thus accruals signal information about future earnings growth and lower underlying 
risk. Ball et al. (2015) suggest that accruals or timing differences between cash flows 
and earnings stem from net investment in working capital driven by positive or 
negative growth. Hence, growth is considered as an adjustment factor of optimal 
level of working capital conditional on a firm’s expected future business. Bushman et 
al. (2011) suggest that working capital investment and capitalization accruals are 
directly related to growth, indicating a growing stage of companies. Wu et al. (2010) 
argue that accruals are negatively associated with discount rate, a proxy for risk, as 
firms optimally react to decreases in expected returns by investing more in inputs in 
production process. Therefore, positive EBITDA changes, EBITDA strings, and high 
abnormal accruals are all observed when the firm is investing in growth. 
This brings an investigation into how credit rating agencies perceive and react to 
positive EBITDA changes and past strings when observing high abnormal accruals. 
Specifically, if agencies believe that current EBITDA increases and past strings 
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conditional on high abnormal accruals predict good future performance, I expect a 
positive association between current EBITDA increases and past strings with high 
accruals and credit rating changes. In contrast, if agencies believe that high 
abnormal accruals reflect earnings management activities, I expect a negative one. 
The following research question is the third question (in two parts). 
Research Question 3.1: Is the association between rating changes and current 
EBITDA increases stronger in the presence of high abnormal accruals? 
Research Question 3.2: Is the association between rating changes and prior 
EBITDA strings stronger in the presence of high abnormal accruals? 
4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Replication of Jiang (2008) 
I first replicate the main analysis in Jiang (2008) for credit rating upgrades given to 
firms reporting earnings increases for one year.  The specification below is for 
examining whether credit rating changes are positively associated with meeting or 
beating last year’s EBITDA. 
             𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                  (1) 
Where ChgCRit+1 is a firm’s credit rating change from year t to t+1. ChgCRit+2 is a 
firm’s credit rating change from year t+1 to t+2. The reason I use ChgCRit+2 as an 
additional dependent variable is that it is known that credit ratings are sticky and 
slow to change and that rating agencies may need more time to react to all 
information available to them. Constructing ChgCRit+2 can detect this delayed 
response. I construct credit rating variable using S&P’s long-term issuer level credit 
rating which reflects a firm’s creditworthiness to meet senior debt obligations. This 
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type of credit ratings is basically similar to the issuer rating. I encode ratings letters 
into numbers taking value from 17 to 1 by coding 17 for AAA, 16 for AA+, 15 for AA, 
and so on. The last value of rating variable or 1 is for CCC+ or lower ratings. So, it 
implies that a greater number specifies a better credit rating. BEAT is an indicator 
variable taking value of one if a firm reports a current EBITDA increase relative to 
prior year’s EBITDA. The subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 denote firm and time, respectively. ԑ is 
the residual term. Consistent with Jiang (2008), I expect that β1 is positive, implying 
that firms with current EBITDA increases have higher credit ratings. 
Following Jiang (2008), I control for profitability and performance affecting ability to 
meet its financial obligations (ChgDEBITDA, ChgAOCF, and ChgTIE), financial risk 
(ChgLEV), business risk (ChgRETSD, ChgVAREBITDA), growth options (ChgMB), 
size (ChgTA), and research and development activities (ChgRD). All control 
variables are defined as change variables consistent with the change specification. 
That is, each variable is a change value from year t-1 to year t.59 
Equation (1) is estimated using Ordered Logit (OLG) regression and OLS regression. 
Year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm (year 
and firm) for OLG (OLS) are performed in this specification. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom tails of the distribution for all specifications 
unless otherwise noted. 
The reason I use OLG is that it does not impose an assumption that an 
increase/decrease from one rating notch to the next is constant for all rating notches. 
It only suggests that higher (lower) ratings imply stronger (weaker) firm 
                                                          
59 See definitions of variables in Appendix A. 
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fundamentals. I also perform OLS because it can employ two-way clustered 
standard errors to control for cross-sectional and serial correlation in the errors. 
4.3.2 The Rating Effects of Prior EBITDA Strings 
According to research questions 1.1 – 1.3, I extend equation (1) by adding prior 
positive and negative EBITDA strings and interactions between prior positive and 
negative EBITDA strings and BEAT variable. The following specification is as 
follows. 
   𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                             + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                             + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                    (2) 
Where LPSTRING is a prior positive EBITDA string, defined as PSTRING at year t-1. 
LNSTRING is a prior negative EBITDA string, defined as NSTRING at year t-1. 
PSTRING is the length of increasing EBITDA relative to the previous year. NSTRING 
is the length of decreasing EBITDA relative to the previous year. My predictions 
related to prior EBITDA strings are first β2 is expected to be positive, suggesting that 
prior good performance is still improving ratings. Second, β3 is expected to be 
negative, implying that credit rating agencies are continuing to discount firms’ credit 
ratings. For interaction terms between BEAT and prior EBITDA strings, I don’t have 
any expectation as it leaves to the empirical investigation. 
As it follows equation (1), all control variables are the same. Equation (2) is also 
estimated using Ordered Logit (OLG) regression and OLS regression. Year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm (year and firm) 
for OLG (OLS) are performed in this model.  
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4.3.3 Controlling for Future Performance 
To answer research question 2, I add future growth and risk into equation (2). 
Specifically, I control for future earnings, future cash flows, future sales, and future 
earnings volatility. I also control for firm life-cycle captured by firm age. The following 
model is used to investigate if credit rating premiums are associated with meeting or 
beating last year’s EBITDA conditional on prior EBITDA strings and future 
growth/risk. 
    𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                               + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                               + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                               + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                               + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                  (3) 
Where ChgFEPS is average value of changes in future earnings per share over 
three year ahead. ChgFEBITDA is average value of changes in future EBITDA over 
three year ahead. ChgFAOCF is average value of changes in future adjusted 
operating cash flows over three year ahead. ChgFSALE is average value of changes 
in future sales over three year ahead. ChgFVAREBITDA is variance of percentage 
changes in future EBITDA for next three years. AGE is firm age. As suggested by 
prior literature, I include ex post future growth and risk to capture information 
conveyed by current EBITDA increases and repeatedly MBEB. I predict that to the 
extent that rating agencies perceive the bright future of the firm, β6, β7, β8, and β9 
(β10) are expected to be positive (negative). For AGE, it is possible that older firms 
are higher rated because of stable stage or lower rated because of slow growth. 
Importantly, if future performance fully captures information contained in current 
EBITDA increases and prior EBITDA strings, β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 are expected to be 
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zero. In contrast, if these parameters are different from zero, it implies that current 
EBITDA increases and EBITDA strings convey credit relevant information that is not 
captured by ex post firms’ growth and risk.  
Consistent with equation (2), all control variables are the same. Ordered Logit (OLG) 
regression and OLS regression are applied to equation (3). Year fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm (year and firm) for OLG 
(OLS) are performed in this model. 
4.3.4 Measuring Credit Rating Premiums Conditional on High Abnormal 
Accruals 
4.3.4.1 Estimating Abnormal Accruals 
Consistent with prior literature, I use abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. In the meantime, abnormal accruals are a proxy for future growth and 
future risk as accruals are one form of investment relating to higher expected growth 
and lower expected returns. To estimate abnormal accruals, I use the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model as follows. 
               ∆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝐵𝐵1𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐵𝐵2𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖             (4) 
Where ΔWC is a change in working capital from year t-1 to year t, calculated as 
changes in accounts receivable plus changes in inventories minus changes in 
accounts payable minus changes in taxes payable plus changes in other assets 
(net). CFO is cash flow from operations at time t-1, t, and t+1. All variables are 
scaled by average total assets. An intercept term captures non-zero accruals on 
average. The residual term or ԑ is considered as abnormal accruals, indicating signs 
185 
 
and magnitudes of earnings management. The higher positive (negative) abnormal 
accruals indicate higher levels of upward (downward) earnings management. 
Equation (4) is cross-sectionally estimated with the same year and the same 
industry. Each cross-sectional regression requires at least 10 industry-year 
observations. Consistent with previous studies, I eliminate all financial firms when 
estimating abnormal accruals.  
I assume that the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model’s accruals are capable of 
informing future cash flows and hence firm value. That is, accruals conveying future 
cash flow information signal future growth and future risk. The alignments between 
economic events and cash flows enhance roles of accruals in reflecting firms’ 
prospects, consistent with the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Therefore, the 
cash flow based model produces accruals better revealing information about growth 
and risk in future periods (Barth et al., 2016). 
4.3.4.2 The Model 
According to research questions 3.1 and 3.2, I modify equation (3) by adding an 
indicator variable for high abnormal accruals and its interactions with BEAT, 
LPSTRING, and LNSTRING as follows. 
   𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                              + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                              + 𝛽𝛽6(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                              + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                              + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                              + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                              + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                              + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
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                                              + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                   (5) 
Where DAbACC is an indicator variable taking value of one if a firm’s abnormal 
accrual estimated from equation (4) is higher or equal to industry average for a given 
year, otherwise zero. If high abnormal accruals are interpreted as a predictor of 
future prospects of firms who MBEB, I expect that β5, β8, β9, β10, and β11 are positive, 
suggesting that firms who MBEB with high abnormal accruals are associated with 
even higher credit ratings relative to firms who MBEB with low abnormal accruals. 
But if they are negative, it suggests that credit rating agencies are suspicious of 
MBEB with high abnormal accruals that are a result of earnings manipulation. In 
other words, they perceive that current EBITDA increases and EBITDA strings are 
fabricated. 
All control variables are consistent with equation (3). I estimate equation (5) using 
Ordered Logit (OLG) regression and OLS regression with year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm for OLG and clustered standard 
errors by year and firm for OLS.  
4.4 Sample 
I collect the accounting and rating data from COMPUSTAT while the market data are 
obtained from CRSP, covering all available listed companies from 1988 – 2014. I 
begin with the sample that consists of 273,436 firm-year observations. Because this 
study focuses on credit ratings, the sample with S&P’s long-term issuer level credit 
ratings data involves 42,817 firm-year observations. Then, requiring data for 
calculating variables and excluding financial firms yield the sample that is equal to 
3,857 firm-year observations over the period of 1990 – 2012. Having eliminated 
missing data for tests of controlling for future performance, the sample of 3,435 firm-
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year observations is used for all analyses during 1990 and 2011. The sample 
selection procedure is described in Panel A of Table 4.1. I note that the sample in 
this study is smaller than that of Alissa et al. (2013) which is equal to 23,909 firm-
year observations and that of Jiang (2008) which is 8,878 firm-year observations. 
The main differences are due to the sample period and data availability for 
constructing variables. However, concern over the sample is relieved as the 
replication of Jiang (2008) produces the results similar to Jiang (2008). 
By a currently increasing EBITDA firm, I mean a firm that reports an increase in 
current EBITDA relative to prior year’s EBITDA. I also define a positive (negative) 
string firm as a firm that reports at least one year of increases (decreases) in 
EBITDA. An EBITDA increase (decrease) is compared with EBITDA from the prior 
year. Note that this definition is less likely to give rise to a problem of survivorship 
bias. 
Using EBITDA is consistent with the view that rating agencies measure the levels of 
profitability and solvency using EBITDA margin (Standard and Poor’s, 2013). 
EBITDA is considered as a more cash-based measure of operating performance 
which is more relevant to creditors or debtholders because it reflects a firm’s debt 
serviceability. In addition, public debt market investors and bond analysts rely on 
EBITDA when they assess firms’ credit risk (Penman, 2007; and De Franco et al., 
2009). Overall, the EBITDA target is consistent with interests of credit rating 
agencies. 
Panel B reports the sample classified by year. I also categorize these observations 
into two groups – positive string firms and negative string firms. Generally, the 
number of observations increases over time. The average sample size is 156 
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observations per year. There are no clear patterns of both positive and negative 
string firms. However, it is obvious that the number of negative string firms is 
unusually high in year 2001 and 2009 that are consistent with dot com crisis and 
financial crisis respectively. 
I present the Fama and French industry classifications of the sample in Panel C.60 
This panel indicates that positive string firms and negative string firms vary across 
industries. Basically, the number of positive string firms tends to concentrate in 
certain industries. For instance, all industry except Steel Works show a large number 
of positive string firms, suggesting that traditionally heavy industries are difficult to 
sustain profitability momentum. In terms of negative string firms, firms in Utilities are 
more likely to experience consecutive decreases in EBITDA than other industries, 
implying that more regulated industries are not profitable industries.  
In Table 4.2 I analyze the sample based on the duration of the strings. The table 
suggests that longer spans are fewer. For example, 29.92% (63.76%) of firms report 
one-year increasing (decreasing) EBITDA; while 15.66% (0.56%) of firms report 
consecutively EBITDA increases (decreases) for six years and more. However, a 
one-year string is more common than other lengths and this holds for both positive 
and negative strings. I highlight that the number of negative string firms is less than 
that of positive string firms for all duration of strings, consistent with the view that 
firms attempt to avoid earnings decreases (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). I combine 
the total number of observations for firms reporting EBITDA strings at least six years 
long in the last category because of the very small number of observations. 
Table 4.3 reports the distribution of firm-year observations based on credit rating 
levels. BBB (13.67% for positive string firms and 15.38% for negative string firms) is 
                                                          
60 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. 
189 
 
the most common credit rating, consistent with Alissa et al. (2013).  However, it 
shows that the percentages of firms in the positive string firm sample are larger than 
those of the negative string firm sample for the most eight highest credit ratings (AAA 
to BBB+) except A-, suggesting that there are rating premiums for increasing 
EBITDA strings. Regarding negative string firms, I find the opposite direction. 
Specifically, the percentages of credit ratings from BBB and lower (except B) for the 
negative string firm sample are greater than those of the positive string firm sample. 
Moreover, approximately 33% of firms are rated lower than BBB-. It implies that one-
third of negative string firms have lower credit ratings than investment grade. 
4.5 Main Results  
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for main variables. The mean of ChgCR is -
0.055 corresponding to the fact that rating agencies are more conservative over time 
(Baghai et al., 2014). The mean (median) of PSTRING is 2.198 (1.000), suggesting 
that on average firms report EBITDA increases for two years. NSTRING has the 
mean (median) equal to 0.484 (0.000). The descriptive statistics of EBITDA strings 
are consistent with previous studies indicating that firms report profits and earnings 
increases on average (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Barth et al., 1999). The mean 
of AbACC is 0.001 which is very close to zero as is expected by construction. 
Sample firms on average report positive ChgEPS. I also find increasing trends in 
future profitability, future cash flows, and future sales. 
Correlations for the main variables are presented in Table 4.5. A credit rating change 
is positively (negatively) associated with BEAT and PSTRING (NSTRING). I do not 
find any relation between credit ratings and abnormal accruals. I also find moderate 
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correlations between ChgDEBITDA and ChgAOCF. This is the case because 
ChgDEBITDA and ChgAOCF are based on the same construct. The correlations 
between changes in credit ratings and changes in ChgDEBITDA and ChgAOCF are 
positive, implying that the higher EBITDA and cash flows from operations the higher 
credit ratings. 
4.5.2 Replication of Jiang (2008) 
As a starting point for my analysis, I first attempt to replicate Jiang’s (2008) results 
using my sample. The findings are reported in Table 4.6. 
For the OLG estimation, I find consistent results with the original findings by Jiang 
(2008). That is, the coefficient on BEAT is significantly positive. The economic 
significance is 41.31%. I also find that the second year change of credit ratings 
(ChgCRt+2) is positively associated with BEAT, as indicated by the positive 
coefficient on BEAT, with the economic significance of 18.39%. The magnitude of 
this coefficient is however lower than for the first year credit rating change.  
For the OLS estimation, the results are similar to those of the OLG. Specifically, the 
coefficients on BEAT are positive, suggesting that current EBITDA increases are 
related to credit rating upgrades. The economic significance of BEAT for ChgCRt+1 
(ChgCRt+2) is 9.32% (4.78%).  
With regard to other variables, the results suggest that changes in performance and 
growth options (ChgDEBITDA, ChgAOCF, ChgTIE, and ChgMB) are positively 
associated with credit rating changes; while changes in risk (ChgLEV, and 
ChgRETSD) are negatively with credit rating changes. I also find that changes in 
research and development expenses (ChgRD) are associated with lower ratings 
marginal at best.  
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In sum, my replication produces results similar to Jiang (2008). It suggests that credit 
rating upgrades are associated with a single year increase in EBITDA in my sample. 
4.5.3 Credit Rating Premiums and Prior EBITDA Strings  
To answer research questions 1.1 to 1.3, Table 4.7 reports the result for estimations 
of equation (2). Recall that this specification is used to investigate whether signed 
prior EBITDA strings are associated with credit rating changes and whether credit 
rating premiums are dependent on prior positive and negative EBITDA strings.  
For the OLG estimation, the results indicate that BEAT is positively associated with 
credit rating upgrades at time t+1, but not in t+2, with the economic significance of 
34.85%. I do not find any relation between credit rating changes at time t+1 or t+2 
and prior strings of increasing EBITDA. This suggests that credit rating changes do 
not respond to prior positive EBITDA strings. In contrast, previous negative EBITDA 
strings are significantly and negatively associated with credit rating changes in both 
t+1 and t+2, with the economic significance of 50.87% and 38.82% respectively, 
indicating that credit rating agencies consider past poor performance to be 
associated with future default risk. There is no moderating effect as the coefficients 
on the interaction term between BEAT and lagged strings are insignificant for both 
periods. 
For the OLS estimation, I find similar results but somewhat weaker. Specifically, the 
coefficient on BEAT is only marginally and positively associated with only rating 
upgrades at time t+1, with the economic significance of 6.02%. Prior positive 
EBITDA strings are not related to any rating changes but previous negative EBITDA 
strings are strongly and negatively associated with both credit ratings changes at 
time t+1 and t+2, with the economic significance of 16.06% and 14.16%. In addition, 
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I find that the coefficient on BEAT x LNSTRING is positive in the regression of 
ChgCRt+2, suggesting that rating agencies put higher rewards in the second changes 
to firms that show improvement in firm performance. However, overall, this table 
does not provide evidence in support of a moderating effect for past strings. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that a one-off increase in EBITDA is not 
related to improved credit ratings beyond one year ahead. More importantly, the 
results provide evidence that firms reporting prior decreasing EBITDA strings are 
more likely to be downgraded in the future even if they manage to report an increase 
in current year’s EBITDA relative to the previous year, but those who report positive 
EBITDA strings do not benefit from upgrades. This result is consistent with 
conservative rating practices that are slow to change and asymmetry in agencies’ 
view of past poor vs. good performance.  
4.5.4 Credit Rating Premiums When Controlling for Future Performance 
Table 4.8 reports the results that answer research question 2. Controlling for future 
earnings, future EBITDA, future cash flows, future sales, future earnings variability, 
and firm age, the coefficient on BEAT remains significant and positive for the 
regression of ChgCRt+1, but only in the OLG specification. As before, I find that prior 
positive EBITDA strings do not have any impact on rating changes, whilst negative 
EBITDA strings negatively affect credit rating changes at both time t+1 and t+2. At 
the same time, a combination of an increase in current EBITDA and negative past 
string is positively associated with future ratings in three out of the four 
specifications. Hence, an increase in current EBITDA relative to previous year is 
beneficial to credit rating of firms that performed poorly in the past. Additionally, I find 
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a positive association between credit rating upgrades and future sales, but the other 
measures of future performance are largely unrelated to future rating changes.  
On balance, although I use ex post firm financial performance to capture information 
with regard to future growth and lower risk signalled by current EBITDA changes and 
EBITDA strings, the results are not sensitive to controlling for revealed subsequent 
performance. This yields evidence that current EBITDA increases and prior EBITDA 
strings contain incremental information to future growth and risk which is accessed 
by credit rating agencies. 
4.5.5 Credit Rating Premiums Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals  
In this analysis I investigate the relations between credit rating changes and current 
EBITDA increases and prior EBITDA strings conditional on high abnormal accruals, 
consistent with research questions 3.1 and 3.2. Recall that this investigation is based 
on equation (5). Table 4.9 reports the results of this analysis. 
Consistent with the findings in previous sections, BEAT is positively related to the 
first change in future credit ratings or time t+1, but not in the second change in future 
ratings or t+2. I also find that firms experience credit rating downgrades in the 
following years, i.e. time t+1 and t+2, when reporting prior negative EBITDA strings. 
In addition, the results suggest that in the second change firms who report current 
EBITDA increases following from consecutive EBITDA decreases obtain higher 
credit ratings, indicating that improvement in financial performance attracts larger 
credit rating rewards. Importantly, I do not find any strong association between credit 
rating changes and high abnormal accruals and MBEB with high abnormal accruals. 
I find weak evidence in the OLG estimation that suggests the following. First, 
currently increasing EBITDA firms who report previous positive EBITDA strings are 
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associated with credit rating upgrades in year t+2. Second, firms with current 
EBITDA increases that previously report decreasing EBITDA strings will experience 
rating downgrades in year t+2 if they have high abnormal accruals.  
Overall, given the question as to how credit rating agencies perceive and react to 
current EBITDA increases and past strings when observing high abnormal accruals, 
the findings show that there is no any strong association between future rating 
changes and high abnormal accruals. It suggests that the implications of current 
EBITDA increases and prior strings for credit ratings are not dependent on high 
abnormal accruals. This evidence seems support neither the earnings management 
hypothesis nor the information content hypothesis. 
4.6 Additional Findings 
4.6.1 The Analysis of Credit Rating Levels 
While the rating change analysis may be better in investigating the implications of 
MBEB for credit ratings, it is intriguing to conduct the rating level analysis to see 
whether the results are sensitive to an alternative specification. Therefore, I re-
estimate equation (5) but replace all change variables with level variables and report 
the results in Table 4.10. Note that dependent variables are CR at time t+1 and t+2. 
The results suggest that the coefficients on BEAT are significantly positive for both 
columns, suggesting that currently increasing EBITDA firms are associated with 
higher future credit ratings. I also find that the coefficients on LNSTRING are 
significantly negative for both ratings at time t+1 and t+2, indicating that ratings of 
firms with prior negative EBITDA strings are successively discounted. 
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To sum up, the results of the level analysis yield consistent evidence that prior 
decreasing EBITDA strings attract successive rating downgrades. This suggests that 
credit rating agencies have long memory for bad news. Moreover, the main findings 
are robust to the specifications. 
4.6.2 Using EPS as the Benchmark 
In the main analyses I use EBITDA as the benchmark. In this section, I replace 
EBITDA with adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS). To test 
the robustness check, I re-run equation (5) and report the results in Table 4.11. 
The findings show that the coefficients on BEAT are positive, significant at 1 percent 
for ChgCRt+1 and 10 percent for ChgCRt+2. I also find that prior negative EPS strings 
are negatively associated with the first change of credit ratings. On balance, the 
results provide supportive evidence that previous decreasing EPS strings have 
negative implications for credit rating changes but last shorter relative to EBITDA 
strings. 
4.6.3 Credit Rating Premiums Conditional on Low Accounting Conservatism 
The literature on debt markets documents that investors in debt markets demand 
conditional accounting conservatism (Ball et al., 2008). A number of studies argue 
that accounting conservatism is beneficial for contracting purposes (e.g., Watt, 2003; 
Guay and Verreccchia, 2006). Conservative constrains opportunistic managerial 
reporting, (LaFond and Watts, 2008; and Gao, 2013). In other words, firms with low 
accounting conservatism may have higher possibility to report earnings strings as 
they are not under pressure to report bad news in timely fashion which reduce 
current earnings and, in turn, break earnings strings. Hence, I argue that low 
accounting conservatism is may be positively associated with earnings strings. I 
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therefore investigate whether and how the relation between rating changes and 
current EBITDA increases and EBITDA strings changes with accounting 
conservatism. The central idea is that if firms with current EBITDA increases are less 
conservative, it is easier for those firms to meet or beat prior year’s EBITDA. Hence, 
rating upgrades may be less pronounced for those firms with low accounting 
conservatism. 
To do this, I estimate C_score based on the Khan and Watts (2009) model as 
follows. 
                       𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜇𝜇2𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇3𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇4𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
         + 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆3𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆4𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  
            + (𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
                     + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 (6) 
Where X is earnings per share before extraordinary items adjusted by stock splits 
and stock dividends, scaled by lagged price. D is an indicator variable taking value of 
one if RET < 0, otherwise is zero. RET is market-adjusted returns compounded from 
market-adjusted monthly returns ending the third month after fiscal year-end. SIZE is 
log of market equity value. MB is market-to-book ratio. LEV is leverage. All variables 
except an indicator variable are winsorized at the 1% top and bottom tails of the 
distribution. I estimate all parameters in equation (6) using annual cross-sectional 
regressions. Then I calculate C_score according to equation (7) as follows. 
                                𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆1 + 𝜆𝜆2𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆3𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆4𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (7) 
C_score is firm-specific measure of conservative accounting. Its value varies across 
firm size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. The greater C_score indicates the 
higher conservative accounting.  
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To conduct the test of credit rating premiums and conservatism, I re-estimate 
equation (5) but replace DAbACC with DC_score. DC_score is an indicator variable 
taking value of one if a firm’s C_score is lower or equal to industry average for a 
given year, otherwise zero. 
The results of the association between credit rating changes and current EBITDA 
increases and prior EBITDA strings conditional on low conservatism are reported in 
Table 4.12. I find that for ChgCRt+1 one-period meeting or beating previous year’s 
EBITDA is positively associated with credit rating upgrades, suggesting that there 
are rating rewards for firms with current EBITDA increases. I also find that prior 
negative EBITDA strings are negatively associated with rating changes, suggesting 
that rating agencies are still discounting ratings of firms with consistency in poor 
performance. Importantly, I do not find any evidence of the differences in rewards 
between low and high conservatism. With regard to ChgCRt+2, the findings suggest 
that BEAT is no longer related to the second change in credit ratings. However, the 
effects of previous negative EBITDA strings continue to hold. In addition, credit rating 
agencies only reward currently increasing EBITDA firms with prior decreasing 
EBITDA strings indicated by the positive coefficient on BEAT x LNSTRING. I do not 
find that rating agencies react differently to different levels of conservatism. I note 
that the more conservative, the lower future credit ratings. 
In short, currently increasing EBITDA firms with high conservatism do not gain higher 
credit rating premiums than those with low conservatism. However, evidence in 
Table 4.12 confirms that the rating effects of prior negative EBITDA string last longer 
and that higher premiums are given to firms that improve their financial performance. 
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4.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Recent research on MBEB and debt markets documents that firms who achieve 
earnings targets are higher rated by credit ratings agencies. It however does not 
provide evidence as to what condition firms with current EBITDA increases are 
rewarded with higher future credit ratings. Moreover, it is possible that credit 
premiums are merely a reflection of future growth and risk as MBEB signals 
information with regard to future firm performance. The rating effects therefore may 
be no longer pronounced when controlling for future growth and risk. Finally, it does 
not investigate how rating agencies react to current EBITDA increases and past 
strings when observing high abnormal accruals. 
The collective findings give corroborating evidence that credit rating agencies offer 
rating premiums for firms reporting one-year meeting or beating last year’s EBITDA 
but only for the first change when they evaluate multiple years of firm performance. 
The results also suggest that rating agencies impose long penalties on firms who 
report prior decreasing EBITDA strings; while there is no evidence on long-time 
rewards for firms reporting prior increasing EBITDA strings. These findings are not 
sensitive to controlling for realisation in future growth and risk. In addition, I find that 
credit rating premiums are not dependent on high abnormal accruals, suggesting 
that this is not consistent with either the earnings management explanation or the 
information content explanation. 
This study provides an insight into the broader context of MBEB. It is clearly useful 
for debt investors, auditors, and regulators. Some caveats are as follows. First, it is 
possible that MBEB is combinations of earnings management and true performance 
during the course of strings and that agencies cannot detect such a mix and, in turn, 
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assign rating premiums to string firms.  Second, the results rely on the estimation of 
accruals. Future research may be interested in earnings strings and other interesting 
issues in debt markets, e.g. debt contract design.  
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APPENDIX 4.A 
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
ChgCRt+1 A change in credit ratings at time t+1, computed as CRt+1 minus CRt. 
ChgCRt+2 A change in future credit ratings at time t+2, computed as CRt+2 minus CRt+1. 
CRt+1 Credit rating at time t+1. I construct CR using S&P’s long-term issuer level credit 
rating which reflects a firm’s creditworthiness to meet senior debt obligations. I 
encode ratings letters into numbers taking on value from 17 to 1 by coding 17 for 
AAA, 16 for AA+, 15 for AA, and so on. The last value of rating variable or 1 is for 
CCC+ or lower ratings. 
CRt+2 Credit rating at time t+2. 
ΔWC A change in working capital, calculated as changes in accounts receivable plus 
changes in inventories minus changes in accounts payable minus changes in 
taxes payable plus changes in other assets (net), scaled by average total assets. 
X Earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) at the end of fiscal year 
adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends, scaled by lagged price. 
Independent Variable 
AbACC A raw value of an abnormal accrual based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
BEAT An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm reports a current increase in 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) relative to 
prior year’s EBITDA, otherwise zero. 
BEATEPS An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm reports a current increase in 
earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) at the end of fiscal year 
adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends relative to prior year’s EPS, otherwise 
zero. 
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets. 
C_score A raw value of C_score estimated from the Khan and Watts (2009) model. 
D An indicator variable taking value of one if RET < 0, otherwise zero. 
DAbACC An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm’s abnormal accrual estimated 
from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is higher or equal to industry average 
for a given year, otherwise zero. 
DC_score An indicator variable taking value of one if a firm’s C_score estimated from the 
Khan and Watts (2009) model is lower or equal to industry average for a given 
year, otherwise zero. 
LEV Leverage, computed as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities at the end of 
fiscal year divided by market equity value. 
NSTRING The length of a past string of consecutive decreases in EBITDA. An EBITDA string 
is defined as a firm reporting at least one year of decreases in earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). A decrease is compared to 
EBITDA from the prior year. 
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Variable Definition 
PSTRING PSTRING is defined as the length of a past string of consecutive increases in 
EBITDA. An EBITDA string is defined as a firm reporting at least one year of 
increases in earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA). An increase is compared to EBITDA from the prior year. 
LNSTRING Lagged NSTRING or NSTRING at time t+1.  
LPSTRING Lagged PSTRING or PSTRING at time t+1.  
LNEPSSTRING Lagged NEPSSTRING or NEPSSTRING at time t+1. NEPSSTRING is defined as 
the length of a past string of consecutive decreases in EPS. An EPS string is 
defined as a firm reporting at least one year of decreases in earnings per share 
before extraordinary items (EPS) adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends. A 
decrease is compared to EPS from the prior year. 
LPEPSSTRING Lagged PEPSSTRING or PEPSSTRING at time t+1. PEPSSTRING is defined as 
the length of a past string of consecutive increases in EPS. An EPS string is 
defined as a firm reporting at least one year of increases in earnings per share 
before extraordinary items (EPS) adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends. An 
increase is compared to EPS from the prior year. 
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity at the end of fiscal year. 
RET Market-adjusted returns compounded from market-adjusted monthly returns 
ending the third month after the end of fiscal year. 
SIZE Log of market equity value. 
Control Variable  
AGE Log of firm age, calculated as the difference between current year and year when 
it was first collected by COMPUSTAT. 
AOCF Adjusted operating cash flows, calculated as operating cash flows + interest 
expenses + tax expense, scaled by average total assets. 
ChgAOCF A change in AOCF, computed as AOCFt minus AOCFt-1. 
ChgDEBITDA A change in DEBITDA, computed as DEBITDAt minus DEBITDAt-1. 
ChgEPS A change in EPS, computed as EPSt minus EPSt-1. 
ChgFAOCF Average value of changes in future adjusted operating cash flows, calculated as 
operating cash flows + interest expenses + tax expense and scaled by average 
total assets for three years ahead. 
ChgFEBITDA Average value of changes in future earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) scaled by average total assets for three years ahead. 
ChgFEPS Average value of changes in future earnings per share before extraordinary items 
(EPS) at the end of fiscal year adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends for 
three years ahead. 
ChgFSALE Average value of changes in (log of) future sales for three years ahead. 
ChgLEV A change in LEV, computed as LEVt minus LEVt-1. 
ChgMB A change in MB, computed as MBt minus MBt-1. 
ChgRETSD A change in RETSD, computed as RETSDt minus RETSDt-1. 
ChgTA A change in TA, computed as TAt minus TAt-1. 
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Variable Definition 
ChgTIE A change in TIE, computed as TIEt minus TIEt-1. 
ChgVAREBITDA A change in VAREBITDA, computed as VAREBITDAt minus VAREBITDAt-1. 
ChgRD A change in RD, computed as RDt minus RDt-1. 
DEBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by 
average total assets. 
FAOCF Average value of future adjusted operating cash flows, calculated as operating 
cash flows + interest expenses + tax expense and scaled by average total assets 
for three years ahead. 
FEBITDA Average value of future earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) scaled by average total assets for three years ahead. 
FEPS Average value of future earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) at 
the end of fiscal year adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends for three years 
ahead. 
FSALE Average value of (log of) future sales for three years ahead. 
FVAREBITDA Variance of percentage changes in future earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) for three years ahead. 
EPS Earnings per share before extraordinary items (EPS) at the end of fiscal year 
adjusted by stock splits and stock dividends. 
RD Research and development expenses divided by lagged market equity value. 
RETSD Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over past twelve months before the 
end of fiscal year. 
TA Log of total assets. 
TIE Times-interest-earned ratio, computed as earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by interest expenses. 
VAREBITDA Variance of percentage changes in earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) over past three years. 
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Table 4.1  
Sample Composition 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Data Firm-Year Observ. Unique Firms 
 
Data set from COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP databases for the 
period 1988 – 2014 
273,436 28,343 
Less observations without credit 
rating data 
(230,619) (23,631) 
Sample with credit rating data 
for the period 1988 – 2014 
42,817 4,712 
Less observations with missing 
data for calculating variables 
and financial firms 
(38,960) (4,042) 
Data available for calculating 
variables during the period 1990 
– 2012 
3,857 670 
Less observations with missing 
data for calculating future 
performance 
(422) (63) 
Sample available for all 
analyses during the period 1990 
– 2011 
3,435 607 
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Panel B: Year Composition 
Year Firm-Year Observ. % of Positive 
String Observ. 
% of Negative 
String Observ. # of Positive 
String Firms 
# of 
Negative 
String Firms 
Total 
1990 85 43 128 3.61% 3.99% 
1991 80 58 138 3.40% 5.38% 
1992 85 37 122 3.61% 3.43% 
1993 103 33 136 4.37% 3.06% 
1994 107 35 142 4.54% 3.24% 
1995 98 25 123 4.16% 2.32% 
1996 91 33 124 3.86% 3.06% 
1997 87 30 117 3.69% 2.78% 
1998 67 43 110 2.84% 3.99% 
1999 94 35 129 3.99% 3.24% 
2000 113 34 147 4.80% 3.15% 
2001 84 90 174 3.57% 8.34% 
2002 110 87 197 4.67% 8.06% 
2003 139 67 206 5.90% 6.21% 
2004 160 45 205 6.79% 4.17% 
2005 147 44 191 6.24% 4.08% 
2006 132 46 178 5.60% 4.26% 
2007 142 41 183 6.03% 3.80% 
2008 109 60 169 4.63% 5.56% 
2009 64 114 178 2.72% 10.57% 
2010 135 34 169 5.73% 3.15% 
2011 124 45 169 5.26% 4.17% 
Total 2,356 1,079 3,435 100.00% 100.00% 
Average Per Year 107 49 156   
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Panel C: Industry Composition 
Industry 
 
Firm-Year Observ. % of Positive 
String 
Observ. 
% of Negative 
String 
Observ. # of Positive 
String 
Firms 
# of 
Negative 
String 
Firms 
Total 
Food 133 55 188 5.65% 5.10% 
Mining and Minerals 7 4 11 0.30% 0.37% 
Oil and Petroleum 
Products 
229 101 330 9.72% 9.36% 
Textiles, Apparel, and 
Footware 
27 19 46 1.15% 1.76% 
Consumer Durables 21 9 30 0.89% 0.83% 
Chemicals 84 45 129 3.57% 4.17% 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, 
Tobacco 
95 34 129 4.03% 3.15% 
Construction and 
Construction Materials 
103 40 143 4.37% 3.71% 
Steel Works 20 28 48 0.85% 2.59% 
Machinery and Business 
Equipment 
370 144 514 15.70% 13.35% 
Automobiles 18 4 22 0.76% 0.37% 
Transportation 110 54 164 4.67% 5.00% 
Utilities 401 205 606 17.02% 19.00% 
Retail Stores 165 62 227 7.00% 5.75% 
Other 573 275 848 24.32% 25.49% 
Total 2,356 1,079 3,435 100.00% 100.00% 
Note: 
This table reports sample composition.  
Panel A presents sample selection process.  
Panel B provides the number of observations based on fiscal year.  
Panel C provides the number of observations based on the Fama and French industry classifications. 
A positive (negative) EBITDA string is defined as a firm that reports at least one year of increases 
(decreases) in EBITDA. An EBITDA increase is compared with EBITDA from the prior year. Note that 
EBITDA means earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. 
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Table 4.2  
The Distributions of Observations 
by Lengths of Positive and Negative EBITDA Strings 
 
Length of Earnings Strings Positive String Firms Negative String Firms 
Observ. Percentage Observ. Percentage 
1 year 705 29.92% 688 63.76% 
2 years 549 23.30% 271 25.12% 
3 years 313 13.29% 74 6.86% 
4 years 249 10.57% 27 2.50% 
5 years 171 7.26% 13 1.20% 
6 years and more 369 15.66% 6 0.56% 
Total 2,356 100.00% 1,079 100.00% 
Note: 
This table analyses the sample distribution based on lengths of strings of EBITDA increases and 
decreases. A positive (negative) EBITDA string is defined as a firm that reports at least one year of 
increases (decreases) in EBITDA. An EBITDA increase is compared with EBITDA from the prior year. 
Note that EBITDA means earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. 
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Table 4.3  
The Distributions of Observations by Credit Ratings 
 
S&P Credit 
Rating Letter 
Rating 
Variable 
Positive String Firms Negative String Firms 
Observ. Percentage Observ. Percentage 
AAA 17 27 1.15% 4 0.37% 
AA+ 16 36 1.53% 3 0.28% 
AA 15 79 3.35% 22 2.04% 
AA- 14 102 4.33% 34 3.15% 
A+ 13 144 6.11% 63 5.84% 
A 12 320 13.58% 108 10.01% 
A- 11 228 9.68% 106 9.82% 
BBB+ 10 223 9.47% 95 8.80% 
BBB 9 322 13.67% 166 15.38% 
BBB- 8 222 9.42% 120 11.12% 
BB+ 7 146 6.20% 69 6.39% 
BB 6 171 7.26% 89 8.25% 
BB- 5 126 5.35% 81 7.51% 
B+ 4 104 4.41% 66 6.12% 
B 3 71 3.01% 25 2.32% 
B- 2 20 0.85% 13 1.20% 
CCC+ and lower 1 15 0.64% 15 1.39% 
Total  2,356 100.00% 1,079 100.00% 
Note: 
This table analyses the sample distribution based on credit rating data. A positive (negative) EBITDA 
string is defined as a firm that reports at least one year of increases (decreases) in EBITDA. An 
EBITDA increase is compared with EBITDA from the prior year. Note that EBITDA means earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. 
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Table 4.4 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observ. Mean Median S.D. Max Min 
ChgCRt+1 3,435 -0.055 0.000 0.647 4.000 -7.000 
PSTRING 3,435 2.198 1.000 2.603 18.000 0.000 
NSTRING 3,435 0.484 0.000 0.873 7.000 0.000 
BEAT 3,435 0.686 1.000 0.464 1.000 0.000 
AbACC 3,435 0.001 0.000 0.028 0.093 -0.096 
ChgEPS 3,435 0.081 0.108 3.910 63.686 -68.191 
ChgDEBITDA 3,435 0.000 0.001 0.041 0.277 -0.349 
ChgAOCF 3,435 0.000 -0.001 0.060 0.345 -0.340 
ChgFEPS 3,435 0.022 0.073 2.824 13.695 -15.258 
ChgFEBITDA 3,435 0.031 0.008 0.302 1.860 -2.214 
ChgFAOCF 3,435 0.034 0.022 0.795 4.604 -4.097 
ChgFSALE 3,435 0.008 0.006 0.015 0.083 -0.041 
FVAREBITDA 3,435 0.651 0.020 4.760 58.912 0.000 
Note: 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of main variables. All variables are defined in Appendix A 
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Table 4.5  
Correlation Matrix - Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal 
 
Variable ChgCRt+1 P 
STRING 
N 
STRING 
BEAT AbACC ChgEPS Chg 
DEBITDA 
Chg  
AOCF 
Chg 
FEPS 
Chg 
FEBITDA 
Chg 
FAOCF 
Chg  
FSALE 
FVAR  
EBITDA 
ChgCRt+1  0.143 -0.166 0.160 0.026 0.165 0.200 0.122 0.071 -0.021 -0.026 0.145 -0.089 
PSTRING 0.074  -0.809 0.823 0.151 0.343 0.416 0.165 0.020 -0.260 -0.136 0.052 -0.179 
NSTRING -0.166 -0.468  -0.983 -0.162 -0.456 -0.629 -0.265 -0.020 0.203 0.104 -0.048 0.139 
BEAT 0.151 0.572 -0.819  0.156 0.473 0.651 0.278 0.019 -0.206 -0.104 0.049 -0.132 
AbACC 0.030 0.111 -0.159 0.153  0.118 0.130 -0.004 -0.026 -0.130 0.015 -0.006 -0.031 
ChgEPS 0.144 0.073 -0.149 0.200 0.074  0.568 0.360 -0.007 -0.126 -0.119 -0.006 -0.025 
ChgDEBITDA 0.162 0.170 -0.379 0.522 0.155 0.307  0.488 0.033 -0.112 -0.075 -0.014 -0.027 
ChgAOCF 0.117 0.071 -0.191 0.254 0.030 0.177 0.558  0.010 -0.064 -0.199 -0.021 -0.025 
ChgFEPS -0.006 0.013 0.010 -0.002 -0.012 -0.004 0.009 -0.006  0.251 0.100 0.246 -0.113 
ChgFEBITDA -0.001 -0.128 0.107 -0.123 -0.091 -0.031 -0.116 -0.096 0.044  0.464 0.219 0.141 
ChgFAOCF -0.021 -0.042 0.030 -0.041 -0.013 -0.069 -0.041 -0.046 0.004 0.118  0.095 0.085 
ChgFSALE 0.149 0.022 -0.014 0.034 -0.003 0.018 -0.034 -0.046 0.066 0.185 0.060  0.003 
FVAREBITDA -0.009 -0.060 0.044 -0.045 -0.058 -0.015 -0.105 -0.050 -0.062 0.135 0.020 0.041  
Note: 
This table offers correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients reported in bold are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 4.6  
The Association between Changes in Credit Ratings 
and Meeting or Beating Prior Year’s EBITDA 
 
 
 
OLG OLS 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
INTERCEPT   -0.020 
(0.682) 
-0.193*** 
(0.000) 
BEAT 0.576***  
(0.000) 
0.254** 
(0.024) 
0.130*** 
(0.000) 
0.066*** 
(0.007) 
ChgDEBITDA 3.602**  
(0.026) 
2.254  
(0.151) 
1.167** 
(0.011) 
0.329 
(0.417)   
ChgAOCF 1.827** 
(0.044) 
1.758** 
(0.037) 
0.414** 
(0.044) 
0.565** 
(0.012) 
ChgLEV -0.062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.044*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010** 
(0.013) 
ChgRETSD -4.338***   
(0.000) 
-2.305** 
(0.029) 
-1.089** 
(0.046) 
-0.326 
(0.238) 
ChgTIE 0.016**  
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.618) 
0.004** 
(0.043) 
-0.000 
(0.748) 
ChgMB 0.049** 
(0.027) 
0.012 
(0.654) 
0.013** 
(0.029)    
-0.001 
(0.883) 
ChgTA 0.482  
(0.114) 
0.273 
(0.328) 
0.080 
(0.375) 
0.022 
(0.713) 
ChgVAREBITDA -0.007 
(0.435) 
0.013 
(0.120) 
0.000 
(0.955) 
0.003 
(0.352) 
ChgRD -0.600* 
(0.087) 
-0.733* 
(0.090) 
-0.168 
(0.165)   
-0.219*  
(0.088) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo or Adjusted R2 0.056 0.036 0.084 0.055 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between changes in credit ratings and meeting or beating prior 
year’s EBITDA. The sample is 3,435 firm-year observations covering the period of 1990 – 2011. The 
results are obtained from Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) and Ordinary Least Square Estimation 
(OLS) according to equation (1) as follows: 
                               𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                      
The number of all observations, pseudo R2, and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include 
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by firm for OLG, and clustered 
standard errors by year and firm for OLS. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4.7 
 The Association between Changes in Credit Ratings and Meeting or Beating 
Prior Year’s EBITDA Conditional on Prior EBITDA Strings 
 
 
 
OLG OLS 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
INTERCEPT   0.081 
(0.163) 
-0.114** 
(0.010) 
BEAT 0.486***  
(0.003) 
0.207 
(0.218) 
0.084* 
(0.066) 
0.020   
(0.571) 
LPSTRING -0.044 
(0.159) 
-0.007  
(0.788) 
-0.012 
(0.278) 
-0.005  
(0.449) 
LNSTRING -0.377*** 
(0.000) 
-0.285*** 
(0.003) 
-0.119*** 
(0.000) 
-0.104** 
(0.024) 
BEAT x LPSTRING 0.020 
(0.587) 
-0.034 
(0.328) 
0.006  
(0.665) 
-0.002 
(0.828) 
BEAT x LNSTRING 0.003 
(0.980) 
0.192 
(0.101) 
0.040 
(0.222) 
0.087** 
(0.029) 
ChgDEBITDA 4.602*** 
(0.008) 
2.540 
(0.111) 
1.431*** 
(0.005) 
0.435 
(0.281) 
ChgAOCF 1.923** 
(0.037) 
1.690** 
(0.044) 
0.425** 
(0.044) 
0.553** 
(0.014) 
ChgLEV -0.063*** 
(0.000) 
-0.045*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.011*** 
(0.010) 
ChgRETSD -4.418*** 
(0.000) 
-2.258** 
(0.030) 
-1.099** 
(0.049) 
-0.312  
(0.273) 
ChgTIE 0.017** 
(0.014) 
-0.003   
(0.598) 
0.004**  
(0.039) 
-0.000 
(0.688) 
ChgMB 0.054** 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.573) 
0.014** 
(0.030) 
0.000  
(0.999) 
ChgTA 0.315 
(0.309) 
0.257 
(0.359) 
0.043 
(0.597) 
0.014 
(0.816) 
ChgVAREBITDA -0.006 
(0.491) 
0.013 
(0.120) 
0.000 
(0.938) 
0.003 
(0.367) 
ChgRD -0.585*  
(0.074) 
-0.716* 
(0.098) 
-0.158 
(0.170) 
-0.211*  
(0.100) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo or Adjusted R2 0.065 0.038 0.096 0.061 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between changes in credit ratings and meeting or beating prior 
year’s EBITDA conditional on prior EBITDA strings. The samples is 3,435 firm-year observations 
covering the period of 1990 – 2011. The results are obtained from Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) 
and Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS) according to equation (2) as follows: 
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                𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                           + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                           + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                         
The number of all observations, pseudo R2, and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include 
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by firm for OLG, and clustered 
standard errors by year and firm for OLS. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4.8  
The Association between Changes in Credit Ratings and Meeting or Beating 
Prior Year’s EBITDA Conditional on Prior EBITDA Strings and Future 
Performance 
 
 
 
OLG OLS 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
INTERCEPT   0.110 
(0.197) 
-0.064  
(0.418) 
BEAT 0.450*** 
(0.006) 
0.216 
(0.200) 
0.071 
(0.135) 
0.016    
(0.650)   
LPSTRING -0.044 
(0.157) 
-0.004 
(0.882) 
-0.012 
(0.261)   
-0.005 
(0.494) 
LNSTRING -0.395*** 
(0.000)   
-0.306*** 
(0.000) 
-0.125*** 
(0.000) 
-0.109**  
(0.013) 
BEAT x LPSTRING 0.023 
(0.539) 
-0.038 
(0.274) 
0.007  
(0.595) 
-0.002 
(0.816) 
BEAT x LNSTRING 0.042 
(0.719) 
0.227** 
(0.036) 
0.050* 
(0.090) 
0.096**  
(0.015) 
ChgFEPS 0.003 
(0.890)   
0.033**  
(0.045) 
-0.003 
(0.495) 
0.006 
(0.135) 
ChgFEBITDA -0.101 
(0.639) 
0.227 
(0.167) 
-0.009 
(0.895)   
0.063  
(0.232)   
ChgFAOCF -0.008 
(0.901) 
0.096 
(0.186) 
  -0.014 
(0.330) 
0.023  
(0.189) 
ChgFSALE 27.305*** 
(0.000) 
31.614*** 
(0.000) 
6.793*** 
(0.000) 
7.024*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA 0.002 
(0.848) 
-0.013* 
(0.061)   
0.001 
(0.774)   
-0.003*** 
(0.006) 
AGE -0.099 
(0.155) 
-0.108 
(0.120) 
-0.024 
(0.140) 
-0.030   
(0.153) 
ChgDEBITDA 4.815*** 
(0.009) 
2.377 
(0.173) 
1.518*** 
(0.003) 
0.474 
(0.271) 
ChgAOCF 2.037** 
(0.028) 
2.010** 
(0.016) 
0.450** 
(0.043) 
  0.625*** 
(0.007) 
ChgLEV -0.060*** 
(0.000) 
-0.041*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.007) 
ChgRETSD -4.117*** 
(0.000) 
-1.679 
(0.103) 
-0.979* 
(0.068)   
-0.199 
(0.459) 
ChgTIE 0.017*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.658)   
0.004** 
(0.033) 
-0.000 
(0.730) 
ChgMB 0.039  
(0.100) 
-0.003 
(0.915) 
0.011** 
(0.045)   
-0.004 
(0.564) 
ChgTA -0.222 
(0.472) 
-0.363 
(0.212) 
-0.084  
(0.224)   
-0.117*  
(0.085) 
ChgVAREBITDA -0.003 
(0.701) 
0.016**  
(0.022)   
0.000 
(0.817) 
0.004 
(0.219) 
ChgRD -0.475  
(0.126) 
-0.610  
(0.143) 
-0.137 
(0.238) 
-0.182 
(0.142) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO YES YES 
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OLG OLS 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo or Adjusted R2 0.079 0.063 0.117 0.090 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between changes in credit ratings and meeting or beating prior 
year’s EBITDA conditional on prior EBITDA strings and future performance. The samples is 3,435 
firm-year observations covering the period of 1990 – 2011. The results are obtained from Ordered 
Logit Estimation (OLG) and Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS) according to equation (3) as 
follows: 
                     𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                               + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                               + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                               + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                               + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                        
The number of all observations, pseudo R2, and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include 
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by firm for OLG, and clustered 
standard errors by year and firm for OLS. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4.9 
 The Association between Changes in Credit Ratings and Meeting or Beating 
Prior Year’s EBITDA Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals 
 
Panel A: Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG)  
 
 
ChgCRt+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BEAT 0.554*** 
(0.000) 
0.471** 
(0.012) 
0.520** 
(0.019) 
0.482** 
(0.027) 
DAbACC -0.013 
(0.928) 
0.011 
(0.951) 
0.074 
(0.758) 
0.092 
(0.703) 
LPSTRING  
 
-0.037 
(0.358) 
-0.044     
(0.376)    
-0.051 
(0.291) 
LNSTRING  
 
-0.371*** 
(0.001) 
-0.315*** 
(0.008) 
-0.358*** 
(0.001) 
BEAT x DAbACC 0.043 
(0.808) 
0.034 
(0.850) 
-0.070 
(0.817) 
-0.077  
(0.798) 
BEAT x LPSTRING  
 
0.019 
(0.612) 
0.026 
(0.617) 
0.036 
(0.482) 
BEAT x LNSTRING  
 
0.002 
(0.985) 
-0.101  
(0.487)   
-0.025 
(0.856) 
DAbACC x LPSTRING   
 
-0.012 
(0.749) 
-0.003 
(0.965) 
0.009   
(0.893) 
DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
-0.011 
(0.922) 
-0.142 
(0.413) 
-0.089   
(0.603) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LPSTRING  
 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.885) 
-0.022 
(0.778) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
 
 
0.221 
(0.310) 
0.146 
(0.499) 
ChgFEPS  
 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.853) 
ChgFEBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.095 
(0.657) 
ChgFAOCF  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.007   
(0.903) 
ChgFSALE  
 
  
 
27.229*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.834) 
AGE  
 
  -0.099 
(0.152) 
ChgDEBITDA 3.578** 
(0.027) 
4.598*** 
(0.008) 
4.559*** 
(0.009) 
4.751*** 
(0.010) 
ChgAOCF 1.843** 
(0.042) 
1.929** 
(0.036) 
1.937** 
(0.036) 
2.049** 
(0.028) 
ChgLEV -0.062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.063*** 
(0.000) 
-0.063*** 
(0.000) 
-0.060*** 
(0.000) 
ChgRETSD -4.340*** 
(0.000) 
-4.417*** 
(0.000) 
-4.429*** 
(0.000) 
-4.116*** 
(0.000) 
ChgTIE 0.016** 
(0.013) 
0.017** 
(0.014) 
0.017** 
(0.013) 
0.017*** 
(0.009) 
ChgMB 0.050** 
(0.026) 
0.054** 
(0.015) 
0.053** 
(0.016) 
0.039* 
(0.099) 
ChgTA 0.480 
(0.117) 
0.313 
(0.315) 
0.312 
(0.317) 
-0.227 
(0.466) 
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ChgCRt+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ChgVAREBITDA -0.007 
(0.435) 
-0.006  
(0.491) 
-0.006 
(0.481) 
-0.004  
(0.697) 
ChgRD -0.603* 
(0.084) 
-0.586* 
  (0.073) 
  -0.587* 
(0.071) 
-0.480 
(0.120) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO NO NO 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.065 0.065 0.079 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
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Panel B: Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) 
 
 
ChgCRt+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BEAT 0.316** 
(0.023) 
0.263 
(0.163) 
0.044 
(0.850) 
0.044 
(0.848) 
DAbACC -0.030 
(0.839) 
-0.062 
(0.749) 
-0.368 
(0.140) 
-0.397 
(0.122) 
LPSTRING  
 
-0.025 
(0.453) 
-0.060 
(0.152) 
-0.070* 
(0.085) 
LNSTRING  
 
-0.258** 
(0.015) 
-0.379*** 
(0.001) 
-0.415*** 
(0.000) 
BEAT x DAbACC -0.112 
(0.545) 
-0.120 
(0.522) 
0.341 
(0.274) 
0.359   
(0.260) 
BEAT x LPSTRING  
 
-0.032 
(0.353) 
0.020 
(0.717) 
0.024 
(0.646) 
BEAT x LNSTRING  
 
0.208* 
(0.076) 
0.420*** 
(0.007) 
   0.479*** 
(0.001) 
DAbACC x LPSTRING   
 
0.031  
(0.373)   
0.101* 
(0.055) 
0.123** 
(0.020) 
DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
-0.084 
(0.442) 
0.214 
(0.228) 
0.249   
(0.166) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LPSTRING  
 
 
 
-0.103 
(0.140) 
-0.117* 
(0.094) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
 
 
-0.469** 
(0.044) 
-0.521** 
(0.027) 
ChgFEPS  
 
 
 
 
 
0.031* 
(0.062) 
ChgFEBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
0.226 
(0.173)   
ChgFAOCF  
 
 
 
 
 
0.097  
(0.178) 
ChgFSALE  
 
  
 
32.039*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014** 
  (0.047) 
AGE  
 
  -0.108 
(0.121) 
ChgDEBITDA 2.411 
(0.128)   
2.775* 
(0.086) 
2.769* 
(0.084) 
2.548 
(0.148) 
ChgAOCF 1.683** 
(0.047) 
1.610* 
  (0.057) 
1.633* 
(0.054) 
1.954** 
(0.019) 
ChgLEV -0.044*** 
(0.000)   
-0.045*** 
(0.000) 
-0.045*** 
(0.000)   
-0.040*** 
(0.001)   
ChgRETSD -2.314** 
  (0.028) 
-2.292** 
(0.029)   
-2.309**   
(0.028) 
-1.719* 
(0.098)   
ChgTIE -0.003 
(0.636) 
-0.003 
(0.619) 
-0.003 
(0.627) 
-0.002 
(0.697) 
ChgMB 0.010  
(0.688)    
0.012 
(0.641) 
0.013    
(0.615) 
-0.004 
  (0.863) 
ChgTA 0.288 
(0.302) 
0.276 
(0.327) 
0.280 
(0.320) 
-0.354 
(0.225) 
ChgVAREBITDA 0.013  
(0.121) 
0.013 
(0.120) 
0.013 
(0.116) 
0.016** 
(0.021) 
ChgRD -0.711 
(0.102) 
-0.679 
(0.114) 
-0.691  
(0.114)   
  -0.580 
(0.165) 
     
218 
 
 
 
ChgCRt+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO NO NO 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.065 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
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Panel C: Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS) 
 
 
ChgCRt+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT -0.017 
(0.773)   
0.078 
(0.215)   
  0.064 
(0.326) 
0.099  
(0.268) 
BEAT 0.125*** 
(0.002)   
0.080 
(0.137) 
0.098 
(0.120) 
0.079 
(0.209) 
DAbACC -0.007 
(0.868) 
0.008  
(0.857) 
0.032 
(0.599) 
0.025 
(0.670) 
LPSTRING  
 
-0.008 
(0.567) 
-0.009 
(0.636) 
-0.012 
(0.540)   
LNSTRING  
 
-0.115*** 
(0.000) 
-0.093*** 
(0.009)   
-0.108*** 
(0.005)   
BEAT x DAbACC 0.011 
(0.820) 
0.010 
(0.831) 
-0.027 
(0.732) 
-0.018 
(0.810) 
BEAT x LPSTRING  
 
  0.005 
(0.710) 
0.006 
(0.759) 
0.010 
(0.628) 
BEAT x LNSTRING  
 
0.039 
(0.240) 
0.003 
(0.944) 
0.025  
(0.596) 
DAbACC x LPSTRING   
 
-0.006 
(0.537) 
-0.005  
(0.852) 
-0.001 
(0.977) 
DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
-0.008 
(0.862) 
-0.059 
(0.487) 
-0.039 
(0.639) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LPSTRING  
 
 
 
-0.002  
(0.956) 
-0.005 
(0.854)   
BEAT x DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
 
 
0.078   
(0.340) 
  0.055 
(0.506) 
ChgFEPS  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.534)   
ChgFEBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.908) 
ChgFAOCF  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014   
(0.332) 
ChgFSALE  
 
 
 
 
 
6.748*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.760) 
AGE  
 
  -0.024 
(0.130) 
ChgDEBITDA 1.166**  
(0.012) 
1.434*** 
(0.006) 
1.424*** 
(0.006)   
1.506*** 
(0.003)   
ChgAOCF 0.416**  
(0.041) 
0.426** 
(0.043) 
  0.424** 
(0.047) 
0.449** 
(0.043) 
ChgLEV -0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000)   
ChgRETSD -1.091** 
(0.046) 
-1.099** 
  (0.049) 
-1.101** 
(0.049) 
-0.980* 
(0.069) 
ChgTIE 0.004**   
(0.044)   
0.004**   
  (0.039) 
0.004** 
(0.039) 
0.004** 
(0.034) 
ChgMB 0.013** 
   (0.026) 
0.014** 
(0.028) 
0.014** 
(0.029)   
0.011** 
(0.043) 
ChgTA 0.080 
(0.377) 
0.042   
(0.602) 
0.041 
(0.613) 
-0.085  
(0.219) 
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ChgCRt+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ChgVAREBITDA 0.000 
(0.956) 
0.000 
(0.938) 
0.000 
(0.947) 
0.000  
  (0.825) 
ChgRD -0.169 
(0.163) 
-0.158 
(0.169) 
-0.157 
(0.170) 
-0.138 
(0.235) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.096 0.097 0.117   
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
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Panel D: Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS) 
 
 
ChgCRt+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT -0.169*** 
(0.000) 
-0.092* 
(0.086) 
-0.078 
(0.160) 
-0.028 
(0.737) 
BEAT 0.067** 
(0.032) 
0.020 
(0.672) 
0.001 
(0.994) 
-0.007    
(0.911) 
DAbACC -0.049 
(0.136) 
-0.044   
(0.411) 
-0.071 
(0.456) 
-0.074 
(0.424) 
LPSTRING  
 
-0.010 
(0.270)   
-0.016 
(0.194) 
-0.018   
(0.138) 
LNSTRING  
 
-0.083** 
(0.022) 
-0.090*** 
(0.006) 
-0.100*** 
(0.001) 
BEAT x DAbACC   0.006 
(0.911) 
0.002 
(0.975) 
0.040 
(0.735)   
0.045 
(0.703) 
BEAT x LPSTRING  
 
-0.002 
(0.811) 
0.005 
(0.781) 
0.007 
(0.688) 
BEAT x LNSTRING  
 
0.093** 
(0.027) 
0.103** 
(0.011) 
0.118*** 
(0.001) 
DAbACC x LPSTRING   
 
0.009 
(0.401) 
0.020 
(0.295)   
  0.024 
(0.197) 
DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
-0.050 
(0.263) 
-0.036 
(0.703) 
-0.027 
(0.781) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LPSTRING  
 
 
 
-0.014  
(0.564)     
-0.018 
(0.476) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LNSTRING  
 
 
 
-0.020  
(0.841) 
-0.034 
(0.729) 
ChgFEPS  
 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.156) 
ChgFEBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
0.063 
(0.230) 
ChgFAOCF  
 
 
 
 
 
0.024 
(0.160)   
ChgFSALE  
 
 
 
 
 
7.043*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
AGE  
 
    -0.029 
(0.176) 
ChgDEBITDA 0.389   
(0.350) 
0.535 
(0.205) 
0.531 
(0.199) 
0.560 
(0.204) 
ChgAOCF 0.546** 
(0.017)   
0.528** 
(0.021) 
  0.529** 
  (0.021) 
0.601*** 
(0.009) 
ChgLEV -0.010** 
(0.014) 
-0.010**  
(0.014) 
  -0.010** 
(0.014)   
-0.009** 
(0.011) 
ChgRETSD -0.342  
(0.218) 
-0.338 
(0.232) 
-0.340 
(0.228) 
-0.226 
(0.400)   
ChgTIE -0.000 
(0.782) 
-0.000 
(0.724) 
  -0.000 
(0.740) 
-0.000 
(0.783) 
ChgMB -0.002 
(0.815) 
-0.001  
(0.879)   
-0.001 
(0.882)   
-0.004 
(0.466) 
ChgTA 0.029 
(0.629) 
0.022 
(0.724) 
0.022 
(0.722) 
-0.110 
(0.106) 
ChgVAREBITDA 0.003 
(0.367) 
0.003 
(0.381) 
0.003 
(0.382) 
0.003 
(0.228) 
     
222 
 
 
 
ChgCRt+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ChgRD -0.214* 
(0.098) 
-0.200 
(0.116) 
-0.200  
(0.117) 
-0.171 
(0.167) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Year YES YES YES YES 
Clustered by Firm YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.065 0.065 0.093 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between changes in credit ratings and meeting or beating prior 
year’s EBITDA conditional on high abnormal accruals. The samples is 3,435 firm-year observations 
covering the period of 1990 – 2011. The results are obtained from Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) 
and Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS) according to equation (5) as follows: 
             𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽6(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                       + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                           
Panel A reports the association between ChgCRt+1 and meeting or beating prior year’s EBITDA 
conditional on high abnormal accruals that is estimated from OLG. 
Panel B reports the association between ChgCRt+2 and meeting or beating prior year’s EBITDA 
conditional on high abnormal accruals that is estimated from OLG. 
Panel C reports the association between ChgCRt+1 and meeting or beating prior year’s EBITDA 
conditional on high abnormal accruals that is estimated from OLS. 
Panel D reports the association between ChgCRt+2 and meeting or beating prior year’s EBITDA 
conditional on high abnormal accruals that is estimated from OLS. 
The number of all observations, pseudo R2, and adjusted R2 are also reported. All regressions include 
year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, clustered standard errors by firm for OLG, and clustered 
standard errors by year and firm for OLS. P-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4.10 
 The Association between Credit Rating Levels and Meeting or Beating  
Prior Year’s EBITDA Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals 
 
 
OLG 
CRt+1 CRt+2 
BEAT 0.462** 
(0.014) 
0.426** 
(0.017) 
DAbACC 0.087 
(0.711) 
-0.077 
(0.709) 
LPSTRING -0.053 
  (0.304) 
-0.046 
(0.297) 
LNSTRING -0.289* 
(0.080) 
-0.370** 
(0.030) 
BEAT x DAbACC 0.000 
(0.999)   
0.171 
(0.477) 
BEAT x LPSTRING 0.049 
(0.334) 
0.042 
(0.353) 
BEAT x LNSTRING 0.059 
(0.731)   
0.283* 
(0.100) 
DAbACC x LPSTRING  0.016 
(0.801)   
0.070 
(0.192) 
DAbACC x LNSTRING -0.019 
(0.939) 
0.153 
(0.503) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LPSTRING -0.024 
(0.732) 
-0.070 
(0.242) 
BEAT x DAbACC x LNSTRING 0.082 
(0.765)    
-0.234 
(0.347) 
FEPS 0.076*** 
(0.000) 
0.114*** 
(0.000) 
FEBITDA 4.449** 
(0.025)   
9.476*** 
(0.000) 
FAOCF 1.009 
(0.511) 
2.269 
(0.211) 
FSALE 0.093 
(0.181) 
0.112  
(0.179) 
FVAREBITDA -0.008 
(0.371) 
-0.014 
(0.106) 
AGE 0.037 
(0.556) 
0.045 
(0.553)   
CR 3.521*** 
(0.000) 
2.183*** 
(0.000) 
DEBITDA -1.966 
(0.209)   
-6.764*** 
(0.000)   
AOCF 2.674** 
(0.011) 
2.442** 
(0.012) 
LEV -0.037*** 
(0.000)   
-0.033*** 
(0.000) 
RETSD -1.602 
(0.131) 
0.157 
(0.871) 
TIE 0.005** 
(0.017) 
0.007*** 
(0.010) 
MB 0.032* 
(0.059) 
0.032* 
(0.066) 
TA 0.034 
(0.649) 
0.061 
(0.489) 
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OLG 
CRt+1 CRt+2 
VAREBITDA 0.004 
(0.544) 
0.009 
(0.311) 
RD 0.655*** 
(0.000) 
0.802*** 
(0.000) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.684 0.546 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between credit ratings levels and meeting or beating prior year’s 
EBITDA conditional on high abnormal accruals. The samples is 3,435 firm-year observations covering 
the period of 1990 – 2011. The results are obtained from Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) according 
to the following equation: 
                              𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽6(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽15𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                           
The number of all observations and pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm for OLG. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4.11  
The Association between Changes in Credit Ratings and Meeting or Beating 
Prior Year’s EPS Conditional on High Abnormal Accruals 
 
 
 
OLG 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
BEATEPS 0.710*** 
(0.003) 
0.468* 
(0.055) 
DAbACC 0.124  
(0.635) 
-0.010 
(0.971) 
LPEPSSTRING 0.052 
(0.560) 
0.028 
(0.680) 
LNEPSSTRING -0.246** 
(0.044) 
-0.078 
(0.640) 
BEATEPS x DAbACC -0.276 
(0.385) 
-0.224 
(0.503) 
BEATEPS x LPEPSSTRING -0.092 
(0.316) 
-0.111 
(0.191) 
BEATEPS x LNEPSSTRING -0.040 
(0.776) 
0.075 
(0.710) 
DAbACC x LPEPSSTRING  -0.008 
(0.934) 
0.031 
(0.702) 
DAbACC x LNEPSSTRING -0.116 
(0.483) 
-0.061 
(0.797) 
BEATEPS x DAbACC x LPEPSSTRING 0.069 
(0.536) 
0.052 
(0.602) 
BEATEPS x DAbACC x LNEPSSTRING 0.252 
(0.224) 
-0.011 
(0.967) 
ChgFEPS 0.002 
(0.930) 
0.034** 
(0.034) 
ChgFEBITDA -0.093 
(0.670) 
0.228 
(0.170) 
ChgFAOCF 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.104 
(0.168) 
ChgFSALE 27.138*** 
(0.000) 
31.339*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA 0.000 
(0.983) 
-0.014** 
(0.045) 
AGE -0.139** 
  (0.045) 
-0.116* 
(0.099) 
ChgDEBITDA 4.354** 
(0.014) 
2.347 
(0.173) 
ChgAOCF 2.063** 
(0.026) 
  2.007** 
(0.017) 
ChgLEV -0.058*** 
(0.000) 
-0.039*** 
(0.001) 
ChgRETSD -3.951*** 
(0.000) 
-1.820* 
(0.080) 
ChgTIE 0.016** 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.686) 
ChgMB 0.036 
(0.124) 
-0.007 
(0.764) 
ChgTA -0.217 
(0.486) 
-0.325 
(0.266) 
ChgVAREBITDA -0.004 
(0.663) 
0.016** 
(0.023) 
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OLG 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
ChgRD -0.480 
(0.134) 
-0.594 
(0.148) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.062 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between changes in credit ratings and meeting or beating prior 
year’s EPS conditional on high abnormal accruals. The samples is 3,435 firm-year observations 
covering the period of 1990 – 2011. The results are obtained from Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) 
according to the following equation: 
                 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽6(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                           
The number of all observations and pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm for OLG. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4.12 
 The Association between Changes in Credit Ratings and Meeting or Beating 
Prior Year’s EBITDA Conditional on Low Conservatism 
 
 
 
OLG 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
BEAT 0.412* 
(0.089) 
0.053 
(0.834) 
DC_score 0.103   
(0.671) 
-0.565** 
(0.025)    
LPSTRING -0.053 
(0.247) 
-0.014 
(0.798) 
LNSTRING -0.386*** 
  (0.000) 
-0.348*** 
(0.002)   
BEAT x DC_score -0.006 
(0.986) 
0.400 
(0.199) 
BEAT x LPSTRING 0.078 
(0.220) 
-0.043 
(0.530) 
BEAT x LNSTRING 0.104 
(0.478) 
0.253* 
(0.099) 
DC_score x LPSTRING  0.009 
(0.882) 
0.032 
(0.591) 
DC_score x LNSTRING   -0.034 
(0.851) 
0.057   
(0.763) 
BEAT x DC_score x LPSTRING -0.070 
(0.393) 
-0.009 
(0.912) 
BEAT x DC_score x LNSTRING -0.095 
(0.680) 
-0.039 
  (0.873) 
ChgFEPS 0.002  
(0.900) 
0.032* 
(0.052) 
ChgFEBITDA -0.100 
(0.641) 
0.238 
(0.156)   
ChgFAOCF -0.007 
(0.905) 
0.098 
(0.176)    
ChgFSALE 27.202*** 
(0.000) 
31.921*** 
(0.000) 
FVAREBITDA   0.002 
(0.854) 
-0.015** 
(0.039)   
AGE -0.094 
(0.192) 
-0.057   
(0.445) 
ChgDEBITDA 4.803*** 
(0.010) 
2.459 
(0.150) 
ChgAOCF 2.039** 
(0.029) 
2.043** 
(0.013) 
ChgLEV -0.059*** 
(0.000) 
-0.041*** 
(0.001) 
ChgRETSD -4.057*** 
(0.000) 
-1.741* 
(0.091)   
ChgTIE 0.017*** 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.603) 
ChgMB 0.040* 
(0.095) 
-0.000 
(0.985) 
ChgTA -0.219 
(0.480) 
-0.312 
(0.285) 
ChgVAREBITDA -0.004 
(0.698)   
0.017** 
(0.018) 
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OLG 
ChgCRt+1 ChgCRt+2 
ChgRD -0.478 
(0.124) 
-0.624 
(0.143) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Clustered by Year NO NO 
Clustered by Firm YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.065 
Observ. 3,435 3,435 
Note: 
This table reports the association between changes in credit ratings and meeting or beating prior 
year’s EBITDA conditional on low conservatism. The samples is 3,435 firm-year observations 
covering the period of 1990 – 2011. The results are obtained from Ordered Logit Estimation (OLG) 
according to the following equation: 
                 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽6(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽8(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽15𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                
                                                            + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                           
The number of all observations and pseudo R2 are also reported. All regressions include year fixed 
effects, industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by firm for OLG. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of parameter estimates, at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Collectively, I extend the literature on meeting or beating earnings benchmarks in a 
number of ways. First, I provide rational explanations for valuation premiums to firms 
who report earnings strings. These explanations are based on future growth, future 
underlying risk, and firm fundamentals. Second, I offer evidence that earnings strings 
are economically genuine, rather than a product of earnings manipulation. It is clear 
that earnings strings are indicative of future firm performance. However, investors 
seem confused about combinations of earnings strings and abnormal accruals. 
Lastly, I highlight that observed credit rating premiums to firms who report current 
earnings increases are dependent on past firm performance as rating agencies’ 
assessment of firm performance involves a number of periods. I also reveal that 
firms suffer from successive rating downgrades if they repeatedly underperform. 
On balance, this study provides evidence that, I believe, is beneficial to investors in 
both equity and debt markets, auditors, and regulatory agencies. First, it reveals that 
valuation premiums to firms reporting earnings strings are based on rational 
behaviour. This should alleviate concern over “Irrational Exuberance” that suggests 
that firms are overvalued by stock markets. Second, long earnings strings are likely 
driven by economic fundamentals. It is expected to lead to more efficient regulations 
if auditors and regulators shift their attention to other firms who are likely to engage 
in earnings manipulation, rather than string firms. Finally, rating agencies evaluate 
long-term firm performance and have long memory for consistency in poor 
performance. This supports the view that rating practices are conservative by being 
slow to change and asymmetry in past good vs. bad performance of firms. 
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There are some limitations in this study. First, I cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that earnings strings are due to earnings management. This might be the 
case that earnings strings are a combination of true performance and earnings 
management. Second, some results rely on model estimations. For example, 
predicted variability of future earnings or abnormal accruals. However, the models 
chosen for estimations are commonly used in the accounting literature. Third, the 
implicit assumption in this study is that markets are rational. If it turns out that it is not 
the case, these results should be interpreted carefully.  
5.2 Future Work 
As Chapter 2, 3, and 4 are on the same theme of research, it is better to conduct 
future work on the foundation of the collective results of these chapters. First, I 
intend to investigate investment strategies that are based on the mis-pricing of 
combinations of earnings strings and accruals. This should be of interest to 
investment firms and hedge funds. Second, I aim to further examine the relation 
between abnormal credit ratings and earnings strings. It will answer the question 
whether and how rating conservatism is dependent on consecutively 
increasing/decreasing earnings. Third, it is interesting to explore debt contract design 
in the setting of string firms. It highlights the contracting roles of earnings strings. 
Finally, I intend to investigate the effects of price efficiency conditional on earnings 
strings on investment efficiency of firms. As the chapters focus primarily on the one-
way stream of information from companies to markets, I intend to explore the 
information from markets to companies. 
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